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Mega-projects are seen as a driving force for countries’ economies (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003; 
Kipp et al., 2008). However, the rate of project failure has never been greater and it has been 
argued that performance in mega-project management has not improved over the last 70 
years (Flyvbjerg, 2017). In this context, this case study research investigates the time and 
cost-related failure of the Haramain High-speed Railway (HHR) mega-project in Saudi Arabia.  
 
The research question asked in this thesis is to what extent agency theory (AT), which posits 
the possibility of agent opportunism and is the primary theory in the thesis, can explain the 
HHR project’s failure. AT is seen as an appropriate theoretical lens for studying the case as 
the HHR project contains a series of complex principal-agent relationships.  
 
This prime theory is supported in the task of explaining the HHR project failure by two further 
subsidiary contextual theories; national cultural theory (CT) and project management theory 
(PMT). It was felt that, given the location and nature of the HHR project, it would be interesting 
to seek to understand the role of AT in explaining the HHR project failure in relation to the 
greater-utilised (within the project management literature) CT and PMT and in exploring the 
existence of overlaps between the theories. 
 
The research adopts a case study approach consisting of qualitative data. 38 interviews were 
undertaken with project participants from different organisations involved with the HHR 
project. This was supplemented by site observations and official documents in order to 
triangulate the findings. 
 
In the event, AT was found to be an underlying explanation for the failures observed in the 
HHR mega-project. Multiple agency problems (APs) were identified as major cause of failure. 
However, there were also other causes which were related to CT and PMT. These causes 
(especially those CT-related) were less significant to the HHR project failure, although the 
research discovered that there was actually some interrelation between the AT, CT and PMT 
causes of failure.  
 
The study makes a contribution to the project/mega-project management literature by 
extending the limited AT-related research on mega-projects, by looking at a more extensive 
range of principal-agent relationships than previous studies, by undertaking the first AT-related 
research into Saudi mega-projects and by establishing that some of the more established 
causes of project failure described in the literature can actually be contributors to, or 
consequences of, agent opportunism. This latter contribution highlights how the research’s 
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1.1 Research background 
This thesis explores the causes of failure in a mega-project undertaken to create a new 
large-scale railway line and infrastructure within Saudi Arabia. It has been observed by 
Flyvbjerg (2017) that mega-projects – which he defines as projects that have a minimum 
cost of 1 billion US dollars; or projects with a noticeable cost that attracts public and 
media attention, as they have a large impact on the country’s budget, the community and 
the environment – are the preferred model for delivering large-scale developments by 
both the public and private sector. A classic example is the Channel Tunnel between 
France and the UK completed in 1986 (StrategicPPM, 2010). Among others currently 
being executed, is the new airport in the city of Jeddah in Saudi Arabia, the country that 
is the case location in this thesis, with more projects currently being considered by the 
Saudi government for the future (Albawaba, 2010).  
 
It has been contended, however, that most mega-projects go wrong – that is, fail to be 
delivered on full, on time and/or within budget (Robertson and Williams, 2006). More 
specifically, major infrastructure projects have historically had a poor performance record 
(Flyvbjerg et al., 2003). Yet despite the failures that occur with infrastructure mega-
projects, Flyvbjerg (2009) confirmed that ever more frequent and larger-scale 
infrastructure mega-projects are being initiated, planned and built. This fact underlines 




1.2 The need for this research 
There is a belief often expressed within the literature that the current techniques used 
within project management have matured over recent decades (Cooke-Davies and 
Arzymanow, 2003; Patanakul et al., 2010). However, the rate of project failure has never 
been greater and it has been claimed that performance in mega-project management 
has not improved over the last 70 years (Flyvbjerg, 2017). For example, Robertson and 
Williams (2006) have reported that more projects overrun in time than are completed 
within the original allocated time scales. These overruns commonly occur in a rate of 
40% to 200% (Robertson and Williams, 2006). To illustrate, a third of the World Bank 
projects accomplished their goals at no extra cost, but suffered from typical delays of 
50% in time (Robertson and Williams, 2006). In a telling development, Flyvbjerg (2014) 
tried to identify a sample of successful mega-projects that was large enough to permit 
quantitative analysis, but the attempt failed because he could only identify a small group 
of such projects that was, some way from permitting such analysis.  
 
Therefore, it is argued here that is imperative to conduct research into what causes a 
project, and especially a mega-project, to fail. As mentioned, Robertson and Williams 
(2006) considered any project to be a failure if it failed to be completed within its allocated 
time frame, if it exceeded the specified budget, and/or it failed to deliver the project scope 
and specification. From this, we can ascertain that there are three classes of failure, i.e. 
time, cost and specifications, although Hodgson and Cicmil (2006) and Söderlund (2013) 
also stress the importance of looking at the human element part of a project (for example, 
health and safety, ethics and morality) and other researchers, such as Shenhar et al. 
(2001), partially looked at the term ‘project failure’ from the perspective of long-term and 




There are many examples of mega-project failure that can be presented to demonstrate 
the scale of the problem under study. For example, the Wembley Stadium project, which 
aimed to replace the original 1923 stadium infrastructure. This project cost more than 
double the initial estimate and took five years longer than the expected project duration. 
Part of the failure was due to the prototyping of unproven techniques and processes 
(mainly in building the unprecedented arch model), which as a result required the 
replacement of the subcontractor in the middle of the project execution (StrategicPPM, 
2011). Another project failure can be found in the aforementioned Channel Tunnel 
project between England and France. The project was 80% over-budget and 20% 
overtime (at six years versus the planned five years). Similar to the failures of the 
Wembley project, the lack of precedent projects was seen as a cause of failure in this 
project, although other factors included insufficient experience to establish sound 
estimates, and poor communication between project actors (StrategicPPM, 2010). A 
third example of mega-project failure is the Gotthard Base Tunnel, the world's longest 
tunnel (total length of 57km), in the Swiss Alps, which suffered from a significant cost 
overrun (Scherer and Moss, 2010). 
 
1.3 Background of theories in previous project management researches 
While many technical factors behind project failure have been advanced (as seen 
above), there are also a number of theories that have been used to explain the above 
and other project failures in the current literature. One such theory has been agency 
theory (AT), which is to be used here as the primary theory for studying project failure. 
There are five key components to this.  
 
The first component is concerned with the presence of a principal-agent division, which 
was observed by Berle and Means (1932) to be a result of the separation of corporate 
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ownership and control, both of which were formerly the responsibilities of the owner. The 
second continues the narrative and states that on many occasions there is an asymmetry 
of information between the principal and the agent(s). Information asymmetry occurs 
through the communication of insufficient and incomplete information between principals 
and agents (Ceric, 2012).  
 
However, it is the third component, the possibility of opportunism, which brings the 
principal-agent division and information asymmetry to life. It occurs by the willingness of 
some agents to exploit the situation and make decisions to suit their agenda – that is, 
create an agency problem (AP) in the eyes of the principal. Authors such as Ahola et al. 
(2014) discussed the area of opportunism as a factor behind project failure. The fourth 
component is managing opportunism and that is where the thesis will discuss 
mechanisms in the literature proposed to overcome AP. AT has focused much here in 
terms of contract and incentives design. 
 
Thus, to summarise, the AP is defined as the exploitation by the agent of the principal’s 
loss of control and the agent’s consequent information advantage in order that the project 
is delivered in line with the agent’s interests rather that the principal’s. To this problem, 
AT suggests potential solutions for principals. 
 
A final component is multiple principal-agent problem – project environments usually 
involve more than one principal-agent relationship. The researcher is looking at a high-
speed railway project of a total length of 470km between two holy cities in Saudi Arabia 
(Makkah and Madinah City). The project involves a large number of stakeholders. Due 
to the size of the project and the magnitude of the work that needs to be executed, the 
project stakeholder structure includes a multiple agency-principal element. Therefore, 
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this case will provide the potential to expand the current knowledge in relation to AT by 
involving more principals and agents in the study. 
 
Arguably, AT provides the underpinning for another key theory within the project 
management literature – optimism bias, which seeks to explain frequent differences 
between expectations or estimations and the actual outcome (Sharot, 2011). In the 
context of project management, the concept of optimism bias could be seen in estimating 
the project activity, time and cost unrealistically. Optimism bias could also concern the 
value of the project outcome. For example, the Channel Tunnel project’s planners were 
reported to have been optimistic in their predictions of the earning potential of the project 
services.  
 
While it is said that optimism bias can result from naivety, it is also argued to result from 
opportunism, often agent opportunism (Sharot, 2011). In such cases, optimistic dates, 
times and specifications are set in order to achieve project initiation – the implication 
being that a realistic set of predictions would risk the project failing to achieve approval. 
This behaviour is also known as ‘rent seeking behaviour’. Rent seeking behaviour in this 
context could concern the contractors’ behaviour at the stage of project approval (or 
otherwise) by the client. Rent-seeking contractors tend to provide overly optimistic cost 
forecasts to their clients, whereas they should be producing expert technical forecasts. 
Authors such as Wachs (1990) stated that contractors and promoters often take that 
route of underestimation and misleading information for the purpose of approving non-




1.3.1 Why agency theory? 
Having outlined the main components of AT, we now discuss why it is being used in this 
thesis. The main rationale relates to a match between the characteristics of the case and 
AT as a theory. This research project is examining a mega-project in Saudi Arabia, a 
case project that, as will be seen, contains multiple principal-agent relationships. 
Flyvbjerg (2014) described mega-projects as a magnified version of other types of 
smaller projects as they are associated with greater complexity and larger numbers of 
stakeholders (Flyvbjerg, 2014). These characteristics of mega-projects, arguably, create 
a high probability of AP occurrence and, therefore, make AT an obvious theoretical lens.  
 
This theoretical rationale is then supported by the existence of a strand of the project 
management literature that has utilised AT in exploring project failure (i.e. others in the 
project management literature have identified the suitability of AT for the study of 
complex projects), although, as will be explained, this literature is, as yet, thin and not 
greatly focused upon mega-projects. In other words, the potential for AT to explain 
project failure has been demonstrated, but not yet been fully exploited. 
 
Accordingly, on the one hand, the literature shows that principal-agent problems are a 
potential explanation for failure in a number of business sectors where projects have 
taken place. Researchers, such as Clipsham et al. (2011) and Teo and Koh (2010), have 
used AT to look into failures of information system projects, where multiple agencies 
were involved. Wilhelm et al. (2016) is concerned with the issue of first tier suppliers who 
work as a bridge (double agent) between principals and other upstream suppliers who 
are expected to deliver the principal’s needs. These examples show that AT has been 
utilised in two different areas of project management: information systems (IT) and the 
project supply chain. Bardsley (2001) applied the agency model into a third area - 
educational research projects. Closer to this study, within the area of construction 
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projects, Ceric (2012; 2014) conducted two similar research studies using AT, which 
involved multiple principal-agent relationship. Ceric (2014) argued that her research was 
the first to look into AT problems that exist between project client, the contractor and their 
project managers in construction projects. Therefore, looking into all previous literature, 
AT is a developing theoretical lens within the study of construction mega-projects. 
 
On the other hand, as Ceric’s claim suggests, the literature applying AT to project 
management is quite limited, which suggests that there are gaps to fill. From the 
literature, a number of observations can be noted. Firstly, the current presence of AT in 
the literature, especially in the area of construction mega-projects failure, is relatively 
weak. Therefore, there is a high potential for theoretical development in a construction 
mega-project management context – that is, to look into the problems of agent’s 
opportunism, which can, if present, both lead the client to approve non-viable projects 
and cause projects to fail (Flyvbjerg, 2014).  
 
Secondly, Ceric (2014) confirmed that there is no existing research that addresses more 
than the four project participants (project client, client’s project manager, contractor and 
contractor’s project manager) which were included in her research. This confirms the 
lack of literature concerning the full extent of the multiple principal-agent issue. Ceric 
(2014) in fact suggested that further research might look into a more complex set of 
relationships in projects, including subcontractors, consultants and others.  
 
Thirdly, an extensive literature review revealed that there was not any existing previous 





Therefore, AT is considered as the primary theory for this research for the following 
reasons: 
 The potentially profound effect of AP in causing mega-project failure. The 
researcher is interested in understanding just how much of the project failure in 
this railway project was the consequence of such problems. 
 The need for the project management literature to use AT more extensively in the 
area of construction to understand better the complex relationships between 
mega-project stakeholders, each possessing as they do a different interest and 
agenda. 
 
What also justifies the use of AT in this thesis is the existing gap in the literature of using 
AT in the analysis of mega-projects in Saudi Arabia. This thesis provides an entirely new 
context for such a study, which will make a contribution to the literature on construction 
management in Saudi Arabia, where major projects are currently being undertaken, and 
provide a new context for the study of AP in project management. It will be interesting to 
assess the extent to which AT applies in such a context. 
 
1.3.2 Adding subsidiary theories 
Therefore, the prime theory for analysis of mega-project failure in this thesis is AT. 
However, as the case is a mega-project and is situated in Saudi Arabia, it was felt useful 
to proceed in the thesis with two further subsidiary contextual theories – cultural theory 
(CT), specifically the (contested) theory related to national cultural differences, and 
project management theory (PMT), specifically temporality, team, task and transition 




In few instances, national CT has been utilised in project management research 
(Hofstede, 1983; Shore and Cross, 2005; Rees-Caldwell and Pinnington, 2013). In some 
of this research, CT when applied to project management has explored the significance 
and consequences of projects or mega-projects often being characterised by diversity in 
the project team’s cultural background. It is argued in such research that different actors 
from different backgrounds may understand the required input and the expected 
outcome of projects in completely different ways which can then lead to sub-optimal 
actions and outcomes (Hofstede, 1983; Shore and Cross, 2005; Sanderson, 2012; Rees-
Caldwell and Pinnington, 2013).  
 
However, the use of CT in this thesis is different, because of the different make-up of the 
organisations and personnel involved with this railway project. In this project the make-
up of the project team is actually largely homogenous – largely made up of Saudi 
organisations and management personnel. As such, the thesis assesses whether certain 
common cultural tendencies within Saudi Arabia provide an alternative explanation for 
the mega-project failure seen in the case study. It is suggested by Kardes et al. (2013) 
that project performance is a major area affected by cultural differences. For example, 
the culture of Saudi Arabia blames luck and fate in cases of project delay or failure. 
Additionally, time appreciation in the Saudi culture is not as serious as in other cultures 
(Hurn, 2007). Including this subsidiary theory is believed to both enhance the theoretical 
interest of the study but also, just as importantly to the researcher, further his practical 
wish to understand the causes of the HHR mega-project failure. 
 
It is also necessary to possess, as a further subsidiary theory, the core features of a 
project environment that differentiate temporary multi organisations (TMOs) from 
permanent organisations (POs), and provide the context to the case and the study’s 
interest in multiple principal-agent problems – temporality, team, task and transition 
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(Lundin and Söderholm, 1995). Time is the main distinguishing feature between tasks 
carried out by TMOs and POs. It refers to the limited duration available for project 
execution and its impact on the project performance (Turner and Müller, 2003; Lindkvist, 
2005). Task is the second feature of a project that differentiates it from other forms of 
businesses which is characterised by its level of complexity (Hanisch and Wald, 2011) 
and uniqueness (Lundin and Söderholm, 1995). The third project feature, team, is 
concerned with issues such as team diversity, team size, effective team orientation and 
an experienced project manager. Finally, the concept of transition refers to two distinct 
meanings. Firstly, the practical transformation within the organisation to execute the 
actual work and secondly, the desirable perceptions of change within the project during 
the project execution (Lundin and Söderholm, 1995). These four project features can 
create issues and challenges for the project team members during the project execution 
process, which will be utilised to support the understanding of the HHR mega-project 
failure.  
 
1.4 Research Question and objectives 
In the context of the above, the prime research question is as follows: 
 
RQ. To what extent can agency theory be utilised in the analysis and 
explanation of the mega-project failure of the Haramain High-Speed 
Railway (HHR) project within Saudi Arabia? 
 
Against the background of the RQ, the research objectives can be stated as follows:  
 
1. To identify the specific APs (if any) that occurred within the HHR mega-project.  
2. To investigate the extent to which these APs explain the HHR project failure.  
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3. To evaluate the influence of Saudi culture and the project management context 
on the HHR project failure. 
4. To explore potential linkages between APs, cultural factors and the project 
management context. 
5. To develop a new framework that illustrates factors of mega-project failure, and 
any potential linkages between the three factors (APs, cultural factors and 
project management factors).  
 
In the exploration of this research question a qualitative case study approach will be 
adopted, with the unit of analysis in the research being the transactional relationship 
between major project actors (clients, contractors and consultants). A total of seven main 
principal-agent relationships have been identified within the case project, as explained 
later in the thesis. 
 
1.5 Contribution to the literature 
It has been observed by the researcher that only a limited literature exists in the context 
of this research. This research is looking to fill the existing gaps in the current literature 
around AT – in the area of mega-project infrastructure and construction. Following the 
achievement of the research objectives, the outcome of this research aims to deliver 
three manifestations that ought to be perceived as areas of contribution to the current 
knowledge and literature on the application of AT to project management, particularly 
mega-project management. These manifestations are as follows: 
 
1) Expand the limited existing research applying AT to mega-projects. This is 
particularly limited in relation to construction infrastructure projects. 
2) Do first work on AT on the basis of multiple principal-agent problems in 
construction mega-projects. The multiple relationships start from the project client 
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and his project manager, project contractor and his project manager, as well as 
more complex relationships which include the project consultant. According to 
Ceric (2014), the context of this research may be considered as unprecedented 
work. 
3) First research on mega-project failure in Saudi Arabia. This thesis will provide a 
case that assesses the extent to which project failure was caused by AP and / or 
Saudi national culture and project management features. 
 
1.6 Organisation of the thesis 
This thesis is composed of eleven chapters, the outlines of which follow:  
 
Chapter 1 has presented the introduction of this thesis. Introducing the need for this 
research into mega-project failure and the role of AT in pursuing it. This was followed by 
the research question, the research objectives and the expected contribution to the 
current literature of the research. 
 
A classical opening structure is presented by the literature review, which is put forward 
in three chapters (see Figure 1 below). Starting with chapter 2, it presents the first area 
of the literature by reviewing the critical perspective of projects to achieve understanding 
of the four concepts (temporality, task, team and transition), which differentiate project 
organisation from any other business organization. The chapter then reviews the 
distinguishing features of mega projects. Chapter 3 covers the primary theory of this 













Figure 1: Conceptual model. 
 
Chapter 5 is the research methodology chapter, which sets the logic behind the research 
strategy, research design and research methods employed. This chapter includes a 
section that will consider the practical element during the data collection trips, stating the 
difficulties faced by the researcher and how they have been resolved.  
 
The next chapter (Chapter 6) is a descriptive section to provide an overview of the HHR 
mega-project. The chapter includes a detailed overview and evidence of the failure of 
the HHR project used in this research as a case study, which will help the reader to 
understand the complex structure of this project. 
 
The next three chapters (Chapters 7, 8 and 9) present and analyse the findings from the 
collected data for this research. Chapter 7 identifies specific APs that have occurred 
within the case of the HHR project. This will be followed by Chapter 8, which presents 
the cultural causes of failure identified from this case. Finally, Chapter 9 shows other 
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causes of failure related to the four project management concepts (temporality, task, 
team and transition).  
 
Chapter 10 is the discussion chapter that follows the data presentation and analysis 
given in the previous three chapters. This chapter starts with a brief summary of the three 
areas of the literature review. It will then be followed by a discussion of the findings in 
each of the three literature areas, and the importance of these causes of failure. After 
that, the researcher aims to provide a discussion of the linkages between causes of 
delays from the three different areas discussed in Chapters 7, 8 and 9.  
 
Finally, the conclusion chapter is the eleventh and last chapter of this thesis. It draws a 
comprehensive summary of this research. Starting by presenting the need for this 
research and the gap in the current literature that necessitated further research, the 
chapter then will demonstrate how the research question and objectives were addressed. 
The contribution to the existing knowledge around the area of AT will be summarised. It 
will then discuss the limitations of this research and offer the researcher’s reflections. 





















PREFACE TO THE LITERATURE REVIEW 
  
From the outset of this PhD research project, the main interest of the researcher was to 
look into project failures. The common problem of project failure is a fundamental issue 
within this business discipline, which appears to act as an obstacle for economic growth 
(Flyvbjerg et al., 2006). This gives rise to the importance of conducting research that will 
investigate the issue of project failure.  
 
In this section of the thesis, the author looks at three areas within the current project 
management literature. To start with, the first area (in chapter 2) is the specific project 
management literature that looks at the concept of projects and the project organisation. 
The two questions – ‘what is a project?’ and ‘why does a project exist?’ – are common 
questions that have been answered again and again by many scholars (Engwall, 1995; 
Morris, 1997). This will be followed by another important aspect of projects – project 
failure.  
 
Furthermore, as much as it is important to understand projects in practical terms, it is 
even more important to understand the theoretical terms of projects (Söderlund, 2004). 
As a result, this chapter is also going to deliver this understanding by reviewing the most 
prominent project organisational theories.  
 
Those theories that are located within the specific project management literature have 
named the organisational form that is used in executing projects as the temporary 
organisation (TO). The TO is created by a PO (Lundin and Söderholm, 1995). Chapter 
2 will discuss the four concepts which it is argued by this literature distinguish the TO 
from its PO, and explore their stated relationship to project failure. It will deliver an 
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understanding of projects and project organisations from a TO perspective, and how they 
are differentiated from POs (Lundin and Söderholm, 1995). Having looked at these 
aspects of the project management literature, the chapter concludes by looking at a 
further strand of the project management literature dedicated to exploring the concept of 
mega-project, in particular, how such projects present even greater challenges. 
 
However, there are wider literatures that have been applied to project management and 
these are also explored. As mentioned, due to project complexity, a PO forms a TO – 
made up of a number of organisations or individuals (team members) – to execute a 
project. Each team member is a specialist in his or her field. The involvement of this large 
number of project parties (i.e. client, consultant, contractor, sub-contractor, project 
designer) in a project – bearing in mind that each party is looking at the project from a 
different organisational angle – increases the potential of ending up with different 
conceptual understandings of the project and different vested interests, which can lead 
to APs.  
 
Hence, the researcher has, as discussed and justified in the introductory chapter, 
selected AT to act as the primary theory of this research. Therefore, this will be the 
second area this section of the thesis is investigating. It will (in chapter 3) analyse the 
process of the AP occurrence, as well as different mechanisms suggested by authors, 
such as Crosby et al. (1990), Bhattacharya et al. (1998) and Coulter and Coulter (2002), 
in order to minimise the possibility of this problem.  
 
The third area of this literature section (in chapter 4) will look at projects from a national 
cultural perspective – like AT, this theoretical lens has also been applied to project 
management. It will look at the potential significance of the fact that the HHR project took 
place in Saudi Arabia. Many researchers, such as Assaf et al. (1995), Odeh and 
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Battaineh (2002), and Al-Kharashi and Skitmore (2009), have looked at project failure in 
Saudi Arabia using different methodological approaches. This chapter will use national 
CT, in particular that of Hofstede (1984), to set up the researcher to assess whether 
certain common cultural tendencies within Saudi Arabia provide an alternative 
explanation for the mega-project failure seen in the HHR case.  
 
Thus, the literature review section of this thesis is formed of three major areas of 
discussion as follows:  
 
1. Critical perspective of projects 
2. AT 

















PROJECTS AND MEGA-PROJECTS 
 
 
2.1 Introduction to the chapter 
Having stated the research question and outlined the literature that will be reviewed in 
order to set up the research question, we now start the literature discussion by looking 
at the specific project management literature that examines projects and mega-projects. 
 
2.2 History and definition of projects 
Project management originated as an organisational social practice form during the 
development of infrastructure and technology projects following World War II (Hodgson 
and Cicmil, 2006). It went through a practical development stage within a number of 
major projects, such as the Manhattan project in the 1940s (Engwall, 1995; Morris, 1997) 
and Polaris – US Navy project in the late 1950s (Marine Corps Gazette, 1966). During 
the 1960s and 1970s, there was much criticism about the managerial approach in 
practice; from there, the theoretical foundations of project management started to 
expand, mainly within the area of organisational management research, and around 
theories of project organisational structure (Packendorff, 1995). Moreover, throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s, project management operational research evolved further.  
 
This went hand in hand with the development of computer technology, which led to the 
creation of software systems that assisted in delivering project planning, project control, 
risk assessment and analysis. With the utilisation of such technology, the communication 
network also increased (Hodgson and Cicmil, 2006). The aim of involving computer 
technology within the project management field – mainly by clients and agencies – was 
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to pursue robust managerial models that would minimise the issue of time and cost 
overruns, and to deliver projects without questioning the quality.  
 
Accordingly, a number of project management control methodologies (e.g. the Prince 2 
program) were very influential, which led to other schemes related to risk management 
being further developed (Hodgson and Cicmil, 2006). This coincided with the acceptance 
of promoting work in a project form. Clarke (1999) confirmed the effectiveness of project 
management tools, when utilised properly, to provide organisations with a useful 
management process, which allowed them to deal with any changes throughout a 
project.  
 
As equally important – and as projects are considered to be socially constructed 
environments (Biesenthal et al., 2015) – it has been argued by Söderlund (2013), that 
there is a need to address two sides of project management. Firstly, the hard side, which 
is concerned with the administrative tasks, particularly the use of tools and techniques 
within project management as a hard system. Secondly, the soft side, which is mainly 
associated with handling the human factors within the project, including the soft skills 
that enable cooperation between people, groups and the project team.  
 
Therefore, while issues such as project time and cost overruns consume a major 
proportion of today’s research, scholars such as Hodgson and Cicmil (2006) and 
Söderlund (2013) emphasised the importance of considering other factors within the 
concept of project success, looking beyond the hard side of project management 
(budget, time and quality), to the soft side that include other areas of human factors within 




The project management literature, therefore, is gradually developing and maturing. It is 
utilised in this chapter to explore some of the key aspects of the project environment. 
 
2.2.1 What is a project? 
It is essential to understand what a project is and what it is not, in order to move on and 
investigate how a project, therefore, could be managed. Interestingly, projects and 
project management have been addressed by scholars, from both within and outside the 
project management field, as self-evident, natural and indispensable (Engwall, 1995; 
Morris, 1997). This prompted some to call for a pause in order to ask the questions: what 
do we mean by a project; what is the actual definition of project management?  
 
To answer this question, two perspectives were adopted by different scholars to define 
a project. On the one hand, an orthodox view of a project was provided by Kerzner 
(1998), who defined a project as:  
“A specific objective to be completed within certain specifications, with defined 
start and end dates, funding limits (if applicable) and which consumes resources 
(i.e. money, people, equipment).” (Kerzner, 1998, p. 2). 
 
On the other hand, however, the reality of a project delivery highlighted that a project is 
not a simple operation that is often repeated (Linehan and Kavanagh, 2006). Instead, it 
involves organisational and social practices that characterise every project to be a unique 
endeavour (Söderlund, 2013), which led researchers to conceptualise projects 
differently. For example, Linehan and Kavanagh (2006) defined projects as: 
“…an emergent outcome of disparate, ambiguous, political practices.” (Linehan 
and Kavanagh, 2006, p. 55). 
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Söderlund (2013) meanwhile looked at defining the term project as: 
“A particular kind of task, a temporary endeavour, and project management is the 
solution to solving that task. The project could then be broken into a series of 
activities, work packages, subprojects, and milestones. Project management as 
such is very much oriented towards these activities, including conceptual design, 
feasibility study, detailed design, detailed planning, etc.” (Söderlund, 2013, p. 
124). 
 
Moreover, the Association for Project Management (APM, 2016) defined a project as: 
“A unique, transient endeavour, undertaken to achieve planned objectives, which 
could be defined in terms of outputs, outcomes or benefits. A project is usually 
deemed to be a success if it achieves the objectives according to their 
acceptance criteria, within an agreed timescale and budget.” (APM, 2016, p. 1). 
 
The previous definitions of the term ‘project’ include a number of characteristics. Within 
the context of this thesis, these characteristics were utilised to provide a definition for the 
concept of ‘project’ as follows: 
 Unique endeavour executed to achieve a specific project goal (new product, new 
system, new plant, etc.).  
 It starts at specific point in time and has a pre-determined deadline.  
 It has a project life cycle that is associated with project phases, from the starting 
point to the termination of the project. In each of those project phases, new 
products or results are created. 
 It involves “Single point of integrative responsibility”. (Archibald, 1987, p. 15).  
 It includes the application of project management tools and techniques.  
24 
 
Furthermore, Larson and Gray (2014) described projects to have two dimensions within 
the execution process (see Figure 3 below). These are the technical and the sociocultural 
dimensions. The first dimension is concerned with the technical side of the project 
management process. This involves all the formal and structural content related to this 
discipline, which includes project planning, scheduling and project control. One important 
element of the project control is the clarity of the project scope and, as a result, clear 
project deliverables and work breakdown structure (WBS) can be determined. 
Furthermore, this is followed by the creation of work packages and tasks. Each task has 
an estimated time and cost and can be monitored throughout the execution stage 
(Larson and Gray, 2014).  
 
 
Figure 3: The socio-technical dimensions of the project management process 
(Larson and Gray, 2014).  
 
In contrast, the second dimension is the sociocultural part of project management. 
According to Larson and Gray (2014), this dimension:  
25 
 
“Involves the much messier, often contradictory and paradoxical world of 
implementation. It centres on creating a temporary social system within a larger 
organizational environment that combines the talents of a divergent set of 
professionals working to complete the project.” (Larson and Gray, 2014, p. 17). 
 
Therefore, project managers have to apply their leadership to form a project culture that 
enables the project team to use their self-motivation to work as an effective team that 
can identify and resolve problems, deal with project changes and redirect the project 
back on track. This dimension also includes facilitating the interface between the external 
environment and the project. Project managers must consider the customer 
expectations, negotiate the requirements of the top management and manage and 
monitor other stakeholders, such as subcontractors (Larson and Gray, 2014).  
 
Other authors, however, identify another approach to describe projects, Hodgson and 
Cicmil (2006) argued that the way to think about a project is as a form of a language – 
clearly because of the existence of communication barriers between different 
departments within a single organisation. In thinking about a project to be a form of a 
language, the vocabulary of project management would be a bar chart, WBS, critical 
path analysis, balanced matrix, project life cycle and so on. The application of all these 
project management techniques is practicing project management language in the real 
world. Hodgson and Cicmil (2006) emphasised the importance of this approach and 
argued that it needs to be learned and practiced across project management 
organisations, just like the language of accounting, quality and marketing and so on.  
 
Hodgson and Cicmil (2006), however, highlighted a potential area of confusion that can 
be caused by applying this language approach within project management field, purely 
because of “language’s undecidability and inherent ambiguity” (Hodgson and Cicmil, 
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2006, p. 56). For these researchers, difficulty within language communication stems from 
in and around the language itself. This, in turn, is because the meaning of communication 
appears to be understood and assigned in a social context (Delisle and Olson, 2004). It 
is said that “individuals create their own meanings and only through [social] agreements 
do parallel personal meanings develop” (Glanville and Ranulph, 1997, p. 3). Thus, this 
language approach gives rise to opportunities for misinterpretation between different 
stakeholders or actors within the project. This misinterpretation arguably can lead to AT 
problem, which can be a partial cause of project failure. Therefore, in this thesis, project 
management was considered as a form of a language (Hodgson and Cicmil, 2006). 
 
2.2.2 Project success and failure 
Having examined definitions of projects, we can advance to assess the notions of project 
success and failure.  
 
2.2.2.1 Limitations of the project management knowledge base 
As mentioned, there are growing incidents of project failure (Delisle and Olson, 2004). 
This is at a time when there is a clear lack of consensus among academics and 
practitioners as to whether existing project management knowledge, tools and 
techniques can reduce project failures or enhance project success. On the one hand, 
the Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK) guide is seen by many 
academics and practitioners to be generally accepted (PMI Standard Committee, 2000; 
Delisle and Olson, 2004), and there is an existing belief that the current project 
management tools and techniques have matured (Cooke-Davies and Arzymanow, 
2003). On the other hand, other practitioners and researchers have suggested that the 
development of better project management tools and techniques would result in 




However, those that doubt the maturity of the project management ‘toolkit’ also advise 
us that not all projects are the same and that different projects are characterised with 
different contexts (Pinto and Covin, 1989). Moreover, it is argued that responding to this 
variation is not easy. Even if we argue that project characteristics and contexts need to 
be identified to better apply project management tools and techniques (Shenhar, 1998), 
an obstacle here is still that the early stages of projects are characterised with high levels 
of ambiguity, lack of clarity and accuracy with regards to the future process of the project 
(Kreiner, 1995).  
 
Given that there are doubts over the project management toolkit, that project type and 
context vary and that responding to that variety is a challenge, it is perhaps not surprising 
that some argued that project performance has not improved over the last 70 years 
(Flyvbjerg, 2014). In fact, is it normal that projects commonly fail?  
 
The answer is that there is always something to blame project failure on. However, does 
the blame solely lie with the literature? Scholars and researchers, such as Hodgson and 
Cicmil (2006), have defended project management tools and techniques by pointing the 
blame for failure towards a number of issues, as follows. Firstly, a “lack of adherence to 
project management tools and techniques” (p. 94). Secondly, poor implementation and 
application of these tools and techniques. Thirdly, a lack of project management 
competencies within organisations which can adequately utilise project management 
tools and techniques to avoid project failure.  
 
There is, therefore, an apparent division between accepting the possibility of project 
failure as inevitable on the one hand, and on the other hand blaming the failure on the 
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ineffectiveness of project management tools and techniques application. This increases 
the importance of understanding what we mean by project success/failure.  
 
2.2.2.2 Defining project success and failure 
The notion of project success is an important area of project management that has been 
broadly researched in the literature (Albert et al., 2017). In projects, there are always 
difficulties in defining the term ‘project success’ or ‘project failure’. This is due to the 
involvement of a large number of stakeholders in each project, and their benefits from 
that project which are multi-faceted in their nature (Shenhar et al., 2001). Jugdev and 
Müller (2005) stated that: 
“Trying to pin down what success means in the project context is akin to gaining 
consensus from a group of people on the definition of ‘good art’” (p. 19).  
 
Indeed, it needs to be remembered that different people perceive success or failure 
differently. For example, Shenhar et al. (2001) stated that: 
“An architect may consider success in terms of aesthetic appearance, an 
engineer in terms of technical competence, an accountant in terms of dollars 
spent under budget, a human resources manager in terms of employee 
satisfaction.” (p. 702) 
 
That being the case, it becomes apparent that each stakeholder (internal or external) 
within a project has different assessment and success criteria towards the project. Mainly 
because each stakeholder has different motives behind the project execution (Aaltonen, 
2011; de Bakker et al., 2011; Mir and Pinnington, 2014). Therefore, project success has 
to be viewed from various perspectives related to the project client, contractor, 
developer, general public, end user, etc (Lim and Mohamed, 1999). This approach 
provides a more accurate assessment of project success that is measured based upon 
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the relevant project success criteria (for example; time, cost, quality, performance, safety 
and so on) to each stakeholder (Lim and Mohamed, 1999). 
 
Within the notion of success criteria, however, Pinto and Slevin (2006) and Baccarini 
(1999) distinguished between two types of criteria. The first type is hard criteria that can 
be used for the assessment of project success (time, cost and performance). The second 
type is soft criteria – related to the human factor. Hussein (2013) and Pinto and Slevin 
(2006) perceived the second type to be subjective and hard to evaluate. Scholars, such 
as Pinto and Mantel (1990), Freeman and Beale (1992) and Shenhar et al. (2001), 
however, supplied the literature with specific frameworks to assess project success and 
failure.  
 
Barnes’ Iron Triangle dimension of success/failure 
The basis of almost all framework types, however, is Barnes’ Iron Triangle (Chan and 
Chan, 2004; Cao and Hoffman, 2011; Chang et al., 2013). In the 1970s, Barnes’ Iron 
Triangle (see Figure 4 below) aimed to illustrate the dependencies between three 








Barnes, in his Iron Triangle, emphasises the relationship between the three dimensions 
during the project execution stage. For example, if the project execution exceeded the 
planned duration of the project schedule, this would usually also increase the project 
costs due to a number of reasons. For example, inflation with respect to material and 
human resources costs; additional overhead costs, including salary, accommodation, 
administration, etc. for the project team; interest payments for loans and overdraft while 
financing the project for a longer period; and penalties for the project late delivery (Lock, 
2013). In other words, any failure on delivering the project on time would result with 
failure on delivering the project within budget. Moreover, failure to allocate a realistic time 
and budget for the project delivery would result in failure to deliver the agreed project 
specification and quality. Overall, Robertson and Williams (2006) considered any project 
completed outside the time frame, which exceeded the specific budget and/or did not 
deliver the project scope and organisational specification, to be a failure.  
 
However, some argue that this is too simplistic and point to a more complex argument 
that could be made. According to this argument, failure to deliver a project on time, within 
the allocated budget and specifications should not be conceived as failure at all. Instead, 
the actual project cost and time are the time they took (at the project completion stage), 
suggesting that the initial time and budget were underestimated. So, they are only a 
failure when compared against an unrealistic project time and budget. 
 
In such cases, Prater et al. (2017) emphasised that: 
“One significant cause of this under-estimation has been shown by research to 





Flyvbjerg (2006) described optimism bias as a psychological and political explanation for 
this kind of human underestimation, which he defined as:  
“A cognitive predisposition found with most people to judge future events in a 
more position light than is warranted by actual experience” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 
6). 
 
Researchers, such as Prater et al. (2017) and Varki (2009), have found that the human 
nature is characterised with optimism. This highlights the importance of researches in 
the soft side of project management.  
 
Reflecting on the previous argument around the soft side of project management, 
including optimism bias, it is perceived as an immature field within the current research. 
Many of the classical contributions to project management research are not substantial 
as to what is actually happening in projects in practical terms (Winter et al., 2006). 
Therefore, an important area to consider in project management research, as suggested 
by Söderlund (2004), is the process of project organisations, in which it will be necessary 
to go beyond the orthodox of project managements models: PMBOK (guide), Gantt chart, 
project plan, program evaluation and review technique, and WBS (Maylor, 2001). In other 
words, this suggestion requires looking at people’s behaviour (soft side) within projects, 
before trying to understand the hard side of projects (Geertz, 1973). The following 
example demonstrates the importance of understanding the soft side of project 
management, as it has high influence on the project outcome.  
 
A project client conducts a feasibility study through a project consultant, to test project 
viability before project initiation. According to the rationalistic assumption of PMT, the 
project consultant produces a feasibility study document, which leads to the initiation of 
the project. Wachs (1990), however, stated that agents (the project consultant in this 
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case) might produce optimistic estimations in order to drive projects to the initiation stage 
for their own organisational interest and to win a project contract. This optimism bias by 
the agent (consultant) can be perceived as a rational behaviour for the favour of the 
consultant’s organisation. In contrast, this behaviour can also be perceived as an 
irrational behavioural by the client organisation, as it will allow approving a non-viable 
project. Thus, understanding such behaviour by project agents is essential to have a 
deeper understanding of project failure, in particular whether a ‘failure’ really is a failure. 
Therefore, research of project management should look further into such issues and 
address this assumption of rational irrationality within agents’ behaviours in projects, 
which can reduce the project team effectiveness.  
 
Other dimensions of success/failure 
Despite the fact that Barnes’ Iron Triangle was considered as the basis of most 
frameworks, others were introduced into the literature. For example, Pinto and Mantel 
(1990) used three dimensions to measure project success. These dimensions are the 
client’s satisfaction, the project value and the execution process. Freeman and Beale 
(1992) introduced seven dimensions to be used in measuring project success: execution 
efficiency, technical performance, organisational and managerial implications, personal 
growth, business performance and manufacturers’ ability.  
 
Other researchers, such as Shenhar et al. (2000), however, differentiated between two 
types of projects – operationally and strategically managed projects. The first are more 
concerned with the project delivery; while using the project budget, time and performance 
as project success indicators. Whereas, the second type extends further to strategically 
achieving business related goals and improving business performance after the project 
completion. Shenhar et al. (2001) found their framework of project success to be 




Figure 5: Time frame of success dimensions (Shenhar et al., 2001, p. 716).  
 
Project efficiency (the first dimension) expresses the efficiency of the project 
management process and tells whether the project was delivered on time, within the 
allocated budget and executed within its resources constraints. This dimension provides 
an immediate chance to assess the project – even during the execution stage. The 
project success within this dimension, however, may not necessarily be conceived as 
success in the longer term after the project completion. Impact on the customer is the 
second dimension, which addresses the customers’ requirements and needs from the 
project (functional, technical and so on). Using this dimension, a project can be viewed 
as successful even if it failed from an operational point of view (the first dimension). The 
third dimension is business success and is related to the influence the project outcome 
may have on the business on the long run. Preparing for the future is the fourth 
dimension; it addresses the impact of the project outcome in preparing the organisational 





Project success and failure in this thesis 
However, it is Shenhar et al.’s (2001) first dimension – project efficiency – that presents 
a favourable framework in order to address the research question while using AT. This 
is because AT primarily analyses the problems between the client and his agents, 
starting from the project initiation stage and continuing throughout the project execution 
stage. Thus, using this theory in the analysis and explanation of project failure within the 
scope of this research is confined to the operational perspective. 
 
Furthermore, having considered the literature on both performance perspectives and 
project types, it has been decided that this operational project will be considered from 
the perspective of the client, due to the following reasons: firstly, it is the client’s first 
project of its kind; secondly, the project is built using public money and this increases the 
significance of finding out whether this project is a success or a failure; and thirdly, the 
client’s decision to initiate this project is of great importance and interest because of its 
value in serving the Islamic community (SRO-4, 2014). Furthermore, it has been decided 
that in accordance with a client-focused perspective, the assessment of the project 
performance will focus on Barnes’ three aspects of the ‘Iron Triangle’ (time, cost and 
quality), which also addresses the operational perspective. Thus, project failure – in this 
research – is defined as follows: 
“If it fails to meet its targeted cost, time, or scope” (Robertson and Williams, 
2006).  
 
2.3 The project perspective  
Shenhar et al. (2001) stated that the “operational mindset is clearly reflected in the 
project management literature” (p. 702). However, there are further efforts within the 
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The process of re-forming tasks as projects can occur in various ways, by the formation 
of task forces, action groups or program committees, which are delegated to deal with 
or to handle some required actions (projects) in the form of a project organisational 
theme, known as TOs (Lundin and Söderholm, 1995). Furthermore, this theme of TO is 
utilised by some businesses in delivering certain organisational tasks in the form of a 
project. Thus, this takes us to the conclusion that a large proportion of today’s businesses 
(POs) are creating project organisations in the form of TOs (Anvuur and Kumaraswamy, 
2016), which hold the following characteristics: 
 They manage complex tasks. 
 They bring together the required capabilities, skills and knowledge that are 
necessary to deliver projects.  
 Time delimited constraint.  
 They deliver complex change.  
 They are goals/objectives oriented (Anvuur and Kumaraswamy, 2016) 
 
Despite the fact that literature around project management stated that “temporary 
organisations are formed within the organisational boundary of a single, parent 
organisation” (Haniff and Ogunlana, 2015. p. 1), we have to emphasise the importance 
of understanding the differences between permanent and TOs, including their structural 
nature, and their managerial and operational perspectives. This is in order to achieve 




There are four concepts that distinguish TOs from permanent ones and they are: task, 
temporality, team and transition. These concepts can be utilised in the classification or 
description of an organisation as they manifest the general demarcation of TOs. These 
concepts differ from other crucial concepts that define POs, which are naturally defined 
by goals (instead of tasks), working organisation (instead of teams), survival (instead of 
time) and production process and sustainable development (instead of transition) 
(Lundin and Söderholm, 1995).  
 
The rationale behind TO existence, as many researchers proposed, is to manage time 
delimited and complex tasks within a specific organisation (Meyerson et al., 1996; Liu, 
1999; Hanisch and Wald, 2011). Goodman and Goodman (1976) identified four 
problems, which were addressed by the creation of TOs. The first problem was the 
complexity of some tasks, which need an integrated effort by the organisational members 
to execute and complete the tasks. Secondly, the problem of having unique tasks that 
may not fit with the permanent organisational processes and procedure. The third 
problem is the issue of organisational tasks with significant importance, which require 
the establishment of new organisational structures in order to manage them. The fourth 
and final problem is tasks defined by goals, with a specific deadline for completion. 
Therefore, it could be argued that TOs exist because of the requirement for specific 
functional organisational effort and the essential need for high levels of coordination in 
order to deliver complex tasks within limited time (Söderlund, 2004).  
 
Temporary multi organisations 
As mentioned above, a TO is a temporary system formed by POs (Turner and Müller, 
2003) to deliver certain complex tasks and projects within limited time. The purpose of 
TOs has been consistent within the literature, which is to achieve higher organisational 
performance through highly specialised project teams (Bechky, 2006). However, in 
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certain type of projects, such as infrastructure projects, TOs are not established in the 
same format (by single PO); instead, it is a system formed by multiple organisations 
working together in a single endeavour (Haniff and Ogunlana, 2015).  
 
The involvement of multiple organisations in the construction sector comes from a 
complex system, which requires functional specialism with high interdependencies in the 
project inputs, execution and outcomes (Hobday, 1998). Eventually, these multiple 
organisations form the project team through a selection procedure by the client (Mohsini 
and Davidson, 1991). The term ‘project team’ was contested by many authors in this 
case, such as Rowlinson and McDermott (1999), Davidson (1988) and Cherns and 
Bryant (1984), as they strongly suggested that this group of actors should be called 
TMOs, rather than a project team. This is because “project actors are temporarily 
‘seconded’ to projects by their employing organisation or function, for the period of their 
involvement in the project” (Hall and Kutsch, 2007). The actors’ involvement was 
described as ‘temporary’ because it lasts for the duration of each single project and, by 
the end of the project, different organisations or members separate or move to work on 
different projects.  
 
Moving on to the definition of a TMO, it is defined as a TO that is formed by multiple 
organisations, aiming to deliver a facility sponsored by the client, through an internal 
integrated effort between these multiple organisations. The form it takes is that every 
single organisation within the TMO has an actor or group of actors to represent and 
supply their organisational services as a member of the TMO (Haniff and Ogunlana, 
2015).  
 
In modern days, the formation of a TMO has included the procurement of specialists’ 
services by the client, such as client representatives, project consultants, main 
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contractors and subcontractors, where these relationships between the actors are 
usually mediated by contractual document. This is a result of clients’ lack of skills to be 
able to undertake the project design and execution themselves. Hence, it is more 
common to outsource these services and mobilise external specialists to carry out these 
tasks (Eccles, 1981; Bygballe et al., 2013).  
 
2.4 A conception on project organisations 
As mentioned, Lundin and Söderholm (1995) identified four concepts that differentiate a 
TMO from a PO. These concepts are temporality, task, team and transition. Looking at 
the way these concepts are perceived in a TMO creates issues and challenges for the 
project team members, which they have to tackle in order to avoid project failure and 
build a team who can perform effectively. Further analysis of these concepts will follow; 
firstly, to draw the basic differences between a TMO and a PO; and secondly, review 
how these differences create the challenges that face project team members in a TMO, 
in order to reach the effective performing stage of Tuckman’s model and avoid project 
failure. Figure 6 below provides a summary of the issues that can lead to project failure 





Figure 6: Four concepts (temporality, task, team and transition) and project failure. 
 
2.4.1 Temporality 
The main distinguishing feature between tasks carried out by TMOs and POs is 
temporality. In a PO, it is about business survival over the time that the business is 
running; whereas in a TMO, there is a starting point and a finishing point. In the literature, 
there is an apparent agreement on these distinguished descriptions of the concept of 
temporality between the two types of organisations (Haniff and Ogunlana, 2015). Within 
the TMO context, the literature in temporality has made a number of distinctions among 
different types or dichotomies of time, such as Kairos and Chronos, diachronic and 
synchronic, slow and fast, subjective and objective, and global and local (Söderlund, 
2004). However, Biesenthal et al. (2015) argued that the first major type in temporality 
research was the distinction between event time and clock time, which is an overlapping 
distinction with the other distinctions mentioned above.  
Temporality:
- Different rates of time within different 
organisations.
- Short time to establish relationships and 
shared knowledge among members.
- Distract TMO's team members from a 
unified project goals toward their mother 
organisation's goals. 
Task:
- Lack of knowledge of required immediate 
reactions within complex tasks.
- Difficulties in producing estimates for 
unique tasks.
- Lack of current research around the area 
of social organisation and process. 
Team:
- Team diversity can create levels of 
uncertainty and ambiguity. 
- Team size can decrease the team's 
effectiveness and ability to solve problems. 
- Poor organisational structure can reduce 
team members' orientation.
- Inexperienced project manager can 
influence team effectiveness.
Transition
- Ineffective transition from PO to TMO 
before the project execution. 
- Ineffective transition to and from TMO 






There are two different approaches of interpreting temporality, which provided the core 
argument of the distinction between the different types of time. The first approach 
interprets temporality as a very limited or short length of time, in order to achieve 
immediate organisational goals. This is an objective approach, which points out the focus 
on the actual quantified duration of a project, in relation to the organisational goals 
(Palisis and Bartolomeo, 1970; Söderlund, 2013). In line with this approach, Chronos is 
a similar classification which perceives time as objective, measurable and in a 
quantitative unit (Reo, 2007). In other words, it is a type of time based on the clock. Clock 
time was the approach that was dominant within temporal research in management and 
organisation literature until the mid-1980s. However, the notion of clock time lost its 
dominance as a result of the increased level of complexity in organisational life (Das, 
1991; Lee and Liebenau, 1999). The increase in organisational complexity shifted the 
dominance to the other side of these distinctions; the second approach of looking at time 
within the context of this research.  
 
The second approach conceived temporality as a short length of time available to 
achieve the required integration and participation between actors within the 
organisational setting, who are involved in interlinked project activities (Lanzara, 1983). 
The first approach shows a close link between time and the clock, as it is used to 
measure performance efficiency and productivity. Whereas in this approach, known as 
Kairos (Smith, 1969), there is another dimension to the perception of time, which 
emphasised the use of meaningful events and human activities as an indication of time, 
rather than actually measuring the time (Bluedorn and Denhardt, 1988). Event time is a 
perception that helps researchers gain a richer and deeper insight of organisational life, 
and is referred to as qualitative time (Starkey, 1989). Hence, Orlikowski and Yates (2002) 
did not conceive event time as fixed nor regular, but rather as a dynamic concept, which 
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varies by different organisational norms. As a result, each single organisation within a 
TMO context might have different measurement dynamics of time, which will distance 
that certain organisation from the rest. This means that the project, may be subject to 
failure as a result of ineffective project team performance. Despite the opposing views 
between the two approaches, Roe (2007) stated that they are competing in the field of 
management, and organisations can adopt both clock time and event time in organising 
their activities, as the discrete separation of the two approaches often collapses 
(Orlikowski and Yates, 1999). This can be illustrated by the notion of different rates of 
time.  
 
Söderlund (2013) argued that different parts of an entity could operate with different 
orientations of time (or rates of time). For example, marketing typically adheres to daily 
checking of clients’ orders and purchases; manufacturing operate with daily deliveries; 
while research and development (R&D) takes a longer-term period to operate.  
 
Looking specifically at the project management practices, the clock time known as 
Chronos (Smith, 1969) is the common approach in managing time in order to meet 
project deadlines (PMI, 2013). This was supported with the assumption that projects can 
be effectively managed by following this approach, based on the predictions of past 
events, and by planning using objective tools and techniques to finalise the required work 
to deliver projects successfully (Atkinson, 1999). However, within the literature, there is 
lack of clear consensus on the duration of time that defines the term ‘temporary’ in 
relation to the project duration, the current literature states a number of variations which 
point out the length of ‘limited duration’ starting from a few months all the way to number 




In spite of all the debates in the literature over the definition of time, many authors have 
investigated the impact of limited duration of a project on the performance of a TMO from 
the behavioural aspect, including the social participation and integration between the 
project’s actors. Lindkvist (2005) indicated that the short duration of a project is not a 
positive factor as it does not allow actors to develop communities within a TMO. In other 
words, the amount of time project actors have during the project execution stage is 
deemed to be insufficient to develop and share knowledge relevant to the project task; 
neither is the time sufficient to establish a tightly working team in a suitable social 
structure form (Morley and Silver, 1977). Therefore, the limited time within a project can 
create difficulties in delivering a project that involves inter-dependent tasks which have 
to be performed by multiple organisations. This is because tasks with inter-dependencies 
require project team members to develop and share knowledge around those tasks 
(Lindkvist, 2005). Thus, TMO team members are required to overcome this obstacle to 
eliminate the possibility of project failure. 
 
Other researchers such as Turner and Müller (2003) looked at the issue of limited time 
from a different perspective: the impact of the limited project lifespan within a TMO on 
project actors. Turner and Müller (2003) have explained this further; they proposed that 
the defined start and end of a project create a matter of urgency between the project 
actors to deliver the outcome of a project within the allocated timescale. Turner and 
Müller (2003) suggested that this level of urgency might be associated with stress 
because of the pressure of the project-limited time. Consequently, the existence of stress 
among the project team could act as an inhibiting factor in the development of an 
effective team, which may leave the team members in the storming stage and prevent 
them from reaching the performing stage. To overcome this stress issue, Morley and 
Silver (1977) called to increase the collaboration, organisational co-operation and 




In contrast, Bryman et al. (1987) contended that while projects with a longer duration 
allow extra time for growing relationships, shorter projects tend to be predominantly task 
oriented rather than focused on improving relationships. Similarly, Bakker et al. (2013) 
argued that, in short duration projects, actors within a TMO have all their attention on the 
present time, rather than considering the impact of their behaviours on future situations. 
Therefore, failure to establish the required project knowledge could lead the project team 
to behave in a way that is not consistent with the project needs at certain stages of the 
project.  
 
Furthermore, a TMO’s engagement occurs over various stages of a project. Each 
organisation within a TMO is delegated to provide resources or certain types of services 
to the project over a certain period, ruled by contractual documentation, with identified 
delivery deadlines (Cherns and Bryant, 1984). Therefore, Haniff and Ogunlana (2015) 
argued that TMO actors are task oriented and more concerned with handling the project 
deliverables within the specified time, with not much concern given to relationship 
development with actors from other organisations. Consequently, building relationships 
within the project team becomes a major challenge among the team members, purely 
because of the limited project duration.  
 
Despite the previous argument, Cherns and Bryant (1984) proposed – about the role of 
the client’s management – increasing the level of co-ordination between actors within a 
TMO. In this regard, the factor of short project duration may affect the degree of 
collaboration and interpersonal support between project actors. Cherns and Bryant 
(1984) found that the actual performance of a TMO is greatly determined by the 
managers and their capabilities to enhance the co-ordination between the project actors. 
Moreover, they envisaged a TMO to be an organisational form that can handle project 
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uncertainties, due to the involvement of specialists and experts in every area of the 
project.  
 
Thus, as much as a TMO might be task oriented, it is essential to highlight the importance 
of relationship development and of a collaborative approach between different 
organisations within the TMO, in order to achieve a lower level of project ambiguity and 
uncertainty, and to overcome the complexities associated with the temporality of the 
project. The failure in achieving this, potentially increases the likelihood of project failure, 
as project temporality can arguably result in: different organisations adopting different 
rates of time (Söderlund, 2013); insufficient time to form a tightly working team and the 
sharing of knowledge among TMO team members (Morley and Silver, 1977; Lindkvist, 
2005); and high levels of stress that can inhibit an effective team formation (Turner and 
Müller, 2003). Evidently, project temporality is deemed as a potential cause of 
disorientation of TMO team members from a unified project goal. As a result, each team 
member follows their organisational interest, which can potentially be part of the causes 
of a project failure.  
 
2.4.2 Task  
Within the research of TMOs, the second theme is task. Normally, the purpose of task 
execution is to achieve specific goals. As mentioned previously, the motive behind the 
creation of a TMO is the need to accomplish certain tasks (Goodman and Goodman, 
1976). Therefore, a TMO is dependent on a minimum of one task or a limited number of 
tasks (Lundin and Söderholm, 1995). 
 
The literature around TMOs has tried to define the characteristics of a task in the form of 
an assumption. Meyerson et al. (1996) have made an assumption in the literature, which 
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states that any task performed by a TMO should have a level of complexity. To define 
complexity in this case, Hanisch and Wald (2011) claimed that complexity could be 
measured by the difficulty of the work that is to be executed. Other scholars such as 
Lundin and Söderholm (1995) measured it by considering task complexity as a form of 
task uniqueness.  
 
At this stage, it is important to distinguish between two different types of TMOs. The first 
type of TMO concentrates on executing projects that are going to be repeated in the 
future; the second type of TMO would only perform unique projects with no possibility of 
repetition of the same project in the future (Gann and Salter, 2000; Prencipe and Tell, 
2001). Thus, looking at the scope of TMOs, which are working on either type of projects, 
the organisations’ members might not have an immediate knowledge in terms of how to 
act and perform the project delegated to them (Lundin and Söderholm, 1995). This 
highlights the importance of understanding the complexity of the situation in case of the 
involvement of multiple organisations to perform a project.  
 
The assumption of task complexity within a TMO framework creates a number of issues, 
which have to be taken into account in the development of the theory of TMO. The first 
issue originates from the definition of complexity. By nature, projects are complex 
systems, for various reasons; they involve a number of tasks with multiple components 
and profound interdependencies within its tasks and components (Davies and 
Mackenzie, 2014).  
 
In some industries (for example, the construction industry) project complexity expresses 
two main aspects. The first is managerial complexity, it appears in the process of bringing 
a number of tasks and different pieces of work to form a workflow and critical path. The 
second complexity is around technical issues within the execution of the project work 
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(Gidado, 1996). However, we should also consider that the degree of complexity will 
differ between the two types – managerial and technical – depending on the actual task, 
its purpose and the interdependencies between tasks, as well as the interactions 
between project actors (Hanisch and Wald, 2011).  
 
The second definition of complexity is concerned with task uniqueness. It has been 
argued by El-Rayes and Moselhi (1998) that projects in some industries are 
characterised by the repetition of tasks. To be more specific, infrastructure projects 
appear to have a common occurrence of repetition of activities, as project elements will 
be repeated from one location or unit to another. Therefore, the time and cost estimations 
of repetitive activities can result in more efficient planning and scheduling of a project 
(Hyari et al., 2009). Despite the conclusion from the previous argument, planning for a 
unique project that is occurring for the first time, even if it includes repetitive tasks or 
activities, does not undermine the complexity of uniqueness. The managerial and 
technical aspects of the execution stage will still demonstrate the challenges of a unique 
project (Crawford and Pollack, 2007).  
 
Söderlund (2013) presents two additional distinctions within task management. The first 
distinction divides the project activities into two perspectives. The first is the actual task 
and its evolution process; this component is more concerned with the technical aspects 
of the actual work. In this instance, a project is defined as a temporary endeavour to 
carry out a complex task, and project management is the solution to deliver it, through 
breaking down the project activities into subprojects, work packages and project 
milestones. The second perspective is the social perspective, which is concerned with 
people’s behaviours, relationships and the social conditions while performing the project 
task (Söderlund, 2013). This second perspective has been discussed in greater depth in 




The second distinction is between content and process. Pettigrew (1990) was found to 
be one of the most influential authors discussing this area of distinction. Both 
perspectives – content and process – in this respect, are interlinked but present two 
different aspects of project organisation. Content refers to the ‘what’ questions (for 
example, what to deliver from the project, what work has to be done to deliver it, what 
needs to be done to build an effective team); whereas process, is more concerned with 
the ‘when’ question (for example, when to carry out certain tasks, when to meet with the 
project team, when to terminate an activity or a process). Such processes will include 
delivery dates and deadlines. Thus, based on the last two distinctions – task and social 
organisation, and content and process – Söderlund (2013) highlighted four areas that 
are concerned with project management practices and they have been the core of project 
management research as follows: 
 
1. Task and content: a significant amount of research has paid attention to the 
content of project tasks, which covers areas like scope management and WBS.  
2. Task and process: similarly, research in project management has addressed 
processes related to tasks, which can be seen through Gantt charts and planning 
techniques. 
3. Social organisation and content: this element of project organisation has been 
implemented through project documentation which shows the distribution of 
responsibilities, interdependencies between project actors and cross-functional 
teams, and so on. 
4. Social organisation and process: this includes a number of examples, such as 




The main argument here is that, historically, the first three areas have been much 
considered in the literature of project management, whereas the last area, which is social 
organisation and process, was given very little attention in project management research 
(Söderlund, 2013). Therefore, project management tools and techniques (including 
WBS, critical path and earned value techniques) are important, but it is necessary to 
supplement them with project management soft skills (such as feelings, emotions, 
cultural awareness, public relations, power and learning) and leadership, in order to 
achieve an effective TMO team (Söderlund, 2013). Otherwise, the project team might 
face the threat of dealing with issues that hinder the project progress such as APs.  
 
Thus, the concept of project task presents three major areas deemed as risks which can 
potentially lead to project failure. Firstly, the lack of knowledge (managerial/technical), 
associated with complex tasks, which is required for any immediate reaction by the TMO 
project team members (Lundin and Söderholm, 1995). Secondly, the difficulties in 
producing accurate time and cost estimations for unique tasks. Finally, the effect of the 
existing minimal research in the area of social organisation and processes within project 
management literature, and how does that influence the social factors of human 
interaction and dynamics within projects. Further discussion around the area of social 
organisation is provided in the next concept that differentiates PO from TMO, which is 
team. 
 
2.4.3 Team  
To continue the narrative, as the design of TMO is based on the concept of task, a TMO 
is characterised by individuals with different capabilities and skills, forming the TMO team 
(Haniff and Ogunlana, 2015). There have been numerous suggestions in the literature 
about the process of team selection; in a number of project management texts, it has 
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been suggested that the selection of the project team members must be on the grounds 
of competency, in other words, each member should have the necessary technical skill 
set that is required to deliver the allocated task (Larson and Gray, 2014; Pinto, 2016). 
Another suggestion, with regards to the selection of the team members, was based on 
the interpersonal skills, in addition to competencies (Bryman et al., 1987).  
 
Besides the importance of the two components suggested above, Baykasoglu et al. 
(2007) argued that it is not sufficient to only consider the interpersonal skills and 
competencies during the team selection. They deemed other factors to be critical in order 
for the team to achieve successful completion of their task, such as: members’ eligibility 
for the task (technical and functional expertise), their capability to execute the task and 
deal with different levels of uncertainty, their problem-solving abilities, and their 
knowledge on the process of decision making. These issues are critical as they have an 
important effect on team performance and effectiveness (Baykasoglu et al., 2007). 
 
Moving to the effectiveness of the selected team members, there are many aspects that 
would increase or decrease the team effectiveness. Researchers warn that the diversity 
of TMO members can push team effectiveness one of two ways. Diversity can lead to a 
positive result and increase the team effectiveness, as it will balance the performance of 
multiple team members and create a supportive dynamic among them (Larson and Gray, 
2014; Pinto, 2016). The counter argument is that diversity could possibly create a level 
of ambiguity, uncertainty and conflict within the team members (McGrath, 1991).  
 
The size of the selected team is another important factor, as it will affect the project 
team’s level of effectiveness. Baykasoglu et al. (2007) presented a debate in their 
research, highlighting that once the team size goes over 12-14 members, the 
performance of the team drops off. However, a small size team suffers from different 
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problems, for example, the team’s ability for problem solving decreases because of a 
lack of interaction and lack of adequate information being shared among members. 
Another factor that can influence the team effectiveness is the difficulty in building shared 
understanding between members; this is purely because, TMOs are formed by 
individuals from mixed specialised competencies (Lindkvist, 2005).  
 
One of the critical highlights from earlier in this discussion, is the fact that there has not 
been a great deal of research relating to the area of social organisation within the field 
of project management. This was summarised by Bennis and O'Toole, who stated: 
 
“The things routinely ignored by academics on the grounds that they cannot 
be measured – most human factors and all matters relating to judgement, 
ethics, and morality – are exactly what make the difference between good 
business decisions and bad ones” (Bennis and O'Toole, 2005, p. 3). 
 
In that sense, Söderlund (2013) considered this criticism very much relevant for the field 
of project management. Despite the little research that has been undertaken in the field 
of social behaviour in project management, authors such as Bourne and Walker (2005) 
and Hall and Kutsch (2007) looked into the behavioural aspect of project actors, and 
what factors could practically reduce the project actors’ level of effectiveness within the 
team. This was highly connected to the area of project culture.  
 
Project culture was found to influence the project actors’ effectiveness as Bourne and 
Walker (2005) considered cultural norms as “the unwritten rules of behaviour” (p. 162). 
Thinking about how culture is formed within an organisation, Trompenaars (1993) listed 





1. System of authority between superiors and subordinates. 
2. Relationships between employees and their organisation. 
3. Employees’ views about the organisation and his/her place in it.  
(Trompenaars, 1993, p. 157). 
 
Thus, considering Bourne and Walker’s (2005) statement about cultural norms, an 
organisational culture with poor structure and undefined rules is a culture that will 
influence team behaviours and effectiveness. This was supported by the argument by 
Hall and Kutsch (2007), as they suggested that project actors could eventually find 
themselves disconnected and alienated from the project, which is related mainly to the 








Figure 7 demonstrates the position of project actors who are seconded from their 
employing organisation, or their functions from outside the project environment, to the 
project organisation in order to represent those organisations/functions within the project. 
The core argument here is the fact that if project actors are not entirely clear of their own 
role within the project organisation (a poorly defined project organisational culture), it will 
create an uncertainty as to whom they should be giving their loyalty, whether to the 
employing or to the project organisation (Hall and Kutsch, 2007). The risk is that they 
might find themselves in the middle between the two organisations, which will hinder 
their work effectiveness within the project team (Oshry, 1996), mainly in cases where 
there are objective conflicts between the project organisation and the employing 
organisation.  
 
Within the small amount of empirical debate in the current literature, Hall and Kutsch 
(2007) stated, “there is an implicit acknowledgement of this issue, judging by the amount 
of attention project teambuilding and, in particular, leadership are given. This attention 
implies that project participants need to be formed into a team in order to work effectively 
and deliver the project” (p. 4). This moves the discussion to the next point on team 
formation, members’ integration and leadership. 
 
One of the main streams of team building is establishing an effective level of integration 
between the team individuals that allows them to conduct themselves as effective 
members, to ensure effective achievement of tasks. Although a project involves 
individuals with distinguished competencies, two factors were identified that can help in 
building an integrated team. Firstly, an experienced project manager with sufficient 
leadership skills should be able to successfully create a level of integration between 
members, and raise the co-ordination standard throughout the project duration (Cherns 
and Bryant, 1984), in order to establish effective team work (Wang et al., 2005). Despite 
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the importance of project managers with the required leadership skills on project team 
building, Crawford et al. (2006) highlighted that little attention had been given to the 
research in areas such as soft skills, leadership and reflective ability for project 
managers. These areas will focus on turning project managers into reflective leaders 
(with an increased awareness level of their team building ability), as well as being trained 
technicians. 
 
Secondly, as Cobb (2012) pointed out in his research, the importance of initiating shared 
knowledge between members needs to be recognised:  
“The more they share common ideas about the team and how it works, however, 
the more they will think and react as a cohesive, coordinated unit.” (Cobb, 2012, 
p. 122). 
As well as building an integrated team, the effectiveness of the team members is deemed 
to have high level of importance. However, there are multiple barriers to building team 
effectiveness, which can lead to poor team performance; for example, inadequate 
planning, accountability avoidance, role ambiguity and focus on individual outcome 
rather than team performance (Natvig and Stark, 2016). It is essential to overcome these 
barriers to form an effective project team, as successful project delivery takes more than 
integrated team members who are undertaking the project delivery. An effective team 
has certain characteristics, which can be developed through a number of stages over 
time and will help in avoiding team failure; this will eventually also minimise the possibility 
of project failure (Catalyst Consulting Team, 2012).  
 
Tuckman (1965) introduced four major stages that can develop an effective team, these 
are: forming, storming, norming and performing (Bonebright, 2010). Tuckman, along with 
Jensen (1977) proposed the fifth stage called adjourning stage. The following table will 




Table 1: Tuckman’s stages of team development (Tuckman, 1965; Tuckman and 




- Test the boundaries 
- Members discover the acceptable inter-personal 
behaviours 
- Create ground rules 
- Establish relationships 
- Identify the group competency for allocating tasks 
(2) Storming 




- New norms are generated 
- Members accept participants and the whole team 
- Desire for harmony among members 
- Start sharing ideas and opinions 
- The team becomes more cohesive during this stage 
(4) Performing 
- Members understand their roles and perform effectively  
- The team is seen as a mechanism for problem solving 
- The team focuses on successful task completion 
(5) Adjourning  
-     Task termination. 
-     Disengagement from relationships. 
-     Recognition of achievement. 
 
Despite the fact that the development process of the team members progresses through 
the five stages, one after the other, it can fluctuate back and forth between these stages 
if there are any changes to the circumstances that surround the project team; for 
example, changes in team members, organisational priorities and leadership (Abudi, 
2010; Seck and Helton, 2014). These changes may hinder the process of building a 
highly performing and effective project team. 
 
Despite the argument about the possibility of building team integrity and increasing their 
work effectiveness, the main concern remains with the inadequate amount of time that 
is available for the team development and integration within the TMO context (Haniff and 
Ogunlana, 2015) – as there is an apparent lack of time for team members to engage in 
55 
 
activities that allow them to build confidence among each other, as an attempt to 
establish trust; unlike, the case within traditional forms of organisations (Haniff and 
Ogunlana, 2015). In spite of lacking the required time, scholars argued that in practice, 
team members are able to overcome this dilemma of inadequate time and build level of 
trust (Jarvenpaa et al., 1998; Guangquan et al., 2007; Robert et al., 2009). Building trust 
in such a short time between members was explained by the term ‘swift trust’ and defined 
as a “unique form of collective perception and relating that is capable of managing issues 
of vulnerability, uncertainty, risk and expectations” (Meyerson et al., 1996, p. 167).  
 
It is argued by Bryman et al. (1987) that the existence of ‘swift trust’ in TMOs occurs as 
a result of the greater urgency in shorter projects, which unifies the final goal between 
members and accomplishes the final project delivery. Working to achieve one objective 
presents a reasonable belief to work on the basis of good trust and, therefore, to 
overcome various levels of uncertainty and ambiguity that arise within complex tasks 
among team members who have never worked with each other before. To support the 
previous argument, researchers suggested that while performing projects without 
sufficient time to slowly establish trust, team members would conduct themselves as if 
trust was already established within the organisation (Jarvenpaa et al., 1998; Powell et 
al., 2004). 
 
It is interesting to observe the applicability of the concept of ‘swift trust’ within TMOs, 
where team members do not expect any future collaboration after the task and project 
completion (Goodman and Goodman, 1976). This begs the question of whether ‘swift 
trust’ is also applicable within the TMOs where actors anticipate to interact with each 




As well as the concept of ‘swift trust’, researchers proposed a different organisational 
nature that evolves relationship between actors within TMO’s, specifically within the 
construction industry (Manu et al., 2015). Eccles (1981) suggested that there are periodic 
relations between main contractors and subcontractors in the construction industry. A 
significant finding suggested that where an actor of a TMO had previously interacted with 
other members of the same TMO, the performance of the current project would be 
optimised (Rowlinson, 1988). Consequently, co-operation and partnership arrangements 
within construction industry have recently been encouraged (Latham, 1994; Beach et al., 
2005; Gadde and Dubois, 2010).  
 
An equally significant aspect to consider – when speaking about TMOs and the 
involvement of a number of actors from different sub-organisations who are forming the 
TMO – is the differences of goals and objectives between the two sides, and the possible 
subsequent implications on the TMO actors’ work effectiveness. According to Alsedairy 
(1994), the goal differences between the actors of a TMO, or in between two sub-
organisations, create tension and conflict. This conflict will slow down the project 
execution, cause friction, and devolve the level of trust and good relationships between 
project actors. Therefore, it could increase the difficulties in dealing with project 
ambiguity, uncertainty and project risks while working on complex task with inter-
dependent activities, which might increase the risk of project failure (Meyerson et al., 
1996). 
 
Thus, team – as the third concept that differentiates PO from TMO – is found to have 
generated few risks which can lead to project failure. Firstly, McGrath (1991) argued that 
diversity within team members potentially creates ambiguity, uncertainty and conflict 
among them. Secondly, Baykasoglu et al. (2007) highlighted the impact of the wrong 
size team, which can decrease team performance (in bigger teams) or cause a lack of 
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managerial and technical skills (in smaller teams). Another risk is defined as poor 
organisational culture, which can cause team members to feel disconnected and 
alienated from the project (Hall and Kutsch, 2007). Finally, an unexperienced project 
manager is considered to be a major cause of an ineffective project team (Cherns and 
Bryant, 1984; Wang et al., 2005). The outcome of these risks, if they were not managed 
appropriately, can be counted as contributing factors that can cause a project to fail.  
 
2.4.4 Transition 
The fourth and last theme considered by Lundin and Söderholm (1995), in their 
comparison between temporary and POs, is about the concept of transition. They have 
identified two distinguished meanings of this term. Firstly, from the point of view of a PO, 
transition was defined as: the practical transformation within the organisation as a result 
of the actual work, in terms of the change occurred within the organisation from before 
to after initiating the project. The second definition refers to the desirable perceptions of 
change within the project during the project execution. The latter definition of transition 
is the one concerned with the operational and functional aspects of a TMO within the 
project. The main reason for PO to form TMO and take on the transition process is to 
achieve complex project’s deliverables, in a specific allocated period, with a deadline 
date (Lundin and Söderholm, 1995). Little research has been done on the issue of the 
transition process. This was supported with Bakker’s (2010) argument that “there was 
relatively little literature that could be matched with Lundin and Söderholm’s description 
of this concept [transition]” (p. 6).  
 
Despite Bakker’s claim about the lack of research in the area of transition, Burstrom and 
Jacobsson (2012) argued that the successful achievement of transition processes is 
associated with operational complexities. This requires the stakeholders involved in the 
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transition process to carry out a number of transformative and translational activities at 
many levels within the PO; it starts with the individual and extends to the functional, 
strategic and operational levels (Burstrom and Jacobsson, 2012).  
 
As a result of the transformative activities within the transition process, the evolution of 
TMOs comes into action. The evolution process starts by having the PO form a TO, 
which will take charge of the project. The TO employs internal expertise from within the 
PO, or external from outside the organisation, at which stage the TO transforms into a 
TMO (Haniff and Ogunlana, 2015). This presents a major challenge to project managers 
(PM) as these people must be borrowed for the project. The PM then needs to negotiate 
with the required personnel employers (functional managers internally within the PO, or 
other employers externally). The negotiation process continues between the PM and the 
actual people to persuade them to take on this task (Jacobsson et al., 2013).  
 
However, some projects require certain project actors at particular stages of the project 
lifecycle, which means that project actors may join and leave the project at any time, 
from the start until the end of the project, which will create transition points. Hall and 
Kutsch (2007) argued, “these points of transition create additional tension and conflict 
within the project environment. Clearly, the scenario described need not arise in all 
projects but may potentially arise in any given project” (p. 5). The potential occurrence 
of such issues between project actors, because of these transition points, highlights the 
importance of social organisation research within the area of project management 
research, in order to avoid the fluctuation back and forth between the four stages of 
Tuckman’s team development model.  
 
Finally, moving to the project close out stage, TMOs cease to exist as each one of the 
TMO actors goes back to their original organisations, or otherwise takes over another 
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future project. Therefore, the transition process post-project period becomes the 
responsibility of the PO (Lizarralde et al., 2011).  
 
Thus, the failure to conduct an effective transition stage by the PO towards a TMO, 
and/or the transition of actors in and out of the TMO, can potentially impact the formation 
of an effective project team, which as a result can be perceived as a risk that may lead 
to project failure. 
 
2.5 Mega-projects 
The project management literature has made a distinction between projects and mega-
projects. This is of interest to this thesis for two reasons. First, the case study is a mega-
project. Second, mega-projects contain more P-A relationships than smaller projects, 
thus mega-projects arguably heighten the relevance of AT as a lens for studying project 
failure. 
 
2.5.1 Key features of mega-projects 
Mega-projects are projects that cost multibillions of dollars (Marrewijk et al., 2008). 
Flyvbjerg (2009) stated that the US Federal Highway Administration defined mega-
projects as projects that have a minimum cost of 1 billion US dollars or projects with a 
noticeable cost that attracts public and media attention, as they have a large impact on 
the country’s budget, the community and the environment. Some mega-projects may 
cost multiple billions of US dollars, way beyond the minimum standard definition. Others, 
in a medium sized town, cost less than 1 billion US dollars, but are still considered as 
mega-projects. The definitions of mega-project within the literature, therefore, are subject 




Mega-projects will highly influence society and are always associated with high costs 
(Flyvbjerg, 2009). Thus, when determining whether a project is of mega size or not, 
various factors must be taken into consideration, such as where the project will be carried 
out, what the cost will be, as well as the impact of the project within a given area. 
Furthermore, mega-project failure runs part of the inevitable risk of incurring further 
costs, and this can affect society in a highly negative way. Therefore, the manner in 
which the project is delivered or executed is of huge importance (Flyvbjerg, 2014).  
 
The mega-project is the preferred form of delivering goods and services throughout a 
range of sectors, such as: infrastructure, industrial plants, water and energy, government 
systems, banking, defence, information technology, air and space regeneration, major 
events and so on. For example, the form of mega-project is used in delivering high-speed 
railway lines, the Olympics Games, hospitals, seaports, motorways, offshore oil 
extraction, amongst others. These projects are not only large projects and cost large 
proportions of countries’ budgets, but now they are also being initiated in large numbers 
with greater values than before (Flyvbjerg, 2014).  
 
The current estimate of global spending in the infrastructure sector between the years 
2013 and 2030 is 3.4 trillion US dollars per year (Dobbs et al., 2013). Another similar 
estimation was provided by The Economist (2008), who stated that the annual spending 
of infrastructure mega-projects in emerging economies is estimated at around 2.2 trillion 
US dollars, from 2009 until 2018. Therefore, there is a noticeable and significant amount 
of money invested in mega-projects, but with no signs of progress or improvements of 
performance over time, or in different geographical locations (Flyvbjerg et al., 2005). The 
core point from the previous discussion is that the continuation of mega-projects 
overrunning in time and cost highlights the importance of looking at the problem of failure 




Before any further investigation on mega-project failure, it is essential to distinguish this 
type of project from others in more detail, which will help the researcher to consider the 
differences in the analysis of this area of research. Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) and Capka 
(2004) have identified three key features associated with mega-projects, and they are:  
 
 The involvement of a large mass of resources: the nature of mega-projects 
requires a large volume of labour, cost, financial and human resources. The 
amount of financial funding differs according to the context of the mega-project. 
However, mega-projects with a total cost of multi-billion dollars are very common 
(Van Marrewijk et al., 2008). 
 
 Great impact on social, human and environmental aspects: mega-projects affect 
communities and countries differently. Mega-projects can strengthen, weaken or 
revive economies. This impact can reach nationwide over a long-term period, and 
that effect can be extended to the next generation affecting society, community 
and environment (Warrack, 1993; Flyvbjerg et al., 2003; Kipp et al., 2008). Mega-
projects also have the public attention and interest, this is because of the large 
public spending in such projects. As a result, the project outcome can affect the 
reputation of project stakeholders including project participants, government 
personnel and public officials (Kipp et al., 2008).  
 
 Extreme levels of complexity: this is, partially, due to the complex engineering 
and construction techniques that have to be executed to deliver the final product 
or service, which is associated with the co-operative difficulties between a large 
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number of stakeholders (each with different interests) involved within the mega-
project (Capka, 2004).  
 
Out of these key features – complexity – is considered as the main challenge for mega-
project managers (Kardes et al., 2013). Accordingly, we will go on to expand further on 
the mega-project complexity challenge.  
 
The origin of mega-project complexity comes from a number of contributing factors, 
including tasks and activities, components, funding and personnel, as well as various 
uncertainties and their intersections (Mihm et al., 2003; Sommer and Loch, 2004). Van 
Marrewijk (2005) suggested that these factors lead to mega-project complexity, as well 
as the great scale of the tasks, long period spans, multiplicity of stakeholders’ disciplines, 
the number of actors and their different interests, multiple nationalities, high project 
uncertainty and political interest. 
 
Therefore, complexity in mega-projects can be categorised into technical (concerned 
with the size of the project) and social complexity (concerned with the interactions among 
the participants involved in the mega-project) (Baccarini, 1996; Bruijn and Leijten, 2008). 
For example, looking at the Channel Tunnel, the undersea railway link between England 
and northern France, presents both type of complexity. Technical complexities originated 
from the concept of building the longest undersea tunnel, which was associated with a 
number of factors that aggravated that level of complexity, including geology, 
engineering, power supply and design. On the other hand, social complexity was due to 
the difficulties in coordination between large numbers of people who were involved in the 
building process, including contractors, sub-contractors and employees (collectively 
around 15,000 people), in which their daily expenditure was over 3 million British pounds 




The previous example illustrates the nature of the complexity dilemmas that are facing 
global project management, as the complexities in that project are similar to other mega-
projects around the world such as the tunnel mega-project in the USA, the international 
airport in Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia, and Burj-Khalifa, the tallest building in the world 
located in Dubai (Kardes et al., 2013). In addition, the greater number of distinguishable, 
ambiguous and interdependent tasks and work packages needed to complete the mega-
project increases the complexity of the delivery methods (Kardes et al., 2013). 
 
2.5.2 Mega-projects’ problems, methods of initiation and managerial 
prescriptions 
Problems with mega-projects 
It has been argued that there are some inherent problems surrounding the concept of 
mega-projects and their management. These include the following:  
 
1. High degree of technical and social complexity (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003).  
2. A high uncertainty level that might trigger unforeseen project risks (Durand, 
2003; Titus et al., 2011).  
3. Poor performance data of mega-projects, nine out of ten mega-projects suffer 
from cost overrun (Flyvbjerg et al., 2005).  
4. The massive impact mega-project failure can have on citizens, communities, 
businesses and countries (Orr and Metzger, 2005). For example, insufficient 
employment of resources, lower than the expected revenue, late deliveries, cost 
overrun and, in some cases, bankruptcy of organisations (Flyvbjerg et al., 
2003).  
As a consequence, Flyvbjerg (2014) recently reported: 
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“Performance in mega-project management is strictly poor and has not 
improved for the 70-year period for which comparable data are available, at 
least not when measured in terms of cost overrun, schedule delays and 
benefit shortfalls” (p. 12).  
 
Methods of initiation 
Despite these negative aspects, mega-projects are still taking place. In fact, mega-
project promoters appear easily able to successfully promote their concepts and 
convince their clients to initiate these mega-projects (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003). In an attempt 
to figure out how promoters manage this initiation, Flyvbjerg (2014) identified two 
methods have been followed by mega-projects’ promoters to achieve mega-projects 
initiation.  
 
The first method is by under-estimating the project features, such as: project costs, 
design, specifications, changes in quality, time, delays, exchange rates, environmental 
or other external factors (Jaafari, 2011). Flyvbjerg (2014) argued that the 
underestimation comes from the lack of experience in finding the right estimates, which 
allows us to consider it as ‘honest incompetency’. Langer (1975) posited a slightly 
different explanation that in some cases it is not because of this lack of experience, but 
the bias towards ‘illusion of control’ by the management, and their optimistic belief of 
their ability to influence the outcome, which leads to the underestimation. This bias 
toward ‘illusion of control’ could be justified, as per Hirschman’s (1967) argument, that 
the underestimation of mega-project difficulties is associated with the overestimation of 
human creativity in dealing with them. Hirschman believed that “the only way in which 
we can bring our creative sources fully into play is by misjudging the nature of the task” 




The second method promoters and planners tend to use to initiate mega-projects is very 
different, however, and constitutes strategic misrepresentation. This method is 
concerned with the information presented within the preliminary project-planning 
document. The misrepresentation of the project information is not perceived as ‘honest 
incompetency’, but rather as an act of ‘deception’ toward the project client. This method 
is seen as unethical, as it penetrates the ‘obligation of truth’ in organisations (Flyvbjerg, 
2014).  
 
Project promoters believe that their behaviour – manipulating project information and 
misrepresenting project costs, time and benefits to get the project construction initiated 
– is justified, as their projects will provide many benefits to society (Wachs, 1990; Pickrell, 
1992). Hirschman (1967) supported this, as he suggested the strategic 
misrepresentation and the ignorance of the real costs is what helps mega-projects to get 
started. If mega-project clients, he argued, knew about the real costs and difficulties in 
delivering mega-projects, they might not even start one and, therefore, mega-projects 
would never get built. For example, the San Francisco Transbay Terminal mega-project 
suffered from a huge cost overrun. Brown (2013) discussed this cost overrun, as he 
stated “News that the Transbay Terminal is something like $300 million over budget 
should not come as a shock to anyone. We always knew the initial estimate was way 
under the real cost” (p. 1). So, the argument claiming that a mega-project will never get 
built might be a reason for the need to accept these massive failures.  
 
However, others have argued that the underestimation and misrepresentation of project 
information are negative behaviours, for two main reasons. Firstly, because these 
behaviours are not acceptable for legal reasoning, and secondly due to the fact that they 
are unethical behaviours. Flyvbjerg (2014) stated: 
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“In most democracies, for project promoters, planners, and managers to 
deliberately misinform legislators, administrators, bankers, the public, and 
the media about costs and benefits would not only be considered unethical 
but, in some cases also illegal” (p. 14-15). 
 
Flyvbjerg (2014) is supported in this by numerous others in the literature, including Kelly 
et al. (2002), Elitzur and Gavious (2003), Wuyts and Geyskens (2005), Marler et al. 
(2006), Remington and Pollack (2007), Cavusgil and Mahnke (2012) and Kardes et al. 
(2013). 
 
Managerial prescriptions to reduce complexity, failure and unethical behaviours 
In response, Kardes et al. (2013) summarised nine managerial prescriptions, to reduce 
mega-project complexity and failure and to assist in avoiding these unethical behaviours, 
as follows: 
 
1. The importance of addressing the need for possession of the required 
knowledge and skills, mainly by managers and their employees, as it will 
increase their efficiency in using any new technology that exists in most mega-
projects. The role of training plays a major factor in increasing the effectiveness 
and reducing any resistance to change throughout the execution (Marler et al., 
2006). 
2. Allocating sufficient time to clarify the project goals and hidden agendas, and 
developing effective information flow methods on all levels of management 
within the organisation. This will help to avoid any project goal deviation based 




3. Contracts should clearly identify the project goals, obligations and rights for all 
project stakeholders, including sponsors, contractors, subcontractors and 
consultants. It is a prevention step to avoid any deception which might occur 
from any project actor because of any conflicts of project interests (Elitzur and 
Gavious, 2003). 
4. Independent and more effective project appraisal, transparency and scrutiny, to 
overcome the issue of ‘illusion of control’, through utilising a reference class 
forecasting and comparing the estimates with others from previous similar 
projects.  
5. A healthy and positive spirit of co-operation and collaboration between project 
actors, which is considered to be a prerequisite factor for mega-project success, 
including hard and soft aspects and criteria (Kelly et al., 2002; Wuyts and 
Geyskens, 2005)  
6. Developing a mutual interest for all project parties, based on sharing projects’ 
gains and risks, as it will deliver the best form of collaboration. In other words, 
a culture of ‘sink or swim together’ (Cavusgil and Mahnke, 2012). For example, 
the London Heathrow Terminal 5 project was accomplished on time and on 
budget, and most problems were sorted quickly and the project actors 
performed in an efficient manner (Kardes et al., 2013). 
7. In addition to well-defined contracts, the role of trust between project actors 
leads to a better co-operative approach and enhances the quality of their 
relationship. This is conceived as a ‘moral contract’ (Arino et al., 2001).  
8. Balancing the power in controlling and monitoring project parties, as excessive 
control might result in increased distrust, which can lead to behaviours that differ 
from the project goals and interest (Van Marrewijk, 2005). 
9. Finally, starting with viable projects, shaping projects at early stage as flexibility 
to change decreases at a later stage (Miller and Lessard, 2007). The World 
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Bank (1996) stated that projects with enhanced initial design showed a success 
rate of 80%, whereas projects with a poor front-end phase had a success rate 
of 35%.  
 
It is argued, therefore, that there is nothing inherent about mega-projects that means 
they must fail. What is also worth noting is that it can be observed from the above that 
there is an overlap here between the suggested prescriptions for mega-project 
management and the assumptions and dictates of the prime theory in this thesis, AT. 
These prescriptions made recommendations with regard to certain issues relating to 
APs. For example, clarified goals and establishing a co-operative and collaborative spirit 
will reduce the principal-agent division; the development of mutual interest reduces 
information asymmetry; well-defined contracts and monitoring agents contributes to 
reducing and managing agent’s opportunism. This highlights the necessity of AT in 
understanding mega-project failures, as well as problems within smaller projects.  
 
In summary, although the list of prescriptions by the likes of Kardes et al. (2013) provides 
a theoretical platform for managing mega-projects, from a practical perspective there is 
a different picture of mega-projects in the real world; that despite the theoretical 
indications on managerial shortfalls and how to manage them, mega-project failure is 
still occurring. Interestingly, Kardes et al. (2013) also stated that these theoretical 
prescriptions could be “affected considerably by major component of the project such as 
culture, resources, information flow systems, contractual agreements and treaties, and 
partners and stakeholders” (p. 914). Taking this into consideration, the research moves 




2.6 Mega-project failure in Saudi Arabia  
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is passing through an intense period of initiating mega-
projects in order to upgrade the country’s infrastructure. Albawaba (2010) confirmed that 
research reports stated that the Saudi government invested around 400 billion US dollars 
between 2008 and 2013. This budget was invested in the development of infrastructure 
across many industries, such as oil and gas, education, transportation, power, real estate 
and others. Since the 1970s, the construction industry was the greatest recipient of 
government expenditure, it received on average 43.8% of the total government 
expenditure (Assaf et al., 1995). The construction industry employs 15% of the labour 
force and accounts for 14% of total energy consumption in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi 
construction industry contributed between 30 and 40% of the output of the non-oil 
productive sector during the period 1980 to 2000 (Al-Kharashi and Skitmore, 2009). 
These figures clarify the importance of this industry’s contribution to the country’s 
economic growth, and these figures are subject to increase in the future. 
 
2.6.1 The problem of mega-project failure in Saudi Arabia 
A critical problem for the Saudi construction industry is excessive project delay 
(Albogamy and Dawood, 2015; Al-Emad et al., 2017; Al-Emad and Rahman, 2018). Al-
Khalil and Al-Ghafly (1999) in the Eastern Province of Saudi found that 59% of projects 
were delayed during the period from 1985 to 1994. Assaf and Al-Hejji (2005) reported 
that 70 per cent of public projects failed to be delivered on time. Another survey carried 
out by Al-Kharashi and Skitmore (2009) stated that 70% of projects undertaken by the 
Ministry of Housing and Public Works suffered from delay in submissions. Another study 
by Falqui (2004) reported that 952 (40%) out of 2379 projects had been delayed, 
although Falqui (2004) suggested that recognisable improvements had taken place in 





Many articles have discussed various causes of mega-project delay. Assaf and Al-Hejji 
(2005) listed 56 main causes of mega-project failure in Saudi projects. These were 
classified into nine groups: materials, work force, equipment, financing, changes, 
government relations, scheduling and controlling, environment and contractual 
relationships. These nine groups had various levels of importance for different project 
parties. Assaf and Al-Hejji (2005) concluded that the most important factors were delays 
in progress by contractors, payment by owners, the relationship between contractors, 
organisational bureaucracy on the project owner’s behalf, labour shortages and unskilled 
labour.  
 
Al-Khalil and Al-Ghafly (1999) surveyed delay factors within public water and sewage 
projects and identified 60 causes of delay. The conclusion was that delay occurred as a 
result of the owners’ involvement, the contractors’ and sub-contractors’ performance, 
financial issues, project change factors and slow decision-making processes by the 
owner (cited in Assaf and Al-Hejji, 2005). Al-Barak (1993) reported the main causes of 
project delivery failure were poor activity estimation practices, lack of experience, bad 
decisions in determining a company’s policy, and crises in the national economy.  
 
Thus, there is a noticeable effort from researchers to figure out the different causes of 
mega-project failure in Saudi. However, the current literature in this field remains narrow, 
and little has been done to explain what is behind these causes of failure. Thus, there is 
a clear gap in the literature around the theoretical underpinnings tying these descriptive 




2.6.2 Research explaining mega-project failure in Saudi Arabia 
Throughout the process of reviewing the literature around mega-projects in Saudi Arabia, 
the researcher observed that a limited theoretical lens was utilised within previous 
research around the area of project failure in Saudi Arabia. The literature has identified 
ten authors who established all factors that cause failure in Saudi mega-projects and 
they are “Al-Mudlej, 1984; Al-Hazmi, 1987; Al-Ojaimi, 1989; Al-Ghafly, 1995; Assaf and 
Mohammed, 1996; Al-Khalil and Al-Ghafly, 1999; Odeh and Battaineh, 2002; Assaf and 
Al-Hejji, 2005; Arain et al., 2006” (Al-Kharashi and Skitmore, 2009, p. 4). Collectively, 
these researchers identified 112 causes of failure. These 112 causes were listed into the 
seven groups, which had been identified by Odeh and Battaineh (2002). This section 
aims to analyse these factors and demonstrate their importance toward the failure of 
Saudi mega-projects. To start, the following table shows the seven groups and the 
number of causes of failure related to each group: 
 
Table 2: Seven groups of causes of project delay. 
 
Number Group name 
Number of factors 
of delay 
1 Client related 27 
2 Contractor related 34 
3 Consultants related 12 
4 Materials related 9 
5 Labour and equipment 17 
6 Contract related 10 
7 Contractual relationships 3 
 
 
It can be seen that the total number of factors of delay from the first three groups (client 
related, contractor related and consultant related) form around 65% of the total number 
of factors of delay in Saudi Arabian mega-projects. The other four groups formed the 
remaining 35%. This observation shows that the major project actors cause the majority 
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of the causes of delay in Saudi Arabia, which again supports the case for exploring 
project failure while using a relevant theoretical lens.  
 
Another observation found within the literature on project failures in Saudi Arabia came 
via a comparison study by Assaf et al. (1995) and Assaf and Al-Hejji (2005). There was 
a ten-year gap between the two studies featured in this paper yet surprisingly, the factors 
of delay in both lists appear to be almost similar. The following table presents the 
comparison. The left column shows causes of delay published by Assaf et al. (1995) and 
the right column presents similar causes of delay published by Assaf and Al-Hejji in 
(2005). It is important to note that the 20 factors of failure listed are in no particular order.  
 
Table 3: Comparison of construction projects factors of delay between the years 
1995 and 2005 (Assaf et al., 1995; Assaf and Al-Hejji 2005). 
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From the previous comparison study of the causes of failure by Assaf et al. (1995) and 
Assaf and Al-Hejji (2005), we can draw two outcomes as follows: firstly, some of the 20 
factors of failure listed above seem to have an apparent link to issues around the 
relationships between the major actors within mega-projects. To illustrate, Assaf et al. 
(1995) and Assaf and Al-Hejji (2005) listed some factors causing delay in Saudi mega-
projects that can be related to the contractor’s exploitation behaviours in times when the 
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client was kept uninformed. For example, shortage of labour, unqualified workforce, 
shortage of equipment, unskilled equipment operators, and ineffective planning and 
scheduling by the contractor.  
 
Secondly, Assaf et al. reported that the 20 causes of delay in Saudi mega-projects listed 
in Table 3 were the same in 1995 and ten years later in 2005; and there is a possibility 
that it is still the same in the following years. This can be a result of the limited research 
conducted in the area of mega-project failure, which may have affected finding a solution 
for these causes of failure. Although, Odeh and Battaineh (2002) and Assaf and Al-Hejji 
(2005) provided some recommendations in their research. 
 
2.6.3 Recommendation for current causes of failure 
Following the identification of the list of causes of in Saudi infrastructure mega-projects, 
authors such as Odeh and Battaineh (2002) and Assaf and Al-Hejji (2005) summarised 
a list of recommendations – probably best seen as assertions – to avoid project delay in 
the Saudi context. To start with, and referring to projects in Saudi Arabia, Odeh and 
Battaineh (2002) listed the following recommendations: 
 
1. Enforcing liquidated damage clauses and offering incentives for early 
completion.  
2. Developing human resources in the construction industry through proper 
training and classifying of craftsman.  
3. Adopting a new approach to contract award procedure by giving less weight to 
prices and more weight to the capabilities and past performance of contractors. 
4. Adopting new approaches to contracting, such as design-build and construction 




Assaf and Al-Hejji (2005) recommended the following in connection with their work on 
causes of delay in large construction projects:  
1. Owners need to consider factors such as paying progress payments on-time, 
limiting the number of change orders during the construction process, avoiding 
delay in approving the project design document, and checking the capabilities 
of the bidder before signing the agreement. 
2. Contractors must pay attention to the following points: shortage and low 
productivity of the current labour force, cash flow issues, planning and 
scheduling the project activities to avoid disputes and cost overrun, and site 
management to ensure submitting the project on time, within the allocated 
budget and delivering the expected quality.  
3. Consultants should facilitate the design document review, as any delay will 
affect the work’s progress. Consultants need to be more flexible with contractors 
and keep in mind the cost and quality relationship.  
 
Faridi and El-Sayegh (2006) argued that an agreed schedule is important between 
contractors and consultants and it must be strictly followed; owners should also 
incorporate and follow the project schedule. The market needs involvement from project 
management organisations to help minimise delay. Human resource management 
needs more attention to improve labour skills and productivity. Finally, contractors need 
to allow more time for obtaining permission and approval from the government.  
 
The previous recommendations and assertions can be classified into two categories. The 
first category is related to better project management, using the PMBOK, and effectively 
applying its methods and techniques to deliver a better project outcome. (PMBOK, 2008). 
The second category was a list of recommendations provided by a number of 
76 
 
researchers, but the effectiveness of those recommendations has not been tested in 
practice to determine if they are practically valid. 
 
Furthermore, after looking at the previous list of recommendations provided by Odeh and 
Battaineh (2002) and Assaf and Al-Hejji (2005), two issues came to light. Firstly, the 
approach that was used to produce some of the recommendations was as simple as 
suggesting avoidance of the causes of failure after they had been identified (for example, 
if Factor A is a cause of delay, the recommendation is to avoid doing Factor A). Secondly, 
by reviewing the relevant literature, the process in which these recommendations were 
produced lacked the required investigation and theoretical support necessary to deliver 
a better understanding of the actual problems behind the factors of failure.  
 
2.7 Lack of generalisability in existing research 
The discussion of mega-project management in Saudi Arabia highlights a frequently 
commented upon criticism of the project management literature, namely that much of it 
is too descriptive. To take the literature regarding Saudi projects, it is said that numerous 
authors (Assaf et al., 1995; Odeh and Battaineh, 2002; Assaf and Al-Hejji, 2005; Al-
Kharashi and Skitmore, 2009; Al-Khalil and Al-Ghafly, 2010) have simply researched a 
project case, identified the surface causes of problems/failures and then reported them 
(Dyer and Paulson, 1976; Packendorff, 1995; Thomas, 2000; Cooke-Davies and 
Arzymanow, 2003; Padalkar and Gopinath, 2016). There is said to be a lack of theoretical 
engagement within the existing literature around the area of project failure, with 
Packendorff (1995) commenting that “descriptive empirical research grounded in 
theoretical problems is rare” (p. 325). The existing research merely provides 
explanations of failed projects by listing the surface causes of failure, which Padalkar 




Why this criticism is believed to be an important one is because the descriptive nature of 
such research means that it lacks theoretical generalisability. It is suggested that a 
search of the literature often reveals one paper describing certain surface causes, while 
others describe other surface causes. All of these causes, however, are said to be case-
specific and thus not amenable to generalisation. In this thesis, the researcher is, by 
contrast, looking to identify fundamental underlying causes of failure and provide 
theoretical explanations of why these causes of failure occur (see Figure 8). It does this 
in part by utilising Lundin and Söderholm (1995) ‘4Ts’ framework (discussed in this 
chapter) as a subsidiary theory. It also does this by adopting AT as the primary theory, 
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2.8 Summary  
This chapter started by defining what is meant by the term ‘project’ and examining the 
parameters of the concept of ‘project failure’. The chapter then touched on the theory of 
TO and the theory of TMO, and how these organisational forms are different from a PO. 
This was followed by an analysis of the four concepts of the critical project perspective 
(temporality, task, team and transition). Finally, the chapter explored the concept of 
mega-projects. 
 
The four concepts of TO were introduced as potential factors that might explain the 
failure of projects such as the one examined in this thesis, the HHR project. Starting with 
the concept of temporality, the projects’ limited duration was found to have a negative 
impact on a number of issues. Firstly, the failure to enhance the relationships between 
project’s team members. Secondly, the difficulty of establishing shared knowledge 
among the team members to perform projects with inter-dependent tasks (Morley and 
Silver, 1977). Thirdly, the high level of urgency to perform the project tasks, which 
increases the stress among project team members, which leads to confrontation and 
less collaboration (Turner and Müller, 2003).  
 
Task was the second concept; Lundin and Söderholm (1995) identified two factors that 
can lead to project failure within this concept. Firstly, the lack of knowledge that is 
required to manage complex tasks; and secondly, the difficulties in producing time and 
cost estimates for unique tasks. Furthermore, through the analysis of this notion, the 
issue of social organisation and process was found to be quite neglected in the project 
management literature, unlike the other three areas identified by Söderlund (2013). This 
was perceived as a factor that may hinder the process of building an effective team, 




Further analysis around the area of social organisation and process followed within the 
third concept of ‘team’. As much as it is important to choose a project team who are 
capable and competent of delivering the project, if project failure is to be avoided it is 
essential to determine the organisational (project) culture, which plays a major role in the 
project team effectiveness (Trompenaars, 1993). Furthermore, failure to build team 
integrity will inevitably reduce the level of co-ordination and co-operation between the 
TMO actors, which eventually leaves the actors to act in favour of their original 
organisations and thus increase the likelihood of project failure.  
 
Finally, the last concept concerns the project team transition. The complexity of projects, 
necessitated the employment of different actors at different stages of a project; and this 
makes it harder to form a performing project team. Therefore, a bigger margin for project 
failure exists.  
 
Therefore, the four core characteristics of projects are presented as potential factors 
behind the HHR project failures. However, as mentioned in the introduction, the prime 
theory for exploring the HHR project failure is AT. As it turned out, and as is discussed 
in detail in chapter 3, the analysis of the ‘4Ts’ started to suggest why this might be an 
appropriate theoretical lens. During the analysis of the four concepts, projects were found 
to be complex in nature, particularly in the case of mega-projects which have also been 
discussed in this chapter. This was said to require project clients to hire specialist 
organisations to perform different tasks, at different stages of a project, under conditions 
of limited performance duration. As a result, a number of problems were said to 
commonly arise, which, in turn, were said to cause project failure in a direct or indirect 
manner. Arguably, however, many of the identified problems within TMOs and the critical 
perspective of projects are, at their core, APs. Thus, to be able to understand these 







Since Meyerson et al. (1996) and Lundin and Söderholm (1995) suggest that projects 
with a certain level of complexity are expected to be delivered by a TO for the interest of 
a PO. It becomes factual that the organisational structure of a project is formed of the 
principal and numerous agents. This was one of the reasons why it was felt appropriate 
for AT to be the prime theory in this thesis for explaining the HHR project failure. In this 
chapter, AT is discussed in detail. Its overlap with the critical perspective on projects is 
also explained. 
 
3.1 Agency theory and a critical perspective on projects 
AT is concerned with the potentially opportunistic behaviours of agents, at the expense 
of the principal, and how the principal might manage them (Mitnick, 2013; Steinle et al., 
2014). It is the second area of the literature review (see Figure 2). This section seeks to 
highlight the overlap in the literature between the first area, critical perspective of 













The initial need for the existence of the ‘project’ entity on the part of POs arguably creates 
an impact on both areas of Figure 9. This impact can be illustrated as an opportunity that 
is associated with subsequent threat. The opportunity is potential business growth, 
achieved by the successful completion of complex tasks within the PO, but executed by 
a TO due to the lack of speciality within the PO (Lundin and Söderholm, 1995). Projects 
draw together different skill sets to solve a business problem and create value. 
 
However, the PO (as the owner of the project dealing with agents) is also faced with the 
threat of losing control over the delegated task to the TO. This separation between 
ownership and control provides the potential for APs and is something that is inherent to 
the project environment (Charreaux, 2004).  
 
The literature review in Chapter 2 examined a range of critical perspectives on projects 
and project management via the four concepts that define TOs. Haniff and Ogunlana 
(2015) and Lindkvist, (2005) considered time to be the distinguishing feature that 
differentiates a TO from a PO. Therefore, the concept of temporality can be used to 
illustrate the overlap between the two areas of literature. As mentioned in Chapter 2, 
temporariness can be defined as a limited and short time to achieve organisational goals 
(Palisis and Bartolomeo, 1970; Söderlund, 2013), or as a short time for the actors to 
integrate and create interpersonal relations (Lanzara, 1983). Either way, the implications 
of project temporality are very much in the realm of AT. 
 
Within the project management literature, the implications of project short duration have 
been described as: 
1. Not sufficient time for project actors to develop good relationships among each 
other and to establish tightly working groups (Morley and Silver, 1977). 
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2. Inadequate time to enhance the level of the project actors’ familiarity with the 
allocated task and to establish sufficient shared knowledge about the task 
(Morley and Silver, 1977). 
3. Because of the short duration, TO members tend to focus on the present task 
rather than the effect of their present behaviour on future relationships (Bakker 
et al., 2013).  
4. Although, Robert et al. (2009), Jarvenpaa et al. (1998) and Guangquan et al. 
(2007) argued that despite the short time period in projects, team members are 
able in some occasions to overcome this dilemma and establish a level of trust 
among themselves. 
 
The above implications of short project duration can have either a positive or negative 
outcome on a project, depending on their occurrence within a project. If only conditions 
one to three apply to a project situation, then the short project duration will have a 
negative effect. However, if condition four applies as well, the negative effect of the other 
three might be mitigated. 
 
Mukherji et al. (2007) used these implications of short project duration to highlight two 
types of project working: 
  
 A cooperative/collaborative relationship (where one to four applies). 
 Conflicting and confrontational relationship (where one to three applies). 
 
The first, a cooperative/collaborative relationship, is considered a constructive approach 
to building the required effective communication channel between different project 
actors. Such a channel enables them to tackle issues that arise during the project 
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execution and establish shared ground to achieve the project goal. The second scenario, 
however, is seen as less constructive and means the project actors face considerable 
difficulties in eliminating the implications of a project’s short duration, and lays the 
foundations for AP. Mukherji et al. (2007) work through various eventualities in relation 
to the second scenario as seen below: 
 
 Firstly, a TMO is characterised by the diversity of the project actors. This 
diversity can be based on personal backgrounds or the members’ professions. 
Either way, it can be associated with an increased level of uncertainty and 
conflict (McGrath, 1991). In an organisational culture, where the main 
orientation is towards performing the task and not having sufficient time to 
optimise the project actors’ relationship nature, once conflict of interest comes 
into action between actors, this division in the relationship will often be the start 
of an AP (Caers et al., 2006). 
 
 Secondly, where conflict and confrontation is the norm of the relationship 
between project actors, and in line with the difficulty of establishing shared 
knowledge due to the shortage of time (Morley and Silver, 1977), relationship 
integrity between the actors is hardly going to exist. Therefore, the gap between 
the relationship actors is likely to be more pronounced and, due to the lack of 
shared knowledge, one actor might have an information advantage over the 
other and that can lead to asymmetry of information, which is a second 
component of the AP.  
 
 The third scenario occurs when different actors have different goals and 
objectives from the project. As a result of the conflictual nature of the 
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relationship, the tension will rise between them (Alsedairy, 1994) and it is likely 
that different project actors will consider achieving their own goals and interests 
from the project as a result of the project short duration, and they will not 
consider the impact of their behaviour for any future situation (Bakker et al., 
2013). Thus, the project short duration and its implication will result in the case 
where some actors behave opportunistically to reach their own goals.  
 
These problems are said to be heightened where there are numerous multi-disciplinary 
organisations, to the extent that it has been suggested that the term ‘project team’ 
should, in construction projects, be replaced by the term TMOs (Cherns and Bryant, 
1984; Davidson, 1988; Rowlinson and McDermott, 1999). In construction projects, there 
is a hierarchical complexity because of the number of organisations involved in a project 
and the interdependency of the activities they undertake. When combined with short 
project duration, the existence of the TMO may lead to multiple APs. 
 
Thus, it can be seen that the (especially critical) project management literature, even 
when discussing other specialist project management concepts and perspectives, 
outlines scenarios that are very much in line with AT. There is a clear overlap between 
critical perspectives on project and AT. In this thesis, this will be made more explicit, a 
task that starts by outlining the main components of AT.  
 
3.1.1 Justification of selection of theoretical lens 
Before outlining and discussing the components of AT, it is necessary to explain why AT 
has been chosen as the primary theory for this thesis. The explanation starts by noting 
that the initial inspiration for this study was the observation of the failure in the delivery 
of the HHR mega-project. From preliminary informal observations, and from the first 
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stages of this study, it became apparent to the researcher that the HHR mega-project, 
the first project of its kind in the region to be built by the Saudi Railway Organisation 
(SRO), included a large number of project actors, which led to the existence of multiple 
principal-agent relationships. AT was at that stage seen as one potential theoretical lens 
that could be used, but there were potentially others too. 
 
What pushed the researcher further down the line towards AT was a perception from the 
early observations and stages of the study that the failure within the project might have 
been to a significant extent caused by information asymmetry and opportunistic 
behaviours within the principal-agent relationships. 
 
The above features of this case then aligned with a gap in the literature identified by 
Ceric (2014). Ceric claimed that the current presence of AT within the project literature, 
especially in the area of construction mega-projects failure, is weak, notwithstanding the 
research that she herself had done to try to address the gap. Furthermore, Ceric (2014) 
also noted that there is no existing research that addresses more than the four 
participants (project client, client’s project manager, contractor and contractor’s project 
manager), which were included in her research. Ceric’s contribution here was interesting 
to the researcher because it simultaneously confirmed the researcher’s initial thoughts 
that AT was relevant to mega-project failure, while also making clear that there was a 
significant research gap, not least in the case of the more complex multi-agent mega-
projects. 
 
Both practical and theoretical reasons, therefore, appeared to justify choosing AT as a 




It is understood by the researcher that the existence of opportunistic behaviours from the 
agents’ side within the HHR mega-project does not automatically indicate AT. For 
example, such behaviours could have potentially pointed to the use of transactional cost 
economy theory (TCE). This provided the researcher with an opportunity to choose 
between AT and TCE, two theories underpinned by the opportunism assumption. 
However, the origin of the opportunism within the HHR mega-project seemed, from initial 
observation, to be coming more from information asymmetry and incentive misalignment 
(AT) than from incomplete contracts and hold up issues (TCE). This observation 
determined the decision not to pursue TCE. 
 
Equally, inter-organisational relationships can also be investigated by resource 
dependence theory (RDT), which was another potential theory to explain HHR mega-
project failure. Malatesta & Smith (2014) identified three principals pertaining to RDT as 
follows: firstly, the need for resources by organisations to achieve their goals; secondly, 
that these resources can be obtained from the same organisation or from other 
organisations; and thirdly, the role of power and how it is considered an important factor 
in understanding the inter-organisational relationships when an organisation seeks to 
obtain required resources from another organisation.  
 
The opportunism seen in the initial observations of the HHR project could, in theory, be 
a result of power asymmetry between principals and agents being exploited. While power 
is not the same as opportunism, opportunism can result from power asymmetries. The 
researcher recognised the potential relevance to the HHR project. There is a large 
literature on buyer-supplier power and how it affects inter-organisational relationships. 
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Chicksand (2015), for example, highlighted the importance of understanding the different 
level of power between actors within business relationships when undertaking a proper 
analysis of forming appropriate relationships. Chicksand stated that “it was argued that 
for partnerships to succeed, there should be an equal sharing of risk and rewards, and 
this is most likely to be achieved when there is a balanced power position between the 
buyer and supplier (interdependence)” (2015, p. 128). By the same respect, a less 
trusting relationship than a partnership might be more likely when power is imbalanced. 
 
In the case of the HHR mega-project, the various agents’ opportunistic behaviours could, 
in theory, be an outcome of imbalanced power relations between the principal and these 
agents. As mentioned, there is literature saying that power can lead to opportunism, in 
particular, supplier opportunism. This can occur through the agents exploiting the power 
asymmetry and behave opportunistically (Chicksand, 2009), knowing the balance of 
scarcity and utility means that the relationship is both of relatively limited importance to 
them and easily replaced.  
 
However, the initial observation of the case suggested that it was information asymmetry 
rather than power asymmetry that resulted with the agents’ opportunistic behaviour. In 
particular, there was no particular evidence that suppliers (agents) were dominant.  
 
There can always be arguments over the choice of theoretical lens for a piece of 
research, but, taking all the above into consideration, AT was considered appropriate as 




3.2 Origins of Agency Theory 
Much of the early analysis of AT was carried out by Berle and Means (1932). Berle and 
Means posed the classical agency-theory problem, the division between owners and 
agents (Williamson, 1996). Following the 1929 financial crisis, the classical AT came to 
light as a result of the segregation of ownership from control, thus creating two functions 
within the structure of a corporation (Charreaux, 2004).  
 
Subsequent development of AT gave way to two different approaches: economic and 
institutional (Williamson, 1996). Ross and Mitnick were prominent in developing the 
economic approach, studying compensation contracting problems and the personal 
incentives problem (Mitnick, 2013). Analysis from the institutional perspective also 
generated interesting analysis and findings. Barnard (1938) had observed that within 
employment relationships, supervisors and workers observed a zone of discretion or 
indifference within which the worker made key choices (Mitnick, 2013). This prompted 
further analysis of organisational structure and leadership culture (Olaniran et al., 2015).  
 
While containing different approaches, AT is based upon certain comment components. 
These are now these discussed in detail below. 
 
3.3 Components of Agency Theory 
In the context of applying AT to the mega-project environment, there are five main 
components of AT that need to be discussed. Firstly, the principal-agent division, and 
secondly, the asymmetry of information that can occur between principals and agents. 
These two components can then lead to agents acting in an opportunistic manner (the 
third component), which is regarded by Williamson (1985) as realistic agent behaviour. 
The forth component is concerned with techniques and mechanisms to deal with the pre- 
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or post-contract opportunistic behaviours, with unsuccessful management leaving APs 
(either adverse selection or moral hazard) unsolved. The final component looks at the 
presence of multiple principal-agent issues that are commonly found in projects, 
particularly mega-projects.  
 
3.3.1 The Principal-Agent Division 
This component was the initial reason for the manifestation of the AT. Since the 1930s, 
literature has emerged that has analysed and explored the relationship between the two 
actors; the first actor being the principal and the second the agent (Nie, 2010). On the 
one hand, the principal provides the financial means/resources for (in this context) the 
project, as well as approving forecasts, plans and milestones. The principal monitors the 
project and accepts project completion (PMI, 2000). On the other hand, the agent has 
been delegated the responsibility, by the principal, to conduct the day-to-day 
management of the project. It is the responsibility of the agent to ensure, through his 
managerial role, that he steers the project towards the agreed objectives (IPMA, 1999).  
 
This work delegation initiates a principal-agent relationship between the owners and the 
agents, as owners depend on their agents to undertake the work on their behalf (Müller 
and Turner, 2005). The prevalence of this relationship has resulted in literature that 
analyses the behaviour of both the principal and the agent in numerous ways, which will 
be discussed throughout this chapter. It has also analysed such behaviour in different 
contexts. Yilmaz and Muslumov (2008) examined the area of insurance, where banks 
undertake high risks that are associated with moral hazard. Other study contexts include 
political contexts (Fratianni et al., 1997) and principal-agent relationships within 




Business-to-business relationships are another important area in which the principal-
agent relationship has been analysed within the literature. This literature looks into the 
principal-agent relationship between suppliers and buyers (Steinle et al., 2014), and 
includes three prominent areas of analysis. The first area looks at the manufacturing 
environment, where manufacturers act as principals and the distributors act as their 
agents. The second area looks at the service environment, such as the management 
and labour sectors (Mukherji et al., 2007). The third area deals with the project 
management environment, where the project owners are the principals and the 
contractors are the agents, who ought to deliver the principal’s objectives from within the 
project. The latter is the focus of this thesis: the project management environment.  
 
It appears, within the current literature on principal-agent problem in projects, that there 
is no consensus on the nature of the principal-agent relationship, although those 
accepting the dictates of AT are relatively few, making the use of AT within the project 
(and particularly construction mega-project) environment relatively thin. There is 
agreement that the principal-agent relationship begins when the principal depends on 
the agent to carry out work on its behalf (Bergen et al., 1992). However, while Fenling 
and Feiran (2012) deemed such relationships to be contractual and sometimes 
conflictual in nature, there are other assumptions in the literature that contextualise the 
relationship in other ways.  
 
So, while Caers et al. (2006) states that a basic assumption within AT is that there is a 
conflict between the interests of the principal and the interests of his agents, other 
authors such as Mukherji et al. (2007) have mentioned other assumptions, such as 
cooperation and collaboration, as well as accepting the existence of confrontation, 




To further understand the nature of the relationship between the principal and agent, it 
is imperative that we understand how the relationship is formed, as the relationship 
formation method may affect its nature. Business-to-business relationships can be 
envisaged as a status that has been built up or formulated by the parties involved. The 
formation process of this relationship can be influenced by the characteristics of both 
parties, or by the nature of the interaction between them during the relationship 
development process (Hardy and Phillips, 1998). The interaction may involve a series of 
business negotiations, which might also affect the outcome and the relationship status 
(Hakansson and Snehota, 1995). If associated with characteristics such as cooperation 
and collaboration, then the outcome can result in a stable relationship. It has been 
suggested that this exists where parties are found to be tied together in a balanced, 
stable and informal bond (Stevenson and Greenberg, 2000). However, it is recognised 
that this is not always the case and that the formation of the relationship might set the 
scene for conflict (Hakansson and Snehota, 1995; Mukherji et al., 2007). 
 
3.3.2 Information asymmetry 
The second component of AT addresses the problem of asymmetry of information, and 
will be discussed within the business-to-business relationship context. In this context, a 
relationship is formed between principal (buyer) and agent (supplier). Following the day-
to-day work delegation from the principal to the agent, Provan (1991) and Xiang et al. 
(2015) contended that agents have an information advantage over their principals. 
Further, Provan’s research suggests that there is a positive relationship between the 
amount of information received by an individual and the influence of this individual on 
the decision-making process. Therefore, because agents have the information 
advantage over principals, it can be assumed that the information that they possess 
allows them to undertake the required decisions. Since the principal has less information, 
it can be assumed that it is less able to understand the effectiveness of, and justification 
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for, that decision (Provan, 1991). This illustrates the information advantage the agent 
may have over the principal.  
 
Another way to interpret this information advantage is from a technical level, in terms of 
the technical performance side (Xiang et al., 2015). In supplying products or services, 
the agents are the experts and are considered superior in having technical, as well as 
managerial information. Normally, this expert information will not be shared with the 
principal, as it is the core skill of the agent's business. It has been observed that this 
often creates instability in the relationship between principals and agents (Caers et al., 
2006). 
 
Following the description of the above two contexts of information asymmetry, it is 
important to note that the literature defines two types of information: public and private 
information (Borisova and Yadav, 2015; Aguirre and Beitia, 2017). The first is when both 
parties (principal and agent) are aware of the same information; the second is when one 
party (most likely the agent in this case) withholds and solely possesses certain 
information. Borisova and Yadav (2015) discussed that information advantage in 
business-to-business relationships can arise through two different scenarios: firstly, it 
can occur through skilled analysis of available public information; and secondly, due to 
the existence of private information that is not available within the public domain. 
Therefore, private information will certainly lead to information asymmetry (Liu et al., 
2016); and public information could do so, if one or both parties do not have the skills to 
professionally analyse public information as required (Borisova and Yadav, 2015).  
 
Therefore, one way or another, there can be an occurrence of information asymmetry. 
This can destabilise a relationship between a principal and an agent. But does it always 
have to? This is debated in the literature. Caers et al. (2006) contended that the concept 
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of information asymmetry is not necessarily a negative concept. This can be the case, 
first, where the principal’s and the agent's interests are perfectly aligned and they have 
established a cooperative and collaborative relationship, both of which are relationship 
forms that, according to Mukherji et al. (2007), commonly exist between principals and 
agents. This can be illustrated as follows: in the case of public information, where both 
parties can peruse the available information – but for some reason one party is not aware 
of certain information – the cooperative collaborative nature of the relationship will help 
the two parties to adjust the situation to a state where both parties are informed (Caers 
et al., 2006). Second, in the context of private information, in a business-to-business 
exchange some of this private information might be commercially trivial. This is another 
scenario where information asymmetry will not necessarily cause a failure in delivering 
the project benefits according to the principal's requirements.  
 
However, these two above scenarios may not always apply. For example, the private 
information in the relationship between the two parties might be critical and might help 
the informed party substantially increase commercial returns in the relationship (Mukherji 
et al., 2007). In a cooperative relationship between the two parties where their interests 
are aligned, it is expected that this information would be shared between them (Crosby 
et al., 1990; Coulter and Coulter, 2002). However, if the information is not shared, this 
can result in another potential scenario.  
 
Mukherji et al. (2007) described the principal-agent relationship as potentially having 
other characteristics from cooperation and collaboration. It was said it can be 
characterised by confrontation, conflict and exploitation. Both parties may also not have 
similar interests from the project. The natures of these characteristics are far from 
positive and likely to result in negative implications that are not in line with the principal's 
expectation. In such scenarios, the agent (supplier) will take advantage of the information 
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asymmetry that exists, in order to forward their own interests, with very little consideration 
to the principal's interest (Xiang et al., 2015). Due to the lack of the principal’s expertise 
to analyse available public information, or the inability to obtain private information from 
the agent, the agent tends to make critical decisions on the principal's behalf (Bergen et 
al., 1992); the principal is then not in a capacity to assess these decisions. The agent's 
exploitation of this information asymmetry occurs to achieve the agent’s organisational 
goals.  
 
This notion of the agent taking advantage of this scenario leads us to the third component 
of AT. This is the controversial concept of opportunism.  
 
3.3.3 The possibility of opportunism  
The concept of opportunism has been defined by Williamson (1979) as a seeking 
process for self-interest that is associated with guile. In the context of this thesis, it means 
opportunism exhibited by the agent (supplier) to take advantage of the principal (buyer) 
by making managerial and/or technical decisions against the principal’s interests. This is 
possible as the agent exploits the advantageous position they are in with regard to 
information. These decisions are most likely to deliver the agent's interests out of the 
project.  
 
Opportunism is purely selfish behaviour as it ignores other actors' interests (Lai et al., 
2005). It is perceived by some as a common behavioural phenomenon within any social-
economic activities, although others demur on this (Mohamed et al., 2011; Church et al., 
2014; Brookes et al., 2015). The potential of this selfish behaviour would increase under 
circumstances where the information asymmetry increases in a relationship (Xiong and 




3.3.3.1 Type of opportunism 
The literature on opportunistic behaviour, in a business-to-business context, 
differentiates between various types of opportunism. Wathne and Heide (2000) 
distinguished active from passive opportunism; they also classified being opportunistic 
as an act of violation, evasion, refusal to adapt or forced renegotiation. Other 
researchers, such as Masten (1988) and Luo (2006), identified weak from strong 
opportunism. Weak opportunism is the violation of unwritten agreements, but 
undermines relational norms. The occurrence of weak opportunism can be explained as 
the result of a lack of cooperation and/or a lack of moral organisational norms. Whereas 
the strong form of opportunism is defined as explicit violation of contractual agreement 
(Masten, 1988; Luo, 2006).  
 
Since there are claims that contracts can guard against opportunistic actions, a question 
remains as to why the strong form of opportunism still occurs, even when there are 
contractual documents in place (Schepker et al., 2014). One possible explanation to the 
latter question may be weakly designed contractual documents, in which there are 
insufficient governing clauses. The agent may exploit this weakness, violate the contract 
and take the opportunity to push forth his own personal agenda (Schepker et al., 2014).  
 
D’Alpaos et al. (2013) provided another possible explanation: even at the presence of 
penalty clauses, agents may conduct an opportunistic behaviour, which can have three 
possible explanations. The first possible explanation claims that agents may act 
opportunistically depending on the committed fee and the associated costs imposed by 
the court of law in order to settle the dispute between the two parties. The second 
discusses whether the value of the gain from the opportunistic behaviour is greater than 
the penalty imposed on the agent in the event of delay (D’Alpaos et al., 2013). The final 
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explanation is that the principal will not raise any disputes case to the court, for one of 
two factors: firstly, the discretion of the court in enforcing the penalty clauses (i.e. the 
principal could lose), as well as the efficiency of the court system (i.e. the length of time 
the trial may consume), can often lead to the principal favouring an informal settlement 
of the dispute; and secondly, an unwillingness on the part of the principal to destroy a 
valuable relationship, which might cost the principal more than any court gain (Atanasov 
et al., 2012).  
 
Opportunism has also been described as either subtle or blatant. Muris (1981) defined 
blatant opportunistic behaviour as the obvious attempts to behave opportunistically. This 
reflects the type of relationship between the two parties, and how the business outcome 
is the only concern of the agent. The subtle form is when the act of opportunism is difficult 
to detect, and is possibly masked to look like a legitimate un-opportunistic act. It can 
occur through a number of ways such as distortion of data, cheating, stealing, 
misrepresentation and false threats (Anderson, 1988).  
 
3.3.3.2 Suggestions of bias in AT 
Regardless of what type of opportunism the agent might adopt, one of the key 
assumptions of AT is that there is a significant chance that agents will act 
opportunistically and will be self-interest driven (Mukherji et al., 2007). However, some 
argue that one should be a little careful about labelling agency behaviour in this way, and 
that AT is ‘biased’ toward principal’s interests. This can be illustrated in what Bergen et 
al. stated:  
 
"It is important to note that most agency models define efficiency from the 
principal's point of view. The assumption is that the principal is the dominant 
party in the relationship. Thus an efficient contract is one that brings about 
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the best possible outcome for the principal given the constraints imposed by 
the situation, rather than one that maximizes the joint utility of both principal 
and agent" (1992, p. 2). 
 
Liu et al. (2016) said that the principal should actually consider increasing the benefits 
allocated to the agent in proportion with the opportunistic tendency – “the more obvious 
the opportunistic tendency, the higher the incentive intensity and the greater the 
proportion of benefits allocation should be” (p. 1109). This gives rise to the argument of 
whether AT bias toward the principal’s interest is behind the assumption of agent 
opportunism in the principal-agent relationship.  
 
Wherever the answer to this may lie, the view is taken in this thesis that such behaviour 
should be conceived as opportunism. Moreover, of prime interest to the discussion of AT 
here, the existence of the agent’s opportunistic behaviour increases the significance of 
the aforementioned principal-agent division and heightens the significance of the 
aforementioned information asymmetry issues between the two parties. As Mejia et al. 
(2005) comment, opportunistic behaviour by agents can occur mainly when the 
information asymmetry between the two parties (principal and agent) is high. The 
justification of this opportunism occurrence belief is that high information asymmetry 
increases the difficulty for principals to claim whether agents are acting opportunistically 
or not (Xiang et al., 2015).  
 
Researchers such as Selviaridis and Wynstra (2015) suggested that one way for 
principals to mitigate these opportunistic behaviours is through contract design. Cavusgil 
et al. (2005) and Huo et al. (2016) perceived the role of contracts as an effective 
safeguard and deterrent against opportunism by specifying rewards and punishment and 
through the enforcement of law. This controlling mechanism of the suppliers’ tendency 
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toward opportunism is essentially optional between the following two forms of contracts: 
firstly, behavioural-based contract by specifying to the suppliers how to behave 
(directives and rules); secondly, outcome-based contract by specifying what to achieve 
(defining, measuring outcomes) (Fayezi et al., 2012). According to Eisenhardt (1989), 
the latter type (outcome-based contract) is more effective when: (1) the principal is risk 
averse; (2) there is a substantial goal conflict between principal and agent; and (3) the 
project outcome is measurable. Thus, by addressing transaction and actor 
characteristics, AT can inform whether outcome-based contracts would be more 
effective (Selviaridis and Wynstra, 2015). Of course, in this thesis, the choice is to a 
significant degree academic, as the researcher is only assessing the causes of project 
failure and whether AT provides a convincing explanation, not going into great detail 
about how the failure might be addressed, including contractually. 
 
Having established the concept of opportunism and contract design as a controlling 
mechanism, we need to engage with an issue that has been mentioned above in passing. 
Namely, the degree to which opportunism is a common form of behaviour. This is now 
discussed. 
 
3.3.3.3 Debating the extent of opportunism in the economy 
There is a long-running debate regarding the incidence of opportunism within the 
academic literature. This debate has two sides. Firstly, some researchers contest the 
idea of a significant presence of opportunism in business-to-business markets and claim 
that AT and transaction cost economy (TCE) theory exaggerates its existence (Shapiro, 
2005). The second side of the debate is conducted by, among others, AT and TCE 
researchers, who beg to differ by assuring the existence of opportunism and believing 
that it is a realistic behavioural assumption (Williamson, 1993b; Shelanski and Klein, 
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1995; Geyskens et al., 2006; Macher and Richman, 2008; Handley and Angst, 2015; 
Kang and Jindal, 2015).  
 
The first side of the debate is concerned with the critics of opportunism. It started when 
the concept of opportunism arose in the 1970s. Since then, there have been several 
criticisms and challenges toward the concept of opportunism. To illustrate, Hakansson 
and Snehota (2006) stated that opportunism is a minor part of business-to-business 
strategic exchange. From their definition of the term ‘strategy’, they identified the concept 
of opportunism as a minor part of business strategic behaviour. Moreover, the evidence 
of opportunism being a major feature of businesses was, they said, less than conclusive 
(Hakansson and Snehota, 2006).  
 
Moreover, some of the non-economic literature on AT ruled out opportunism and 
considered it an unrealistic assumption (Shapiro, 2005). Indeed, Kauppi and Raaij (2015) 
contended that in many cases opportunism is actually 'honest incompetence'. This 
concept regards both parties (principal and agent) to be honest but with less competence 
(Hendry, 2002), which can be explained as follows: the principal may not be competent 
enough to deliver a project's precise expectations to the agent, or the agent may not 
have the required competence to understand those deliverables, which will eventually 
affect the way in which the agent behaves. 
 
One reason why it has been argued that opportunism might be a minor feature of 
business markets is that social relations bestow social obligations (Granovetter, 1985), 
which, it is said, proponents of the opportunism concept underplay. Granovetter (1985) 
claimed that opportunism is an under-socialised concept, as it "does not allow for the 
extent to which concrete personal relations and the obligations inherent in them 
discourage malfeasance, quite apart from the institutional arrangement" (p. 489). In 
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terms of personal relationships, a strong concrete relationship is associated with a 
number of expectations and obligations and is characterised by certain ethical 
behavioural norms and morals, such as trust, which is considered sufficient to discourage 
opportunistic behaviour by the parties involved. Further discussion on trust and ethical 
responsibilities will follow. 
 
Where trust exists within a principal-agent relationship, the trustor (the principal) is 
accepting vulnerability to any uncertain behaviour from the trustee (the agent). The fact 
that the principal trusts his agent, it is argued, creates an ethical responsibility for the 
agent, and this is generally associated with the idea of morally right behaviour. Thus, 
principal is trusting the agent not to exploit certain situations and there is a duty on the 
agent not to act opportunistically (Greenwood and Buren, 2010).  
 
Trust, it is argued, can be an existing relationship factor between principal and agent, 
certainly in cases where the two parties have worked together in previous projects. In 
other cases, where principal and agent have not yet developed a trusting relationship, 
multiple researchers who looked into the relationship theory indicated that it is 
realistically possible to establish trust, as well as commitment, through 'growing 
relationship length' (Bhattacharya et al., 1998; Rousseau et al., 1998; Deeds and Hill, 
1999; Lai et al., 2005).  
 
Starting from the vulnerable actor (principal), Mayer and Gavin (2005) argued that the 
acceptance of a vulnerable actor to be in that position with another actor – at the time 
where trust is present in the relationship – shows commitment and willingness to be more 
interactive and work in growing the relationship. On the other hand, Mayer et al. (1995) 
proposed three attributes of the agent (trustee) to build perceived trustworthiness: firstly, 
the abilities and competences of the trustee to build trust; secondly, benevolence, and 
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this concerns the trustee’s belief that he wants to act correctly towards the trustor 
(principal), aside from thinking about the profit motives; and finally, integrity, which refers 
to the ability of principal to govern agents’ behaviours. Thus, the principal’s commitment 
to cooperate, alongside with the agent’s willingness to act accordingly, will result in a 
continuous cooperative approach in their relationship. Alexrod (1984) contended that 
relationship-based trust can be developed over time, as long as there was a pattern of 
co-operative behaviour between principal and agent.  
 
Following the establishment of relationship-based trust, Crosby et al. (1990) and Coulter 
and Coulter (2002) argued that through growing relationship length principals are able to 
reduce the level of vulnerability by gathering more information about the agents, which 
will result in minimising the information asymmetry, simultaneously, allowing agents to 
adapt their goals to those of the principal. Hence, both parties have aligned objectives 
and the principal’s vulnerability is finally eliminated through sharing the relevant 
knowledge and unifying their goals. Thus, growing and increasing the relationship length 
between principal and agent is a tool to build shared knowledge between the two actors 
and build knowledge-based trust. Therefore, there is a direct positive relation between 
the relationship length and trust.  
 
A final argument on this side of the debate concerns a suspicion that many researchers 
have ignored the aforementioned effect of social relations and exaggerate in the 
presence of opportunism because they want to justify the necessity of "hierarchical 
control mechanisms such as monitoring and incentives" (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996, p. 





Sitting behind the above arguments is empirical research which some argue supports 
the idea that opportunism is a minor economic problem. Researchers from this side of 
the debate argue that there is a lack of sufficient empirical support within the literature 
for the concept of opportunism, which further undermines the case for the concept 
(Carter and Hodgson, 2006; Yam and Chan, 2015).  
 
On the second side of the debate, however, researchers such as Williamson (1993b) 
and Shelanski and Klein (1995) disagree with the above and consider opportunism to be 
a realistic assumption in their studies. Despite of all the challenges and criticisms 
discussed above – which were taken into account by AT and TCE researchers – they 
have argued that the concept of opportunism has been critically assessed in the 
development of their commercial frameworks and that it is a realistic behavioural 
assumption. This has been explained from a number of perspectives.  
 
The first explanation was provided within the transaction cost analysis theory. This theory 
suggests that many business partners will act opportunistically whenever the opportunity 
becomes available in order to achieve certain organisational objectives. Klein and 
Paladino (1996) stated that agents carry out a cost-benefit analysis to help in directing 
their behaviour by measuring the financial gains and losses. In such cases, if the agents’ 
gains from an opportunistic act are more than the losses then they will act 
opportunistically.  
 
The second perspective acknowledged the effect of culture on individuals who act 
opportunistically (Williamson, 1993a). Studies have taken into consideration, for 
example, national cultural differences to explain the basic assumption of opportunism. 
Despite what has been discussed as general cultural considerations, there is not a 
theoretical framework that explicitly demonstrates how culture can affect the 
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opportunistic behaviour of an economic actor. However, it has been argued that cultures 
that are characterised with a high degree of individualism might exhibit opportunistic 
behaviour more often than collectivist cultures. This is because individualist societies 
prioritise tasks over relationships (Hofstede, 2011). Therefore, keeping valuable 
relationship is not considered as an incentive to dismiss a chance of opportunistic 
behaviour.  
 
This can lead to the third explanation, which considers opportunistic propensity as part 
of human nature (Chen et al., 2002). This is, of course, controversial and has arguably 
led economists into speculating about specific scientific matters.  
 
Overall, therefore, supporting the previous debate, authors such as Williamson (1993b) 
and Shelanski, Klein (1995), Geyskens et al. (2006), Macher and Richman (2008),  
Handley and Angst (2015) and Kang and Jindal (2015) considered opportunism to be a 
realistic behavioural assumption and, like the camp criticising the concept, have 
marshalled evidence to support their case. The debate does not look likely to be settled 
soon. This thesis, however, will proceed on the basis outlined by AT, that opportunism 
is a significant possibility and requires a managerial response. 
 
3.3.3.4 Specific types of opportunism – pre and post-contract opportunism 
It can be seen from the above analysis that the principal-agent division and information 
asymmetry create the conditions where an agent can exploit the principal’s vulnerable 
position. It is argued by many that the agent will exploit the principal if it has an 
opportunistic disposition and the circumstances mean that the gain to the agent from 
opportunism outweighs the risk of detection and retribution on the part of the principal. 
What is to be established in this section is that the exploitation can take place in two 
different stages of a project. Opportunism in each stage has been distinguished as a 
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totally different type. There are two types of opportunism in particular that have been 
identified by many researchers (Caers et al., 2006; Ceric, 2012; Eriksson, 2016) - 
adverse selection (pre-contractual) and moral hazard (post-contractual). 
 
Adverse selection is the type of opportunism that occurs before signing a contract 
between principal and agent. At the pre-contractual stage, the principal can only gather 
public information about the agent. In the same instance, it is challenging for the principal 
to obtain private information about the agent. Therefore, due to this information 
asymmetry, the principal is not able to observe, collect or verify the relevant information 
and characteristics about the agent or manager before setting up the contractual 
document (Caers et al., 2006; Saam, 2007). The failure to solve the information 
asymmetry between principal and agent in such a case will affect the selection process 
of the agent by the principal. This may result in the principal choosing an agent with the 
wrong level of competence and who may not be capable to deliver the principal's goals.  
 
To illustrate by way of example, Pontes (1995) argued that agents hold more information 
about their own characteristics and capabilities than principals and they may use this 
asymmetry of information in exaggerating their competence and commitment, showing 
their overconfidence of their ability to achieve principals’ goals (Rosa, 2011). 
Researchers have also mentioned how agents may provide false forecasts of price 
estimations to principals, and underestimate the probability of a bad outcome to 
encourage the project initiation (Wachs, 1990; Rosa, 2011). Agents are said to do this 
just to get the project started, as they know that it is rare for a principal to stop a 
commenced project and that the money will always be found (Wachs, 1990). For 
example, in the UK, MacDonald (2002) found that in 50 road projects, the final costs 




The second type of opportunism is moral hazard, which is known as post-contractual 
opportunism (Eriksson, 2016). It occurs where there is a division between the principal 
and agent, a degree of information asymmetry and when the principal is not fully 
confident that the agent will act on the principal’s behalf once the contract is signed. In 
particular, moral hazard occurs where the agent can obtain more private information 
through its actions, which might be very difficult for the principal to observe (Fenling and 
Feiran, 2012). Furthermore, Alparslan (2006) argued that not only can hidden actions 
cause moral hazard, but hidden intentions as well, and that exacerbates the difficulty of 
the principal to identify this type of agent opportunism. 
 
Because of the low level of confidence the principal has towards the agent, and the 
information advantage the agent has over the principal, the agent is able to prioritise his 
own interests from the project. This prioritisation will be at the cost of the principal’s 
interest. Therefore, the agent will only deliver the principal’s interests if they are aligned 
with his (Müller and Turner, 2005). AT suggested a solution for this problem through the 
realignment of principal and agent interests in the contractual document, an option now 
discussed (Müller and Turner, 2005).  
 
3.3.4 Opportunism management  
As discussed earlier in the opportunism section, there are two generic possible outcomes 
once there is division between principal and agent and once information asymmetry 
exists. The first outcome is when trust is the moral norm between the two parties. In the 
context of lean supply management, Lamming (1996) stated that under such moral 
norms “problems that occur are targets for solution, not opportunities for reinforcement 




In this scenario, the agent’s opportunistic behaviour is removed from the equation. 
Hence, both parties are not divided, and both share the relevant knowledge and 
information that is required to perform certain tasks. In addition, they will work together 
to find solutions for issues that slow down work progress. They both put trust in each 
other, in the hope that nobody will get fooled (Bohren, 1998), and, eventually, the 
information asymmetry will be eradicated (Mukherji et al., 2007). Ceric (2014) found in 
her research that trust is the most important strategy to manage and minimise the level 
of information asymmetry between principals and their agents.  
 
The second outcome is when the relationship between principal and agent lacks trust. In 
this case, it is imperative to address the notion of opportunism. From this standpoint, 
researchers have discussed a number of methods to manage this opportunistic 
behaviour. These opportunism management mechanisms will be presented in the 
following two distinguishable steps or scenarios: 
 
The first approach is to deal with opportunism by changing the agent’s attitude toward 
dealing with the project principal. The aim here is to develop the level of trust between 
project parties - to allow them to deal with each other in a cooperative and collaborative 
manner. Relationship theory indicated that it is possible to establish trust and 
commitment via growing the relationship (Bhattacharya et al., 1998). Once trust has been 
established between the principal and agent, increasing the intensity and the duration of 
interaction between the two parties will reveal additional information to principal about 
the agent. This will reduce the division and the information asymmetry between them 
(Crosby et al., 1990; Coulter and Coulter, 2002). Thus, without a division in the interests 
of the principal and agent – and where both parties are holding the relevant information 
required to manage the project – a cooperative/collaborative relationship should be the 
driver to eliminate any opportunistic behaviour. So, this mechanism is to accept that trust 
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does not exist at the present time, but to believe that the advantages of trust outlined in 
the above section can nevertheless be secured in the future. 
 
The second scenario is where a principal aims not to change the agent’s attitude, but to 
change his behaviour. In this scenario, principals accept the fact that the agent may wish 
to act opportunistically, but they aim to prevent this through certain mechanisms. There 
are a range of mechanisms here, starting with the realignment of the incentives for the 
agent to make it favour not acting opportunistically (Müller and Turner, 2005). For 
example, as suggested by Cox and Thompson (1997), the client can restrict the agent’s 
opportunistic behaviours by providing certain incentives such as winning future projects. 
The incentive of establishing long-term relationships between the principal and the agent 
can establish a long-term collaboration (if not necessarily trust) between the two actors. 
Consequently, the agent may not act opportunistically, even under the circumstances of 
incomplete contracts or weak monitoring by the principal, to avoid the risk of losing future 
work opportunities (Eriksson, 2016). Thus, this mechanism (incentive realignment) 
delivers a greater level of consistency of the principal’s and the agent’s interests, which 
will result in minimising the conflict of interest from the project between the two and 
increase the level of collaboration and cooperation in that relationship (Basu and 
Lederer, 2011).  
 
Other methods were suggested by Steinle et al. (2014) which are monitoring, screening, 
and signalling. These techniques can provide efficient management of the information 
asymmetry between principals and agents. This includes operational possibilities of both 
measurable and non-measurable information. Starting with the measurable information, 
Eisenhardt (1989) claimed that monitoring the agent's actions or outcomes evidently 
might result in avoiding the information asymmetry issue. According to Steinle et al. 
(2014), regular meetings are a potential monitoring mechanism. The effectiveness of 
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these mechanisms is empirically supported by Hawkins et al. (2008) as they reduce the 
information imbalance, and improve the process of observable information exchange in 
more appropriate manners (Müller and Gaudig, 2011).  
 
Signalling is the second mechanism used to understand information asymmetry. It aims 
to achieve authenticity in the agent’s voice by reducing information asymmetry (Taj, 
2016). It has been used in many different fields of management. One important function 
of this management mechanism can be employed in reducing information asymmetry by 
controlling the unobservable actions to project principals, which can be conducted by 
their agents. For example, in corporate governance, CEOs used their financial 
statements to signal unobservable qualities of operational work (Zhang and Wiersema, 
2009). Screening mechanisms can also be used to reduce the information asymmetry 
level between the principal and his agent in both pre-contractual, resulting in better 
selection of the project agent, and post contractual stages, for better performance by the 
agent. This method, however, generates additional costs to the principal (Saam, 2007). 
Finally, bonding is another mechanism to manage information asymmetry (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). This mechanism binds the agent to produce certain information to the 
principal, for example, on the process of producing his work. The agent agrees on 
penalties in cases where the required information is not provided to the principal (Saam, 
2007).  
 
There are, therefore, a range of mechanisms that can be used to address potential 
opportunism. However, they have to be used in the knowledge that any failure in 
managing opportunism, dealing with the risk of its occurrence, or not dealing with the 
principal-agent division and information asymmetry, will lead the agents to acting 
opportunistically, whether in the pre-contractual stage (adverse selection), post-
contractual stage (moral hazard), or both. According to Kutsch and Hall (2005), the 
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failure of the principal to indeed deal effectively with the risk of the agent’s opportunistic 
behaviour can be explained by one or more of the following:  
 
1. Risk refusal: where the principal refuses to consider that type of risk to keep the 
negativity away from other project stakeholders.  
2. Risk avoidance: this is due to the lack of attention to that risk which might come 
from the principal’s lack of experience.  
3. Risk delay: this is because of the principal’s lack of interest to consider the risk. 
4. Risk ignorance: due to the lack of awareness of the risk and its probability of 
occurrence.  
 
Therefore, there are various issues in addressing opportunism. These are amplified 
when there are situations, in our context a project, with multiple principal-agent 
relationships. 
 
3.3.5 Multiple principal-agent issue 
As discussed earlier, APs appear in cases where one party delegates or authorises 
another to conduct and manage certain tasks or activities. The first party is the project 
owner (principal) and the second is the project contractor (agent) (Wu et al., 2014). 
Certain projects and industries, however, involve more than one party who act as the 
principal and the agent (a case where a subcontractor is hired, for example). 
Researchers, such as Toor and Ogunlana (2010), perceived certain types of industries 
to be 'highly goal conflicted'. The reason is the involvement of numerous stakeholders in 




The construction project industry is the focus of this thesis, and is one of the industries 
perceived by Toor and Ogunlana (2010) to have a large number of stakeholders with 
different project goals and interests. In the construction industry, the stakeholder's 
structure involves multiple links between two distinguishable parties, both of whom have 
certain agreements to execute certain parts of the project. Consequently, and according 
to Wu et al. (2014), an AP may potentially appear between every two parties within the 
same project. Hence, multiple agency (principal-agent) problems come in to action.  
 
A demonstration of the multiple principal-agent problem can be explained, as follows. 
Ceric (2014) included the project owner, contractor and their project managers in her 
research. The classical AP occurred between the project owner, who was the overall 
principal of the project, and the contractor, who was the agent. In the multiple AP, the 
contractor is taking the principal role, with respect to the contractor project manager. 
Furthermore, Ceric (2014) proposed that future research should enlarge the scope, and 
include more project stakeholders to investigate the multiple agency issue. The following 
list gives examples of other stakeholders who may be involved in an infrastructure 
construction project:  
 
 Project consultant.  
 Sub-contractor hired by the overall contractor. 
 Project designer hired by the main contractor. 
 
With respect to these three stakeholders, the project owner is the principal, and the 
project consultant is the agent. This point of contact between the two actors is the first 
area for a potential AP to take place. Another point of contact is between the project 
contractor, who is acting as a principal with respect to any further sub-contractors, and 
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the project designer in the case of a design-and-build project type; the sub-contractors 
and project designer will be the agents of the main contractor. This presents the 
possibility of a minimum of two different areas of AP. The first AP is between the main 
contractor and the project designer, and the second is between the main contractor and 
subcontractor/s (subject to increase once additional subcontractors get involved in the 
project).  
 
As noted by Toor and Ogunlana (2010), it becomes apparent that the magnitude of 
multiple APs can affect a project severely, each different stakeholder having as they do 
a certain agenda to fulfil by completion of the project. This highlights the importance of 
this research, not least as the literature on multiple principal agent problems within the 
area of construction mega-projects is currently thin. 
 
3.4 Summary 
This chapter aimed to provide a thorough review of AT, having justified its use as the 
primary theory in this research. It included a critical review of the theory’s five 
components (principal-agent division, information asymmetry, possibility of opportunism, 
management mechanisms and multiple principal-agent problems), which will be used in 
the analysis of the case study of this research. The first component (principal-agent 
division) looked at the basic construct of AT and how the relationship between the 
principal and the agent could be either characterised by co-operation and collaboration 
or confrontation and conflict, with the latter entrenching the principal-agent division. The 
second component, information asymmetry, can exist within such a relationship and 
provide the agent with an information advantage. If agents exploit the advantage they 
said to be acting opportunistically to achieve their own interests – the third component. 
The fourth component contains the methods to manage the agent’s opportunistic 
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behaviour, mostly relating to monitoring and incentives within the contract document. 
Finally, the last component covers the possibility of multiple principal-agent relationships 
(and potentially APs), a high possibility occurrence in certain industries, where multiple 
relationships exist and where the project actors are ‘highly goal conflicted’, such as the 
focal industry in this thesis, the construction industry (Toor and Ogunlana, 2010). Thus, 
these five components constituted the structure of AT chapter, as demonstrated in the 





Project FailureAgency Theory 
 * Agency Theory Components
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- Information Asymmetry




- Multiple Agency Problem 
 
Figure 10: Conceptual model – Agency theory. 
 
To conclude, this chapter has continued the exploration of the thesis’ research question. 
AT, discussed in this chapter, has been put forward in the research question as a 
potential explanation for the failure seen in the HHR mega-project. The research 
question accepts, however, that even if AT is found to be a significant factor behind the 
HHR failure, it is unlikely to be the sole factor. As a result, the thesis examined (in chapter 
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2) various theories of project management, in particular those relating to the ‘4Ts’ of 
Lundin and Söderholm (1995). These characteristics may well also be factors behind the 
HHR project failure. 
  
In this context, the next chapter will discuss the final area of literature. This is national 
CT, a further subsidiary theory for this research. This theory, like the ‘4Ts’, is introduced 









As mentioned, the researcher wishes to explore with national CT whether Saudi culture 
was a significant cause of the HHR project failure. It does so using Hofstede’s (2011) 
well known culture framework. This analysis will complete the exploration of the research 
question regarding the extent to which AT can explain the HHR project failure. AT is the 
prime theory being used to explore the project failure, but the ‘4Ts’ from the project 
management literature and the CT discussed in this chapter are being advanced as 
subsidiary theories highlighting factors that may also have played a role in the HHR 
failure.  
 
 4.1 The context to Hofstede’s national cultural framework 
CT has been studied in various fields, such as politics, history, art, linguistics and 
management. However, the in-depth cultural behaviour studies emerged from the fields 
of social anthropology, sociology and social psychology (Sennara, 2002). Interestingly, 
there is no consensus on one definition of ‘culture’, across and within different fields 
(Ferraro, 1990). Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952) defined culture as: 
 
"Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behavior acquired 
and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human 
groups, including their embodiments in artefacts; the essential core of culture 
consists of traditional (i.e. historically derived and selected) ideas and especially 
their attached values; culture systems may, on the one hand, be considered as 





This definition by Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952) was influential for scholars that 
followed. For example, Downs (1971) provided a different definition of culture as being 
“a mental map which guides us in our relations to our surroundings and to other people”. 
More recently, Hofstede’s (2011) definition was “culture is the collective programming of 
the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from others” 
(p. 3). In line with the cultural theory (Hofstede’s theory) used in this research, the latter 
definition of culture by Hofstede is deemed appropriate to be followed for the purpose of 
this thesis. This is purely because this thesis is concerned with analysing culture from a 
business and strategic perspective rather than anthropological or sociological 
perspective. 
 
These definitions lead us to think whether culture can be learned or whether is it 
otherwise inherited. Every person is characterised by certain patterns of thinking, 
behaviours and feelings, which were learned in their lifetime, mostly during childhood. 
Ferraro (1990) said about culture, that it is transmitted through the learning process of a 
person in one environment and not by the genetic process. Similarly, Hofstede et al. 
(2010) confirmed that “culture is learned, not innate. It derives from one’s social 
environment rather than from one’s genes” (p. 6).  
 
A further issue relates to the importance of distinguishing culture from the human nature 
on one side, and from the personality of an individual on the other side. This can be 





       
Figure 11: Three levels of uniqueness in mental programming (Hofstede, 1991).  
 
Human nature is a universal measure of someone’s mental ability, which is inherited 
through their genes. For example, the person’s ability to feel love, anger, sadness and 
joy is part of their human nature. However, the manner in which each individual 
expresses these feelings is modified with culture; where a person chooses how to 
express these feelings or use these feeling in their behaviours. This process is learned 
through generations and is not unique to a certain individual. Finally, personality is a 
unique personal process of programming the inherited nature with the learned culture. 
Looking at Figure 11, Hofstede et al. (2010) clearly defined the three levels of mental 
programming, but they agreed that the borders that separate the three levels are not 
clear.  
 
4.2 Hofstede’s national culture framework 
Having provided a context to Hofstede’s (2011) national cultural framework, its 
components can now be examined. This starts with his four concepts of culture and then 




4.2.1 Symbols, Heroes, Rituals, and Values 
Hofstede et al. (2010) identified four concepts to describe the manifestation of national 
culture. These concepts are: symbols, heroes, rituals and values. Hofstede illustrated 




Figure 12: Hofstede’s onion diagram (Hofstede, 1991). 
 
Symbols (for example, gestures or words) have been placed in the outer ‘superficial’ 
layer in the onion diagram, as symbols can be easily changed, developed and then 
copied by others. The concept of ‘heroes’ comes in the next inner layer, which are 
persons who can be dead, alive, real or imaginary, and taken as models for people’s 
behaviour. The next layer presents rituals, which are defined as collective activities that 
are socially essential to reach the desired ends (for example, greeting and giving the 
required respect to other people, as well as religious and social ceremonies). The inner 
layer on the onion diagram is values, representing the core of the cultural manifestation. 
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The cultural values are invisible and acquired from people’s childhood, which makes it 
the hardest one of the four concepts to change. 
 
For the purpose of this research, it is important to define the Saudi culture using the four 
concepts introduced by Hofstede et al. (2010), as presented in the onion diagram. This 
is purely to understand the level of flexibility within the culture, and to be able to provide 
pragmatic and practically valid recommendations at the end of this research, which can 
be applied in Saudi organisations and are not classified as inconsistent with the Saudi 
culture.  
 
Saudi Arabians are known as people who are hospitable and very religious, with high 
regard for their values and traditions. Islam is the only religion across the nation and it 
dictates every aspect of life (for example, what they wear, eat, when and how they should 
pray). This applies even during the working hours as well. There are breaks to allow 
people to perform their prayers, and business shops are closed during those times 
(World Trade Press, 2010). 
  
Furthermore, Saudi Arabians do value their personal relationships and courtesies in 
providing services and performing jobs (Hofstede, 1991). World Trade Press (2010) 
stated that in Saudi Arabia, even “in a business environment, you can expect either a 
glacial pace or lightning speed” (p. 22). Thus, it is apparent that the core of the Saudi 
culture (rituals and values) is having a major impact on how the Saudi people conduct 
themselves in business.  
 
Considering Hofstede et al.’s (2010) suggestions that the core on the onion diagram is 
the most difficult to change out of the four layers, the researcher has to consider these 
cultural norms and values during this research and in its outcome. For further analysis 
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of the Saudi culture, the researcher will look into the six cultural dimensions by Geert 
Hofstede (2011).  
 
4.2.2 Hofstede’s six dimensions of cultural theory  
Hofstede’s cultural framework identifies six universal dimensions of culture that can 
accommodate all societies and allows for cultural comparison on an international level 
(Beugelsdijk et al. 2015). These dimensions are power distance (PD), uncertainty 
avoidance (UA), individualism/collectivism, masculinity/femininity, long-term vs. short-
term orientation, and indulgence vs. restraint.  
 
During the process of building this framework, Hofstede collected data, and studied and 
analysed the values of people from over 50 countries around the world (Sennara, 2002). 
Furthermore, a number of researchers have built on Hofstede’s framework of CT from a 
business perspective. For example, Storti (1990) referred to four fundamental 
dimensions to culture: concept of self, concept of time, personal vs. social responsibility, 
and locus of control. Similarly, Jackson (1995) also identified four dimensions: 
sociological differences, corporate cultural differences, industrial and professional 
cultural differences, and individual psychological differences. Trompenaars and 
Hampden-Turner (1998) is also credited with a useful adaptation. A number of other 
researchers, including Bjerke and Al-Meer (1993), Beugelsdijk et al. (2015), have also 
sought to validate Hofstede’s dimensions and framework.  
 
However, as well as praise and emulation, Hofstede’s framework has received 
considerable criticism since its emergence in the early 1980s. Cray and Mallory (1998), 
for example, criticised Hofstede’s framework because it was narrow and only considered 
national culture and not other cultural domains, for example, organisational culture. Lowe 
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(2001) explained further that Hofstede avoids any clarification of the relationship between 
national and organisational culture in his study (Hofstede, 1984). Cray and Mallory 
(1998) concluded that Hofstede’s “dimensions seem to have some predictive validity, but 
their applicability may be considerably blunted by the intrusion of other levels of culture” 
(p. 57). This is clearly because Hofstede did not conduct an empirical investigation on 
the relationship between his dimensions, mainly of his study participants’ values and 
attitudes and their organisational structures (Tayeb, 1994). Tayeb (1994, p.435) 
commented: 
“The relationships are conceptual and speculative. He arrived at his 
conclusions about the overwhelming influence of cultural factors on 
organizational structure on the basis of these speculations and subsequent 
‘after event’ corroboration with findings of other studies, rather than ‘hard 
evidence’.”   
 
Hofstede’s framework has also been criticised as it does not consider the influence of 
individual differences within a nation. Bond (1988) commented: “The ecological or culture 
level approach [of Hofstede] does not yield individual level dimensions of values” (p. 
1009). This has left Hofstede open to the criticism of propagating stereotypes. 
 
Furthermore, there have been methodological criticisms. The basis of Hofstede’s study 
was restricted to the IBM survey material (mainly for the initial four dimensions), the 
Chinese value survey (for the fifth dimension) and world value survey (for the sixth 
dimension) – which led to the findings from one organisational background on each of 
those dimensions.  
 
A last criticism on Hofstede’s study is related to the cultural dimensions’ generalisability. 
The Chinese Culture Connection group revealed that one of the Hofstede’s cultural 
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dimensions – UA – is irrelevant to the population in China. Therefore, UA was 
downgraded as a cultural dimension into a non-universal one (Bond, 1988).  
 
While mindful of these criticisms, this research has decided to study Saudi culture by 
adopting Hofstede’s six dimensions. This is for the following reasons:  
1. This research is focusing on the aspect of national culture and its relation to 
project failure. The criticism regarding the narrowness of the framework is of 
limited concern as a result. 
2. The importance of the time dimension to this thesis. Key aspects of this research 
project are around project temporality and failure of project delivery within the 
allocated time. Hofstede can help with this, as one of the dimensions in 
Hofstede’s CT is about the concept of time.  
3. Hofstede’s study is comprehensive, and involved detailed research and analysis 
in one of the biggest multinational corporations (IBM). The research was 
undertaken over several years, and involved participants in over 50 countries, 
including Saudi Arabia, the location of the case study in this research (Hofstede 
et al., 2010). 
4. Hofstede’s study is measurable, by allocating different countries in an identified 
index. 
5. As Hofstede is a researcher in the business field, the researcher has an interest 
in the aspects of national culture identified by, and applied in, business 
corporations, by Hofstede and other researchers. 
6. The six dimensions by Hofstede are consistent with the major areas of 
intercultural comparison related to Saudi Arabia for the purpose of this research.  
 





1. Power distance – related to the problem of human inequality and its solutions. 
PD has been defined as “the extent to which the less powerful members of organisations 
and institutions (like the family) accept and expect that power is distributed unequally” 
(Hofstede, 2011, p. 9). Hofstede suggested that the followers endorse inequality in 
societies as much as the leaders, and it is natural to have inequality and power in all 
societies, but in various levels. Moreover, the notion of PD does not exist only in the work 
place, it extends further to other institutions (for example, family and whole society). In 
this context, the superior person is the one who is entitled to privileges and respect 
(Hofstede et al., 2010). So, because there are different levels of PD, societies can be 
described as high PD or low PD. The following table will differentiate between the high 
and low PD society.  
 




High power distance society Low power distance society 
Characteristic 





 Inequality between 
members in organisational 
society. 
 Hierarchical organisational 
structure. 
 Hierarchical relationship 
structure. 
 Authority and power are 
only for certain people in 
the society. 
 Privileges are expected 
and status symbols are 
popular. 
 Managers make decisions 
autocratically and 
paternalistically.  
 Parents expect obedience 
from the children.  
  Equality between members 
of an organisation. 
  Flat organisational structure. 
 
  Equality in relationship 
structure. 
 
 All society have equal power 
and authority. 
 Status symbols and 
privileges are frowned upon.  
  Managers take decisions 
after consulting with 
subordinates.  
 
  Parents treat their children 
as equal. 
 Older people are neither 
feared nor respected.  
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 Older people are feared 
and respected. 
 Followers expect to be 
informed what to do.  
 Subordinates expect to be 
consulted.  
 
Hofstede (2001) standardised the measurement of PD among the countries in an index, 
with the Philippines scoring the highest (94), and Austria the lowest (11). Hofstede 
declared that the Arab countries – where Saudi Arabia can be embedded - have scored 
(80). Bjerke and Al-Meer (1993) used Hofstede’s cultural dimensions to specifically 
allocate Saudi Arabia in their study within Hofstede’s index; their result for Saudi was 
(73) which was considered to be at the high end of the range. Accordingly, Saudi Arabia 
is classified as a high PD society. 
 
Furthermore, some of the characteristics of high PD societies presented in Hofstede’s 
study seem to fit with the culture of Saudi Arabia; however, the Islamic religion advise 
otherwise. For example, Islam and the Arab culture recognise hierarchy, and despite the 
argument that managers may make decisions autocratically and paternalistically, the 
Islamic religion suggests consulting subordinates before making decisions. This was 
important to clarify for the purpose of a religious belief.  
 
Another aspect that was addressed for the Saudi nation is that managers dislike the 
impersonal and formal notion of ‘business is business’; they would rather deal informally 
and use the personal approach among themselves (Bjerke and Al-Meer, 1993). 
Moreover, the World Trade Press (2010) expressed inequality in the Saudi society to 
extend further with foreigners “it is usual practice to keep foreigners waiting” (p. 22), this 
was stated in relation to business meetings on an individual or group level, and in 




2. Uncertainty avoidance – related to the amount of stress a society may suffer 
from uncertain future. 
Hofstede (2011) distinguished UA from risk avoidance. UA is related to a society’s 
tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity, “It indicates to what extent a culture programs 
its members to feel either uncomfortable or comfortable in unstructured situations” (p. 
10). This dimension identified two types of UA societies, they are high UA society and 
low UA society. Within the high UA societies, Hofstede (2001) observed that managers 
are given a lot of power and authority to maintain more control on others’ behaviours. 
However, a major threat is that these managers may exploit their authority and power to 
pursue and make decisions for their own interests. The following table compares the 
characteristics of both types:  
 





High uncertainty avoidance 
society 






 Uncertainty considered as 
threat and must be fought. 
 Higher stress, anxiety, 
emotionality. 
 Low scores on subjective 
health, and well-being.  
 No tolerance for oblique 
ideas: what is different is 
dangerous. 
  
 High need for structure and 
clarity. 
 Stay in jobs even without 
liking them.  
  Emotional need for rules 
even if they are not 
obeyed. 
 More emotional resistance 
to change.  
 Uncertainty in life is 
accepted and treated in a 
daily basis. 
 Lower stress, ease, low 
anxiety, self-control.  
 High scores on health issues 
and well-being. 
 Tolerance for oblique person 
or ideas: what is different is 
curious.  
 Comfortable with chaos and 
ambiguity. 
 Changing jobs is no issue.  
 
 Dislikes of rules whether 
written or un-written.  
 Less resistance to change. 
  




 Conflict in organisation is 
undesired.  
 Loyalty to employer is a 
virtue.  





In Hofstede’s research (1984), he measured this dimension of UA in an index that had 
similar range to the one used in PD. The result among the countries included in the study 
presented Greece with the highest UA score (112), while the lowest was Singapore (8). 
Hofstede gave a general score for the Arab countries in this dimension and that was 68, 
which allocated Saudi Arabia in the high end of the index. Matching Hofstede’s outcome, 
the other study by Bjerke and Al-Meer (1993) also presented Saudi Arabia in the 
category of high UA with a score of 73. 
 
Managers in Saudi Arabia are very much attached to their religion and traditions. They 
do not have any tolerance for people who deviate from both Arab culture and Islamic 
teaching. They do not like conflict and tend to solve a conflict situation with authoritarian 
behaviour (Bjerke and Al-Meer, 1993). This begs the question, to what level are the rules 
in Saudi Arabia formal and rigid? The answer was provided by expatriates, as they 
described their experience in Saudi as “total chaos” and “rules and regulations being 
applied about 20 per cent of the time” (Muna, 1980, pp. 83-84).  
 
Another point related to UA is the concept of fatalism. This can be discussed in two 
perspectives: cultural and professional. Firstly, there is a cultural belief that destiny 
always depends on a superior power, and this higher power dictates the outcome of an 
event. Thus, late delivery or lack of progress on a project is blamed on fate rather than 
effort (Larson and Gray, 2011). It is important to highlight that this cultural fatalistic 
approach is opposite to the teaching of the Islamic religion (Muna, 1980), which will lead 
to the second perspective. In the Saudi professional world, Muna (1980) stated that the 
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Arabic managers, including the Saudis, are far from being fatalistic, she described them 
as future oriented managers, planning with rationality, and they do attempt to prevent 
failure. 
 
3. Individualism/collectivism – related to the level of integration of individuals into 
a group or a society.  
This dimension describes “the relationship between the individual and the collectivity” 
(Hofstede, 2001, p. 209), in more particular terms the “extent to which people are 
autonomous individuals or embedded in their groups” (Triandis and Gelfand, 2012, p. 
499). The level of individualism or collectivism can affect the norms of a person’s 
relationship with their organisation and their reasoning of whether to comply with the 
organisational regulations (Hofstede, 1984).  
 
Hofstede (1984) found that society in the USA is the most individualistic society, with an 
index score of 91, and the society in Venezuela is the most collectivistic society with an 
index score of 12. Saudi Arabia, under the Arab countries category in Hofstede’s study 
scored 38, which indicates that the Saudi has a relatively collectivist society. In Bjerke 
and Al-Meer’s (1993) research Saudi was also presented as a relatively collectivistic 
society, with an index score of 41, alongside India (48), Japan (46) and Iran (41). The 
following table shows some of Hofstede’s characteristics which apply in the Saudi 





















 People are born into 
extended family, which 
avoid exchanging loyalty. 
 ‘We’ – consciousness. 
 Stress on belonging.  
 Harmony must be always 
maintained. 
 Other people classified as 
in-group or out-group. 
 The word ‘I’ is avoided in 
the speaking language.  
 The purpose of education 
is to learn how to do. 
 Managers rate obtaining 
security on their job 
position as more 
important. 
 Everyone is supposed to take 
care of him/herself and close 
family only.  
 ‘I’ – consciousness. 
 Right of privacy.  
 Speaking one’s mind is 
healthy.  
 Other people classified as 
individuals. 
 The word ‘I’ is indispensable 
in speaking language.  
  The purpose of education is 
to learn how to learn. 





The table above described some of the characteristics of the Saudi collectivistic culture. 
It can be seen that in Saudi society an important cultural attribute is defined by feelings 
of obligations for others, rather than logic (Larson and Gray, 2011). These feelings of 
obligations are extended to family and friends in the social and professional world. 
Therefore, it is not surprising to see Saudi managers depend on these relationships and 
friendships to get things done in their organisation. In that case, formal planning and 
business policies may act only as “shells” or “facades” for an organisation that is 
operated by smaller groups of families or close friends (Muna, 1980, p. 36). Hofstede 
(1991) confirmed that the personal relationship plays a major role in businesses in Saudi 
Arabia as he stated:  
“For the Swedes, business is done with a company; for the Saudis, with a 
person whom one has learned to know and trust. As long as one does not 
know another person well enough it is convenient to have present an 
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intermediary or go-between, someone who knows and is trusted by both 
parties” (Hofstede, 1991, p. 50). 
 
Furthermore, in business meetings, the person may wait far beyond the allocated 
meeting time before being called for to enter. Once there, there may be other people 
present, as it is rare to have one-to-one meetings in Saudi. Moreover, there may be 
continuous interruptions during the meeting, visitors may arrive and start speaking to the 
host, and secretaries may come and go throughout. Therefore, it is said to be important 
for the guest to remain composed and continue the discussion whenever the host is 
ready (Larson and Gray, 2011). 
  
The Islamic religion is considered as an important source of the collectivist cultural 
orientation. Saudi managers, as Muslims, are expected and required to co-operate and 
collaborate with others and to share grief and happiness among each other. They are 
also required to offer all cultural and social rights to non-Muslims as well, as they are 
defined to be general bonds of humanity (Maududi, 1967).  
 
4. Masculinity/femininity – related to the level of division between the roles of men 
and women. 
This the fourth dimension of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, which discussed the 
masculinity versus femininity across the whole society, not per an individual’s 
characteristics. Hofstede’s study of IBM revealed the following: (a) there is less 
difference between women’s values and their roles within the societies, in comparison to 
men; (b) men’s values vary across different societies, men are competitive and assertive 
and totally different from women on the one side, but caring and modest (similar to 
women’s values) on the other side (Hofstede, 2001). The assertive side has been 
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described as ‘masculine’, and the caring and modest ‘feminine’. Further descriptions of 
the two terms are found in the following table. 
 









 Men and women must be 
caring and modest. 
 Balance between work 
and family. 
 Sympathy for the weak.  
 Both parents deal with 
facts and feelings.  
 Attitude on sexuality: sex 
is a way of relating. 
 
 The focus of religion is on 
fellow human being.  
 Men must be, and women 
may be, assertive and 
ambitious.  
 Work is prevailed over 
family.  
 Admiration for the strong. 
 Fathers deal with facts and 
mothers deals with 
feelings.  
 Moralistic attitude about 
sexuality: as it is a way of 
performing.  
 The focus of religion is on 
god or gods.  
 
The masculinity versus femininity index in Hofstede et al. (2010), presented scores for 
76 countries. Masculinity score was found to be the highest in Slovakia (110), followed 
by German speaking and some Latin countries. The most feminine country was found to 
be Sweden (5). Arab countries scored (53), which puts these societies including Saudi 
Arabia marginally on the feminine side. More specifically, Bjerke and Al-Meer (1993) 
stated that, in their study, Saudi Arabia scored (43). This was surprising to some people 
who have a stereotypical picture of a Saudi society as being one dominated by men. 
However, men in Saudi society do show and express their emotions. They are usually 
seen embracing, holding hands, caring about other people and being friendly among 
their society (Bjerke and Al-Meer, 1993). Similarly, Muna’s study (1980) reported that 
Arabic employees expect their managers to treat them with kindness, care, respect, and 




Having said this, there are some restrictions in the Saudi feminine society – in relation to 
work and professional life – that originate from the country’s laws and society’s social 
constraints, which limit women to certain fields of work, such as healthcare, services and 
education. For example, it is impossible to see women in the construction industry, nor 
in government offices and municipal departments, which corresponds with sectors and 
industries occupied by men only (World Trade Press, 2010).  
 
The four cultural dimensions that have been discussed thus far are Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions introduced in his book, ‘Culture’s Consequences’ (1980). Hofstede later 
added a fifth dimension looking at the issue of time. This will be discussed next.  
 
5. Long-term/short-term orientation – related to the option to focus on people’s 
effort whether in the past, present or future.  
This dimension was not based on the IBM survey material, instead it was based on the 
results of the Chinese value survey, that was undertaken across 23 countries worldwide 
(Hofstede, 2006). This dimension is the only one out of the six that is connected to 
economic growth (Hofsted, 2006; Bond, 1988). On this, long-term oriented society is said 
to have better economic growth. This type of society is characterised with perseverance, 
relationships are ordered according to status, and they have a sense of shame. On the 
other hand, short-term oriented societies are stuck with their social obligations, respect 
their traditions and care about personal stability and steadiness at work (Hofstede, 2011).  
 
Examples of the long-term oriented countries are countries in East Asia, such as South 
Korea with a score of 100, Taiwan (98), followed by Central and Eastern Europe, and 
South Asian countries. Short-term oriented countries are Australia with a score of 21, the 
USA (26), Latin America, and finally Muslim and African countries. In this dimension, 
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Saudi Arabia was given a specific score of 36, which categorises the country’s society 
as a short-term oriented culture according to Hofstede et al.’s model (2010). More details 
of the two societies’ characteristics are in the following table.  
 









 The most important event 
in life happened in the past 
or is occurring now.  
 Personal stability: a good 
person is usually the same 
all the time. 
 There are guidelines and 
definitions of good and 
evil. 
 Traditions are sacrosanct. 
 
 Family life is guided by 
imperatives. 
 Success and failure are 
related to luck. 
 Slow economic growth.  
 The most important event 
in life is going to happen in 
the future.  
 A good person adapts to 
every circumstance.  
 
 The definition of good and 
evil depends on the 
situation. 
 Traditions are adaptable to 
change.  
 Family life guided by 
shared tasks.  
 Success or failure related 
to lack of effort. 
 Fast economic growth 
within the country until level 
of prosperity.  
 
 
From the table above, most of the characteristics of the short-term oriented society apply 
in the Saudi culture. Larson and Gray (2011) stated that it is very hard to get involved in 
projects in Saudi Arabia as Saudis have a different perception of time in comparison to 
the European view. The Saudis’ approach to time can be seen from a favourite 
expression in the country: “bokra insha Allah”, which means, “tomorrow if God wills” (p. 
548). This is in contrast to the expression in North America, “the early bird gets the 
worm”. This is purely because Saudis believe that they do not have control over time, 
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hence there is no guilt in failure to achieve plans (Larson and Gray, 2011). Thus, 
achieving deadlines is associated with fate and luck rather than hard work. 
 
On a different aspect of business life, in the case of business engagements, it is a 
necessity to arrive on time for business appointments in Saudi, but at the same time you 
have to be patient as the meeting may start at a later time, or it can be cancelled even 
while a person is waiting. Therefore, it is always recommended to leave extra time when 
setting schedules. The best time to set a meeting is in the morning or immediately after 
a prayer time (which is usually used as an indication to set out a meeting time). In 
addition, meetings can be carried out throughout the day and a person should be 
prepared for the fact that meetings may last until midnight on some occasions.  
 
6. Indulgence/restraint  
This is a new dimension that was added in Hofstede’s et al.’s (2010). It uses Minkov’s 
label ‘Indulgence versus Restraint’. This dimension complements long-term/short-term 
dimension, and looks into aspects that were not covered in all the previous studies. 
Hofstede (2011) stated: 
“Indulgence stands for a society that allows relatively free gratification of 
basic and natural human desires related to enjoying life and having fun. 
Restraint stands for a society that control gratification of needs and regulates 
it by means of strict social norms” (p. 15).  
 

















  Higher percentage of 
happy people. 
 Higher importance of 
leisure. 
 Maintaining order within 
the society is not provided 
with high priority. 
 Higher birth rates among 
educated population.  
 Lower percentage of happy 
people. 
 Lower importance of 
leisure.  
 Higher number of police 
officers per certain number 
of population.  
 Lower birth rates among 
educated population. 
 
The table above listed the differences between the two different societies in this 
dimension, where 93 countries were included in Hofstede’s study. Indulgence was found 
to be prevailing in American countries, Western Europe and some parts of Africa, 
whereas restraint tends to prevail in Asia, Eastern Europe and Muslim Countries 
(Hofstede, 2011). However, according to Hofstede et al. (2010) Saudi Arabia has scored 




It is suggested by Kardes et al. (2013) that project performance is a major area affected 
by national cultural differences. In this project, early observations revealed that the make-
up of the project team is actually largely homogenous – largely made up of Saudi 
organisations and management personnel. This was deemed worth exploring in the 
research, alongside AT. This was because some Saudi national culture features have 
been deemed to have an impact on project management organisations. For example, 
Hurn (2007) argues that time appreciation in the Saudi culture is not taken as seriously 
as in other cultures. World Trade Press (2010) stated that in Saudi Arabia, even “in a 
business environment, you can expect either a glacial pace or lightning speed” (p. 22). 
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Larson and Gray (2011), meanwhile, have claimed that in Saudi society an important 
cultural attribute is feelings of obligations for others, rather than logic. Overall, it is 
believed that the core of the Saudi culture (rituals and values) has a major impact on 
how the Saudi people conduct themselves in business.  
 
Taking into consideration the unit of analysis in this research is the transactional 
relationship between major project actors (clients, contractors and consultants), it was 
believed that national cultural theory (Hofstede’s cultural theory) would help the 
researcher to achieve the practical wish to understand the causes of the HHR mega-
project failure. It would also help the researcher be able to provide pragmatic and 
practically valid recommendations at the end of this research, which can be applied in 
Saudi organisations and are not classified as inconsistent with the Saudi national culture.  
 
In addition, as this research is investigating inter-organisational relationships and not 
internal organisational dynamics, it was not deemed necessary to supplement 
Hofstede’s national culture theory with theories relating to organisational culture. The 
researcher wished to retain a focus on those theoretical lenses that appeared from initial 
observations and initial contact with the literature to have the greatest explanatory 
potential in relation to the HHR failures.  
 
While much criticised, Hofstede’s six dimensions assist researchers in identifying the 
characteristics of different types of society. In this chapter, the Saudi Arabian society was 
identified within these six cultural dimensions. Figure 13 below illustrates Saudi Arabia’s 
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Figure 13: Saudi Arabia - Hofstede's national cultural index. 
 
 
This cultural analysis provides us with a series of characteristics of Saudi national culture 
that can be examined as potential causes of project failure. These cultural dimensions 
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Figure 14: Conceptual model – Cultural theory. 
 
In particular, three issues arising out of the six dimensions suggest themselves as 
potential factors causing project failure. First, a factor that relates to high PD is the fact 
that authority and power is limited for people who tend to make their decisions 
autocratically. This could feasibly result in un-manageable conflict of interest within a 
relationship in the project environment, which can lead to a possible opportunistic 
behaviour. Second, a factor that relates to short-term orientation is the perception of the 
Saudi society toward time – that is, giving less importance to the activities that will occur 
in the future which can have an impact on the effectiveness of the project plan (for 
example, addressing project risks), and, therefore result in project failure. Third, a factor 
that relates to indulgence is less priority given to maintaining order within the society. 
This could imply a risk of occurrence of any factor that might lead to project failure – 




POSTSCRIPT ON THE LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This section of the thesis has reviewed the literature in relation to the primary theory (AT) 
and the subsidiary theories (PMT and CT) in this research. It started with the first area 
(in Chapter 2) pertaining to the project management literature that looked at the concept 
of projects and project organisation. It began by providing a background on the term 
‘project’, ‘what it means?’ and ‘why does it exist?’ This was followed by critical 
demonstration of project success/failure and how project failure is perceived for the 
purpose of this research. Later, it provided an analysis of the four concepts that 
differentiate TMO from PO (time, task, team and transition), which helped in identifying 
issues that might negatively influence project team performance and which may cause 
project failure. Finally, the chapter explored the concept of mega-projects, which by 
nature have a large number of project actors who are ‘highly goal conflicted’ (Toor and 
Ogunlana, 2010), which increases the potential of ending up with different conceptual 
understandings of the project and different interests, which can lead to APs.  
 
The possibility of APs having been raised, the second literature area discussed (in 
Chapter 3) was theoretical approach that seeks to explain APs, that of AT (the primary 
theory of this research). The chapter included an analysis of the process of APs 
occurrence, and the different mechanisms suggested by authors, such as Crosby et al. 
(1990), Bhattacharya et al. (1998) and Coulter and Coulter (2002), in order to minimise 
the potential of such problems. Finally, the possibility of multiple APs occurrence in 




The last area (in Chapter 4) looked at national CT and assessed the cultural 
characteristics of Saudi Arabia. Such theory is introduced as a potential alternative 
and/or additional explanation of the HHR project failure. The researcher wanted to 
examine whether Saudi culture was in any way a cause of failure in this railway project. 
 
Thus, reviewing the literature in the three areas discussed above results in an updated 
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We are now, thus, in a position to move forward with the exploration of the stated 
research question: 
 
RQ. To what extent can agency theory be utilised in the analysis and 
explanation of the mega-project failure of the Haramain High-Speed 
Railway (HHR) project within Saudi Arabia? 
 




















5.1 Introduction  
This chapter starts by re-stating the research question and objectives of my research. 
Then, it describes, evaluates and justifies the research methodology which underpins 
my research. It will also help in answering the research question and achieving the 
research objectives. In order to do this, the researcher will explain the philosophical 
approach to knowledge within this research by clarifying the ontological and 
epistemological approach. This will be followed by a discussion of the methodology of 
which this research was conducted, including the research design (case study design), 
and the different methods that were used in addressing the research question. The 
chapter will then provide further discussion of the data collection procedures, as well as 
the analysis steps that were followed. Finally, there is a discussion of the ethical 
considerations and the limitations of this study.  
 
5.2 Research question and objectives 
A focused research question is essential to a sound study (Gratton and Jones, 2007). 
Moreover, the data that will assist in answering a research question must be obtainable 
and the researcher should have the skills that are appropriate to undertake certain 
research (Blaikie, 2010). As mentioned earlier in the introduction chapter, the research 
question is as follows:  
 
RQ. To what extent can agency theory be utilised in the analysis and 
explanation of the mega-project failure of the Haramain High-Speed 




In order to answer the research question and address to what extent AT can be used to 
analyse and explain project failure in Saudi Arabia, a set of five objectives must be 
achieved within this research. These objectives are: 
 
1. To identify the specific APs (if any) that occurred within the HHR mega-project.  
2. To investigate the extent to which these APs explain the HHR project failure.  
3. To evaluate the influence of Saudi culture and the project management context 
on the HHR project failure. 
4. To explore potential linkages between APs, cultural factors and the project 
management context. 
5. To develop a new framework that illustrates factors of mega-project failure, and 
any potential linkages between the three factors (APs, cultural factors and project 
management factors).  
 
Therefore, the first step of this research is to investigate whether there are any APs within 
the HHR project case study, in particular, multiple APs from multiple relationships, which 
involve the client representative and his project manager, three contractors and their 
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Figure 16: The HHR mega-project organisational structure. 
 
Each two actors involved in a relationship within the project may, or may not, have an 
AP between them. The researcher aims to identify all APs that might have an impact on 
the project failure. The second objective aims to analyse these APs and relate them to 
AT components in the literature review chapter. Furthermore, the researcher aims to 
investigate the level of importance of these APs in order to find out the extent to which 
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these APs contributed to the project failure. The third objective aims to find out the 
influence of the Saudi national culture and project features on the HHR mega-project 
failure by identifying [if any] Saudi cultural causes and project management features 
causes of failure. The fourth and final objective is to explore if any linkages and 
interrelations exist between the three cause of project failure (APs, national cultural 
factors and project management context).  
 
5.3 Theoretical perspective as a researcher 
5.3.1 Philosophical underpinning of the study  
According to Cohen et al. (2000), a research is: 
“Concerned with understanding the world and that this is informed by how 
we view our worlds, how we take understanding to be and what we see as 
the purpose of understanding” (p. 3). 
 
In order to grasp the thinking behind this research, the philosophical rationale used by 
the researcher needs to be explored for two reasons. Firstly, the philosophical approach 
is integral to any research as it constitutes the researchers’ ‘silent thinking’ about their 
research (Scott and Usher, 1999). Secondly, because the researcher’s value set and the 
ethical mind-set (or ‘paradigm’) have a major influence on how the study or research is 
conducted (Kuhn, 1962; Cohen et al., 2007); which was later described as ‘research 
culture’ (Johnson et al., 2007). Although the number of these paradigms has been 
debated, this research was conducted while considering the premise that there are three 
research paradigms, each with their own position on human nature and existence issues 
and they are: interpretivist, positivism and pragmatic ‘or mixed methods’ (Johnson et al., 
2007). Thus, to clarify the philosophical approach of this research, it is essential to 
identify the ontological and epistemological position as well as the methodological 




The ontological assumptions are concerned with the nature of reality. There are two 
aspects of ontology and both of them are accepted to produce valid knowledge 
(Saunders et al., 2016). Therefore, the researcher needs to define and understand the 
ontological position of this research in order to differentiate the two perspectives of reality 
(Mason, 1996). The first aspect is known as subjectivism (Saunders et al., 2016) or the 
Nominalist view, where reality is considered to be an individual’s (or social actor’s) own 
making (Cohen et al., 2000). The second aspect of ontology is objectivism. This is where 
reality is seen to be external to individuals (or social actors) and imposed on them (Cohen 
et al., 2000).  
 
These two aspects of ontology have their devotees within researchers, in both business 
and management fields (Saunders et al., 2016). Furthermore, the researcher recognises 
that in some situations, reality is formed by individuals, and the way they perceive and 
interpret this reality is affected by cultural, social and educational experiences (subjective 
reality). However, the researcher also believes that reality may not be formed by 
individuals, as there are specific agenda imposed upon them by their employing 
organisation (objective reality). For example, in this research, multiple individuals from 
different organisations (entities) together form a project team. The team members – 
under the influence of cultural, social and experience – form the subjective reality. 
However, the objective reality can be seen when the client’s representative and his 
project manager are employed to deliver the client’s interests and goals; the contractor’s 
project manager and employees are taking their employer’s instructions on-board while 
executing the project; and consultancy firms employ their expertise to deliver the service 
according to the contractual document with the client. This research, therefore, is 
positioned in between the two aspects and my ontological approach is somewhere in the 
middle, between the subjective and objective approach. As the researcher concluded 
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what constitute reality for this research, this gives rise to the questions of how is this 
reality measured? And what will constitute the knowledge of this reality? This takes us 
to the next philosophical part, which is epistemology.  
 
Epistemology is the second philosophical ground. It is concerned with the grounds and 
nature of knowledge, which depends on the ontological approach of a research. 
Epistemological questions are essential in a research process as it generates 
explanations and the required knowledge to understand the ontological view of a social 
world (Mason, 1996). Epistemology is a word that defines the way we conceptualise our 
reality (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000). On the one hand, researchers argue that knowledge 
can be described as real, hard and can be transmitted in a ‘tangible format’ (Trochim, 
2002). The other side of the argument, stating that knowledge is subjective and 
originates from insight and experience (Denscombe, 2003). Despite the argument of 
what constitutes the knowledge of our reality, it is important to explicitly clarify the 
epistemological approach of this research because it: 
“Holds up the methods and procedure of the natural science for producing 
valid knowledge claims” (p. 12).  
 
The epistemological approach of this research is positioned in between the two 
epistemological extremes, which are the subjective and objective approaches. The 
appropriateness of this research position is derived from the fact that this research is 
inquiring about the objective epistemological knowledge within the area of project 
management practices (objective knowledge), as well as the project actors’ behaviours 





Following the identification of the ontological and epistemological position, the 
researcher will explore the three research paradigms, so as to be able to subscribe to 
the adequate paradigm for this research. Starting with the interpretivism, it mainly 
acknowledges subjective realities and social phenomena (Saunders et al., 2016), which 
does not align with the philosophical approach of this research. Positivism, conversely, 
takes the philosophical approach that supports objectivism (Saunders et al., 2016). 
Therefore, these two paradigms are excluded from this research’s methodologies. The 
last available paradigm is ‘pragmatism’, acknowledges observable phenomena, 
subjective meanings or both. In the pragmatism paradigm, the focus is on the research 
question and it allows applying all approaches and choosing research methods that can 
help in understanding the research problem. It includes the additional benefit of 
triangulation of data collection methods to increase the validity of the collected 
knowledge (Robson, 2000; Cohen et al., 2007; Creswell, 2012). Thus, the pragmatic 
approach was adopted in this research.  
 
5.3.2 Theoretical approach 
Pragmatism is an epistemological approach that can adopt practical applied research to 
find knowledge that is applicable in specific contexts. It focuses on practices and 
problems; and addresses problem-solving and practical future recommendations as 
contribution to the knowledge (Saunders et al., 2016). In this research, the researcher 
was involved in practical aspects of project management practices in Saudi Arabia. 
Specifically, the APs within the project team, which is formed by the involvement of a 
number of social actors (e.g. client representatives, consultants, contractors and project 
managers), each represent different employing organisation. In consideration of 
addressing the APs in the context of the research question of this study, the researcher 
was also considering issues of cultural and social construction which affect the project 
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actors and their behavioural aspects in project management practices in general, and 
more specifically within the AP.  
 
Therefore, predominantly ‘the knowledge of what APs there are and how they can be 
managed’ in Saudi project management context lies between beliefs, values, and 
practices of the people in Saudi Arabia; and international knowledge, theories and 
practices within project management field. In order to utilise the latter (knowledge, 
theories, and practices) to apprise the former, the researcher subscribed to the abduction 
process. Moreover, this research is neither falsifying nor verifying a theory (as in 
deductive approach), nor generating and building a new theory (as in inductive 
approach); but rather ‘incorporating existing theory where appropriate’, leading this 
research to the abductive approach (Saunders et al., 2016, p. 145):  
“Abduction begins with the observation of a ‘surprising fact’; it then works out 
a plausible theory of how this could have occurred” (Saunders et al., 2016, 
p. 148). 
 
This research started by the observation of agents’ opportunistic behaviour towards 
projects’ principals. The implications of this kind of behaviour were found to have a level 
of contribution towards project failure, which highlighted the importance of looking at this 
phenomenon, specifically in a project management context. The researcher then, named 
AT as the appropriate theory to explain how this phenomenon occur. Van Maanen et al. 
(2007) noted that some theories are more effective in revealing more facts behind certain 
phenomenon than others. This research is considering AT as the primary theory to 
investigate in the area of APs (agent’s opportunistic behaviour) and their impact on 
project failure. The national CT and project features are also considered as the 
subsequent theories for this research. The theories are introduced as a potential 




However, the use of CT in this thesis is different, because of the different make-up of the 
organisations and personnel involved with this railway project. In this project the make-
up of the project team is actually largely homogenous – largely made up of Saudi 
organisations and management personnel. As such, the thesis assesses whether certain 
common cultural tendencies within Saudi Arabia provide an alternative explanation for 
the mega-project failure seen in the case study. It is suggested by Kardes et al. (2013) 
that project performance is a major area affected by cultural differences. For example, 
the culture of Saudi Arabia blames luck and fate in cases of project delay or failure. 
Additionally, time appreciation in the Saudi culture is not as serious as in other cultures 
(Hurn, 2007). Including this subsidiary theory is believed to both enhance the theoretical 
interest of the study but also, just as importantly to the researcher, further his practical 
wish to understand the causes of the HHR project failure. 
 
It is also necessary to possess, as a further subsidiary theory, the core features of a 
project environment that differentiate TMOs from POs, and provide the context to the 
case and the study’s interest in multiple principal-agent problems – time, team, task and 
transition (Lundin and Söderholm, 1995). These four project features can create issues 
and challenges for the project team members during the project execution process, 
which will be utilised to support the understanding of the HHR mega-project failure.  
 
5.3.3 Influence on my research design 
The theoretical perspective and the philosophical approach of this research formed a link 
to the traditions of the academic research. They can also establish a link to the research 
design that was employed for this study. In this research, the researcher began with 
observing a phenomenon in project management practices that takes place in the real 
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world and, as a result, causes project failures (agent’s opportunistic behaviour). Then, a 
plausible theory connected to the observed phenomenon was chosen for use in the 
investigation process (AT). Some data were collected and referred back to the theory in 
order that it may uncover further issues that result in project failures (Van Maanen et al., 
2007). Applying this abductive approach required the researcher to collect rich data that 
contained sufficient level of details in order to explore the phenomenon (Saunders et al., 
2016) of this research.  
 
Therefore, the role of the researcher was to establish variables that linked the 
phenomenon which were causing project failure to the chosen theory for this research. 
The researcher then addressed the required data by setting up questions for the 
research participants (i.e. to be asked in data collection methods such as interviews), 
and targeted other data sources that could be used to answering the research question, 
such as observations and document review. Therefore, in order to achieve the required 
detailed understanding and deep insight of the phenomenon (Creswell, 2012), this 
research adopted the qualitative case study approach, which is a feasible option under 
this research theoretical perspective (pragmatism). Further details will follow of why the 
qualitative case study approach fits this research process.  
 
5.4 Methodology 
5.4.1 Qualitative approach 
Blaxter et al. (2006) stated “Different kinds of research approaches produce different 
kinds of knowledge about the phenomena under study” (p. 1). For example, in 
quantitative approach, quantitative data is concerned with the frequency of a phenomena 
(Lacono et al., 2011). Whereas in qualitative approach, data is more concerned with: 
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“Detailed descriptions of situation, events, people, interactions, observed 
patterns of behaviours, direct quotations from people about their 
experiences, attitudes, beliefs, and thoughts and excerpts or entire passages 
from documents, correspondence, records, and case histories” (Patton, 
1990, p. 22). 
 
In the process of making the choice of methodology that underpins this research, the 
type of data required to answer the research question had to be first identified. The aim 
of this research project was to look at the impact of APs on project failure. This means 
that an in-depth investigation and analysis of the situation were required to deliver the 
outcome of this research. So, this research was concerned with collecting data that 
provided detailed understanding and deep insight of the phenomena not the frequency. 
To do so, Lacono et al. (2011) stated that the qualitative research methodology is the 
right approach for this type of research. 
 
Furthermore, Trauth (2001) listed five factors that should influence the decision of 
choosing this approach. These factors are as follows: firstly, the nature of the research 
problem, this means that the researcher should know what the problem is in order to 
know how to carry on the investigation process; secondly, the researcher’s theoretical 
lens used to frame the research investigation process; thirdly, the uncertainty level 
surrounding the research problem, fourthly, the researcher’s skills and ability in using 
this approach; and finally, the academic philosophical approach of the research. In 
applying these five factors to this research, the nature of the problem in this research 
related to AT, and the required data concerned with the agent’s opportunistic behaviour 
were not ‘out there’ available to be collected or discovered – as in quantitative research. 
Moreover, this data around the agent’s opportunism needs interpretation (Denscombe, 
2003). It also involves forming an insight perception that involves human interaction 
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(Foskett et al., 2005) – and that shows the significant and important role of the 
researcher. Finally, within the ontological and epistemological position of this research, 
the researcher aimed to produce qualitative data and interpret it to answer the research 
question.  
 
The qualitative approach stresses the type of evidence required for such studies, which 
is based on what the participants say and do. This will assist in understanding the 
explanations of what is going on in the real world. Strauss (1967) supports: 
“Qualitative data for a number of reasons: because the crucial elements of 
sociological theory are often found best with a qualitative method, that is, 
from data on structural conditions, consequences, deviances, norms, 
processes and systems” (p. 18). 
 
Furthermore, project management is an area of knowledge and practice that is full of 
complexity and uncertainty, which involves a significant level of human participation. 
Mason (2002) believes that a qualitative method is reliable for understanding such 
complex situations. This is because there are numerous methods of data collection 
available for gathering qualitative data. Among others, these methods include interviews, 
questionnaires, observation, participant observation, documentary analysis, discourse 
analysis (Ritchie, 2003). The ability of using different methods during the data collection 
stage, when looking for qualitative information, will enable in-depth and breadth analysis 
(Snape and Spencer, 2003; Veal, 2005; Blaxter et al., 2006; Creswell, 2012) and may 
eventually lead to a basis for theoretical explanation of existing phenomenon – even from 
studying a single case (Hyde, 2000). 
 
However, the qualitative method requires intensive understanding of the research area 
or context in which to interact with participants, in order to achieve the objectives of the 
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research. Therefore, as long as the researcher has sufficient knowledge in the area of 
this research, the level of effectiveness of the qualitative method will increase within the 
context of this research process (Snape and Spencer, 2003; Alvesson and Skoldberg, 
2009). The qualitative research method needs the researcher to be actively involved in 
order to solve “the intellectual puzzle” as Mason (2002, p. 18) expressed. The conclusion 
of the qualitative research should be logical (Hinton et al., 2003). Therefore, this type of 
research requires tremendous amounts of reflection from the researcher’s side to assess 
the information provided from participants, and to also debate and challenge some of the 
decisions and actions (Carcary, 2011).  
 
The following guidelines are provided by Mason (2002) for the conduct of qualitative 
research: 
 The research should be executed rigorously and systematically; 
 The research must be strategic, flexible and contextual; 
 The claims and quality produced are under the researcher’s accountability; 
 The researcher should engage in precise, critical analysis; 
 The researcher should come up with logical, convincing discussion. 
 
The researcher addressed these guidelines during the data collection period. This was 
purely because the main question of this research project required considerable 
exploration, probing, analysis and reflection to deliver expected findings from this AP 
phenomenon and its influence on project failures. 
 
5.4.2 Case study design 
A case study is an empirical action to explore certain phenomenon within the real-life 
context (Saunders et al., 2016), more precisely, when the relationship between the 
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phenomenon and the context is not reasonably clear (Yin, 2015). Creswell (2012) stated 
that ‘a case’ could be an individual, many individuals (in separate or a group form), 
activities, events or a program (e.g. a contractor, several contractors or the 
implementation of a new system in an organisation).  
 
The case study design provides the opportunity to carry out an extensive analysis into 
the problem, plus it is helpful to use different research strategies in order to reach a good 
answer to the question. McNeill (1990) confirms that this research design allows the 
researcher to profoundly investigate and analyse a case, or a few cases within the field 
of the research. Bearing in mind that case study design tests the research cases as 
individuals, not as part of the population. It is also called ideographic research design. In 
contrast, the nature of case study may establish a basis for grand theory as Blanche and 
Durrheim (1999) stated “Rich ideographic information about cases has been the start of 
many grand theories” (p. 255). In the context of this research, case study design has an 
added value in allowing the researcher to investigate project failures by using AT. For 
the first time in Saudi Arabia, therefore, the nature of this design helped the researcher 
to find out more about the enquiries in this research, which theories were influential in 
analysing HHR mega-project failure.  
 
Talking about the research enquiries, Yin (2003) suggested that, based on the type of 
enquiries in the research, the researcher can determine the strategic approach in which 
he will follow through the case study research. These three strategies are identified as 
explanatory, exploratory or descriptive. Based on the enquiry of this study from the 
research question (the extent AT can be used in analysing project failures in Saudi), my 
case study was primarily explanatory. Although, in the operational level of exploring this 
enquiry (from the research question), the researcher wanted to know certain managerial 
practices concerned with descriptive and explanatory approaches (e.g. how APs occur 
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and why). The purpose of understanding these realistic practices was that it would lead 
the researcher to explore the issue further and answer the research question. Yin (2003) 
discussed that: 
“…‘how’ and ‘why’ questions are more explanatory and likely to lead to the 
use of case studies, histories, and experiments as the preferred research 
strategies. This is because such questions deal with operational links 
needing to be traced over time, rather than mere frequencies or incidence” 
(p. 6). 
 
The in-depth analysis within the case study design enabled the researcher to combine 
various managerial elements and investigate how they operate in certain contexts. The 
rich understanding that can be gained from such a case study design (Saunders et al., 
2016) may enable the researcher to contribute to more effective project management 
practices in Saudi mega-projects as an outcome of this research. Hitchcock and Hughes 
(1995) explained that: 
“Case studies can be of particular value where the researcher aims to 
provide practitioners with better or alternative ways of doing things. This 
partly accounts for the popularity of case study within management research 
and the whole area of managing change”. (p. 322). 
 
Case study types 
Yin (2015) distinguishes between four types of case study strategies, on the basis of two 
dimensions. The first dimension differentiates single case from multiple cases. The 
second dimension differentiates between holistic and embedded cases. Saunders et al. 
(2016) explains that a single case study is used in critical, extreme or unique case; 
whereas multiple cases mean that the researcher is choosing more than one case – 
based on the rational of whether the research findings can be replicated. The second 
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dimension is holistic versus embedded case, which mainly refers to the number of units 
of analysis. The holistic case study design includes a single unit of analysis, whereas the 
embedded case study design is composed of multiple units of analysis (see Figure 17 
below).  
 
          
Figure 17: Basic types of designs for case study (COSMOS Corporation, 1983).  
 
The initial concern in this research was to look at the phenomenon of project failure and 
the role of AT in analysing some of the causes of failure, which is the first research of its 
nature. Therefore, this research subscribed to single case study type. Saunders et al. 
(2016) stated that: “single case study may be selected because it is typical or because it 
provides you with an opportunity to observe and analyse a phenomenon that few have 
considered before” (p. 179). Although the single case study was formed by a group of 
three different contractors, they were working for the same client on the same mega-
project but at different sites and locations. Furthermore, as this research focused on 
causes of failure related to the AP, the unit of analysis of this research was defined as 
the transactional relationship between major project actors (client, consultant, 
contractors and their project managers). Thus, with a single case study formed by a 
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group of three contractors and one unit of analysis, this research positioned itself in the 
top left quarter of Figure 17 above. After identifying the type of the case study, this leads 
us to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of this design.  
 
Strength and weaknesses of case study design  
Time: one of the main issues with case study design is the amount of time it requires to 
reach the end of the research. In spite of the fact of being time-consuming, it gives an 
opportunity to the researcher to use more than one data collection method, depending 
on what suits the situation. An important issue, besides the timing of the design, is that 
regardless of the method used for data collection; the data will be collected from a 
number of different sampling points, instead of having a continuous observation period. 
This means, some important and valuable data might be missed, not observed, or not 
collected between different sampling points (Gomm et al., 2000). 
 
Observation and causal relations: thinking about the limitations of case study design. 
The difficulty of testing the established causal links between variables is one of them 
(Blanche and Durrheim, 1999). Another limitation, as Burns (2000) stated, is the difficulty 
in interpreting the observed information – during the data collection – within a case study 
design research. On the other hand, this allows the researcher to express his or her 
opinion and points of view regarding the research, “While external checks are weak” 
(ibid, p. 474). Therefore, the researcher was aware of additional factors at the time that 
may have helped to interpret the observed information.  
 
Sampling: when a research is looking at one or more cases, the sample in this design 
could be one or more people, one or more locations, one or more organisations, or one 
or more event (Bryman and Bell, 2011). So, it is from a limited number of cases that the 
researcher can opt. The critical part, which the researcher may face, is the agreement of 
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the project organisation to allocate the amount of time the researcher needs to collect 
the required data. Choosing the population after having an agreement with project 
organisation is not a difficult issue, as long as the organisation has the initial interest to 
contribute to the research and there is interest from the interviewees themselves. Burns 
(2000) stated that the bigger the sample, the better, as a lesser possibility of error would 
exist. Therefore, for this research project, the researcher looked for a reasonable number 
of cases to be studied, which fitted within the time constraints. This can be illustrated by 
the inclusion in the research of all three project contractors, rather than a restricted 
investigation which only included a single contractor.  
 
Practicality: case studies provide a huge amount of information through a variety of 
different data collection methods, which may make most, if not all, the collected data 
challenging to use, for the analysis stage of the research project. This might increase the 
level of bias as some data may be ignored or the researcher could be selective of the 
utilised data. Burns (2000) mentioned that case studies require the physical presence of 
the researcher at the time of collecting and observing data. 
 
Besides all the limitations and weaknesses mentioned earlier about case studies, there 
are strengths in this design, for example, it aids researchers to deal with complex and 
uncertain situations within the research area. It gives an opportunity of using multi data 
collection methods (triangulation) depending on what the situation needs (Denscombe, 
1998). Walliman (2001) stated that case study design is a very useful one in situations 
where data needs investigation and probing, and it is feasible when the researchers want 
to ask questions about observed information (Burns, 2000). So, this research design is 




Ethical Implications: using this design in this research with multiple data collection 
methods generated concern regarding ethical issues. Especially during the researcher’s 
observation process of the project, where issues regarding the quality of work and the 
performance from the project team may have arisen. This issue was critical, as the way 
in which the researcher handled it should have been ethically approved. On the other 
hand, interviewing revealed the identity of the interviewee. Therefore, sensitive 
information may not have been provided by the interviewee. However, high levels of 
anonymity and confidentiality were required to acquire some information. In this case, 
the name of participants was concealed in order to gain required information. Moreover, 
any unethical conduct within the organisation practices was reported generally in the 
finding report of this research. 
 
Internal validity: talking about the internal validity of case study design, the question of 
the research, and to what extend the findings match the reality, is what the researcher 
should think of. Burns (2000) stated “internal validity has been assessed by a number of 
strategies, such as triangulation, rechecking with participants as to observer 
interpretations made, peer judgement, and long-term observation” (p. 476) – these 
strategies were adopted by the researcher to optimise the internal validity of the collected 
data. Such techniques helped in strengthening the findings as well.  
 
External validity: Case study external validity is weak and the final results of a research 
following this design are not generally similar to that research conducted by social 
surveys (Gomm et al., 2000). At the same time, it could bring broad generalisations to 
life, as McNeill (1990) mentioned. In one case, we could generalise the result from a 
case study research and the result suggested to be shared with other cases. This 
depends on the level or extent that these cases were similar to the original case 
(Denscombe, 1998). The reason of not generalising the result from this design is, as 
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Burns (2000) discussed, that this design provides a very small amount of evidence that 
supports its generalisations. The strength of random sampling does not exist in this 
design through checking a large number of samples from the population. The 
generalisation of case study design is eventually left to the reader as each reader could 
relate their findings from one case to the experience he or she had in the past. In this 
regard, Burns (2000) said: “case studies are generalisable to theoretical propositions, 
not statistical populations” (p. 474). Lacono et al. (2011) affirmed that case studies are 
generalisable theoretically (analytical generalisation) but not overly popular. 
 
In project management, many different projects are suffering from similar kinds of 
practices and delay factors. So, the recommendation from this research could be used 
for other similar projects in the field of construction projects in Saudi Arabia, as well as 
in other developing countries with a similar cultural background. Simultaneously, project 
managers could adapt the recommendations to their own experiences of managing 
projects, in order to enhance the management practices in current projects. However, 
the researcher aimed to enhance the research outcome level of generalisability by using 
a number of data collection methods (triangulation), which will be explained further next.  
 
5.4.3 Research and data collection methods  
Cohen et al. (2007) defined method as “the range of approaches used in educational 
research to gather data which are to be used as a basis for inference and interpretation, 
for explanation and prediction” (p. 44). This research selected three data collection 
instruments as methods to gather data and they are: 
1. Semi-structured interviews; 
2. Observation (Field notes); 




In regards to the choice of data collection methods, Robson (2000) stated that: 
“There is ‘no best method’ but the choice should be according to the feasibility of 
time and resources. The reason behind choosing multi-methods, in collecting 
data, is that every method has strength as well as weaknesses, and matching the 
strengths of one with the weaknesses of another could help in later stages of the 
study” (p. 304) 
 
Selecting three methods ensured triangulation in this research. Triangulation is using two 
or more methods to gather data for a research (Cohen et al., 2003; Yin, 2015). Cohen et 
al., suggested triangulation approach to map-out, and explain more, the complexity and 
richness of human behaviours – through studying and analysing the behaviours from 
different standpoint. The significance of triangulating the data collection method is that it 
will provide the researcher with multiple reference points (Bryman and Bell, 2011). 
Therefore, triangulation approach strengthens up the data. Hammersley and Atkinson 
(1983) said that the qualitative research findings could be strengthened up by combining 
a number of research data collection methods such as interviews, observation (field 
notes), and other documentary sources. Furthermore, the researcher’s decision of using 
‘multi-methods’ approach in this case study was related to the validity factor. Morse et 
al. (2002) stated the following definition in terms of validity: 
“… to validate is to investigate, to check, to question, and to theorize. All of 
these activities are integral components of qualitative inquiry that ensure 
rigor.” (p. 14)  
 
Hitchcock and Hughes (1995) said: 
“The most common way in which validity can be strengthened is by some 




Therefore, the researcher considered a number of data collection methods, based on 
different situations that required different methods of data gathering. This will help in 
achieving an improved evaluation of the case study. 
 
5.4.3.1 Interviews 
Interviews can be structured, un-structured or semi-structured. The researcher preferred 
to use the semi-structured interviews in this research, as this kind of interview delivers 
more focused, richer and deeper information than other types of interviews. The semi-
structured interview process takes a longer conversational route of up to two or more 
hours (Yin, 2015). The semi-structured interview allows the researcher to reveal how the 
interviewee constructs reality and sees the situations instead of just answering the 
researcher’s question. This insight to reality could provide data with better value (Yin, 
2015) considering the ontological approach of this research. Therefore, a semi-
structured interview benefits from asking the constructed questions for this research, as 
well as having the chance to probe and ask further questions, which will help to 
understand the genuine situation from the interviewee who knows the practical reality 
better. The reason for choosing this kind of interviews (semi-structured interviews) was 
the uncertain influence of APs in HHR mega-project (i.e. the research has a focus in this 
area of problem and anticipated the need for follow up probing questions) – as this 
research is unprecedented in this context. 
 
Interviewing respondents is a method that is characterised with a list of positives for this 
research. First of all, it is a good method to follow if probing questions are included in the 
data collection stage (Walliman, 2001); and it is a useful method to get the story and 
justification of the answer from the participant’s experience (Thomas and Nelson, 1996; 
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McNamara, 2006). Burns (2000) said: respondents like to give a speaking response 
rather than writing. Moreover, the interviewer is able to observe the interviewee whilst 
responding.  
 
The downside of this method is that there is no guarantee that the information collected 
during the interviews is right (McNeill, 1995). This could be because it is difficult to ensure 
confidentiality and anonymity for the respondents through this method of data collection, 
because the respondents are identifiable to the interviewer (Nachmias and Frankfort, 
1992). To illustrate the previous point, Greenfield (1996) wrote about a situation of a 
manager who agreed to be interviewed. The interview was recorded and at the end of 
the lunchtime interview, the manager admitted to the interviewer that if the interview had 
not been recorded, he would have revealed the low morale and problems within the 
organisation, instead of discussing the good parts of it. The researcher appreciated the 
down side of this method and managed to find a contingency plan to deal with the 
anonymity and confidentiality of the respondents in order to ensure obtaining the required 
data (further details in regards to the confidentiality and anonymity factors will be 
discussed later in this chapter in the ethical consideration section).  
 
Taking into considering the philosophical approach (ontology/epistemology), the 
researcher decided to use interview as a data collection method in order to understand 
the individuals’ history and experience, and their effect in dealing with the APs in an 
attempt to avoid opportunistic behaviours. Consequently, using interviews to find 
qualitative data allowed the interviewees to reveal experiences and deeper feelings than 
it is possible if other method was used (e.g. questionnaire); this is a major strength of 
this method (Rubin and Rubin, 2004). This was achieved by forwarding follow up 




5.4.3.2  Observation 
Observation is the second method that has been conducted to gather data in this 
research. One of the most common methods is direct observation in the field of the 
research. This kind of observation focuses on human actions, the physical atmosphere 
in a real-world situation (Yin, 2015). Yin (2015) said that executing this method will 
prompt the researcher to use their five senses, collecting notes from the field of 
observation and creating a basic explanation of what the researcher has seen, heard or 
sensed from the observed situation. Observation is an effective tool to test non-verbal 
communication in the field site, which cannot be tested by interviews, questionnaires or 
any other data collection methods (Sobreperez, 2008). It also allows the observer to see 
the detailed operational processes of the natural situation or environment (Morgan, 
1997).  
 
From the discussion about observation method, the researcher saw a place for this 
method in this research, mainly during and after conducting the first method (interview). 
In construction projects, the project execution team is quite large, and the sampling 
targets the main stakeholders of the project (client, consultant, contractor and project 
manager). While using this method, the researcher was able to observe non-verbal 
communication between the project stakeholders, observe human actions and physical 
reactions to certain situations and observe the nature of relationships – all of which were 
noted in the observation form (see Appendix 4). The combination of the two methods 
(interview and observation) enabled the researcher to analyse unclear and ambiguous 
actions and situations. The observation method gave the opportunity to establish a 
connection with the data collected from participants and the real situation in the project 
field, as natural actions were captured and the actions of the project execution team were 
observed. The observation process offered the researcher an opportunity to put his own 
perspective on the data collected from other methods in connection with what he has 
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observed in the real environment. Thus, this method helped in collecting data with value 
and strength, which increased the validity and reliability of the data in parallel with the 
other methods used in this research. 
 
5.4.3.3 Document review 
The third method used in this research was document review. In this method, written 
materials are the main sources of information (Yoddumnern-Attig et al., 1993; Yin, 2003). 
There are two major categories of documents: public and personal documents (Lincoln 
and Guba, 1985). In this research, the researcher has used public documents (e.g. 
magazines, newspapers) that were available and provided information about the case 
project. This helped to form a background about the area in which the researcher was 
getting involved throughout the data collection period. On the other hand, private 
documents (e.g. various sections of project planning document project planning software 
pages, contractual documents) were used to gather supportive information to analyse 
the data that was collected through other methods, and review certain parts of the 
documents that could be related to AT components. The positives of using this method 
were the fact it was inexpensive and unobtrusive, whereas the negatives were the fact it 
consumed time and, in some cases, it was difficult to gain access (Krishna, 2008).  
 
The researcher considered this method as a suitable one for this research because it 
provided qualitative data and included a large amount of information which could be used 
for the benefit of this research case study (Gratton and Jones, 2007). It was important to 
review the documents thoroughly, as the validity of the information was determined by 
the form and the context of the document. Therefore, the researcher strategically 
attempted to access the documents from reliable sources. Finally, in advance to the 
process of document review, the researcher identified what type of information was 
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required to answer the questions, or to help collect the data through other methods, in 
order to answer the research question.  
 
5.5 Variables and Measures 
This section of the methodology chapter will explain the variables and measures used in 
this study. It is important to understand the origin of the themes and areas of exploration 
that the researcher used in setting the major areas for investigation. In order to answer 
the research question of this study, the researcher had to look into three main areas 
within the literature. These three areas were presented as three sections within the 
literature review, they were: critical perspective of project management; AT; and Saudi 
Arabian cultural perspective. Each one of those areas had a number of components – 
the components were used as variables in this study. For example, the critical 
perspective of project management had four components (time temporality, team, task 
and transition), which were used as variables for this study. Furthermore, the 
components of each area were sub-divided into sub-components which were used as 
measures in this study. These measures were then used as the basis for areas of 
exploration through the methods of data collection in this study (interview, observation, 
and document review). Table 10 shows the areas, variables, measures and areas for 
exploration, which were used in designing the semi-structured interview’s questions, 


































Task and content: The agents’ performance in these four areas 







Diversity The impact of team size and diversity as well 
as impact of project culture on team will be 
explored and identified if it is an area leading 





Parent to TO 
transition 
This study aimed to explore the transition 
complexities within the two positions and its 
impact on project failure Operational multiple-
transitions within TMO 
168 
 









Information asymmetry between principal and 





Information asymmetry after signing the 
contractual document. 
Opportunism 
Adverse selection The impact of adverse selection towards the 




The impact of post-contractual opportunism 
on project failure 
Opportunism 
management 
Relationship nature The relationship nature and its impact on APs 
occurrence 
Contractual nature Impact of incentives and penalties embedded 
in the contract on APs occurrence 
Potential opportunism 
acceptance 






Multiple APs from 
multiple relationships 
The existence of multiple APs and its impact 













High PD The impact of the high PD cultural nature on 






The impact of high UA Saudi cultural nature 





Individualism The impact of collectivist nature in the Saudi 





Feminine society The impact of Saudi feminine society on the 
occurrence of AP and project failure  
Masculinity society 
 
Time orientation  
Short-term orientation The impact of the Saudi short-term oriented 
society on the occurrence of APs and  




Indulgent society The impact of the Saudi indulgent society on 





For more detailed explanation of the variables and measures table, see Appendix 1.  
 
5.6 Data collection 
Following on from the identification of the research problem, the research methodology, 
data collection methods and the design of the questions which were to be asked in order 
to investigate and obtain the required data for this research – this section explains the 
data collection process, including all phases that the researcher went through to 
complete the data collection, in order to answer the research question.  
 
5.6.1 Data Collection phases 
As mentioned earlier, there are three data collection methods (i.e. interview, observation, 
document review). In order to complete the process of data collection, the researcher 
had to go through various phases which helped to the successful completion of the 
process (see Table 11). This started with obtaining a written permission from the HHR 
project’s president. Obtaining this permission to conduct the data collection process 
allowed the researcher to proceed to the next phases of the process. The following three 
phases included pilot process for the interview method. This was followed by selecting 
the cases and areas, and allocating the sample of the interview method. After the 
completion of the first five stages, the researcher proceeded to the sixth phase 
(implementation phase – 6.1, 6.2, 6.3) and that included the three different methods of 
data collection. At a later stage of this study, additional data were needed, which required 
the researcher to conduct a follow-up data collection. The follow-up data collection 
included the same methods as in the first stage of collecting data (Interview, observation 
and document review). The follow-up data collection included four phases. Starting from 
phase seven, a pilot process was conducted for the interview forms to check the design 
of the interview method (similar to phase 2 – from the first stage of data collection). Phase 
171 
 
eight was to address all necessary changes reflected from participants’ feedback in 
phase seven. In phase nine, a second pilot process after the modification and all 
necessary changes were addressed by the researcher to the interview method (including 
clarity of the questions). Finally, phase ten was the phase of implementing the follow up 
data collection. The table below provides more details about the phases and the duration 




Table 11: Data collection phases. 
 
Phase Purpose Duration Action taken 





1 week In this phase, the researcher aimed to facilitate the access process for the data 
collection. This was achieved through submitting a request from the researcher’s 
sponsor to the SRO. Thereafter, a written permission was obtained. Further 
details on this will be provided on Section 5.6.2 in this chapter.  
Pre-Phase 2 Preparation: first 
interview pilot 
process (1) 
1 week This phase included the first pilot study to check the initial design of the interview 
method of data collection. Further details will be provided on Section 5.6.3. 
Pre-Phase 3 Preparation: 
modification to 
interview method 
1 week In this phase, the researcher considered the feedback from all participants in 
phase 2, and all necessary changes to this method were conducted. Further 
details will be provided in Section 5.6.3. 
Pre-Phase 4 Preparation: 
second pilot 
process (2) 
1 week A second pilot process was conducted in this phase to check the changes that 
were made to interview method and the clarity of the modified questions and 
statement to participants. Further details will be provided in Section 5.6.3. 
Pre-Phase 5 Preparation: case, 
and area selection 
1 week The researcher gathered as much information as possible to ensure that the 
selected areas within the project were the adequate areas to help in answering 
the research questions. Further details will be provided in Section 5.6.4 in this 
chapter. 
Phase 6.1 Implementation: 
data collection 
(interviews)  
4 weeks The researcher conducted 21 (one-on-one) semi-structured interviews, which 
were voice recorded.  
Phase 6.2 Implementation: 
data collection 
(observation)  
3 weeks Field notes were taken from on-site observations while using the observation 
form (see Appendix 4). The observations were conducted in the selected areas 
for data collection (see Page 177), focusing on the variables and measures of 
the three theories utilised in this research (see Appendix 1). 
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The researcher collected data from reviewing documents. This was by taking 
notes from reviewing the available documents. 






3 days This phase included the first pilot study to check the clarity of questions within 







2 days In this phase, the researcher considered the feedback from all participants in 
phase 7, and all necessary changes to this method were conducted. Further 
details will be provided in Section 5.6.3. 
Pre-Phase 9 Preparation: 
second pilot 
process (2) 
3 days A second pilot process was conducted in this phase to check clarity of the 
modified questions and statement to participants. Further details will be provided 








The researcher conducted 21 (one-on-one) semi-structured interviews, which 












2 weeks The researcher collected data from reviewing documents. This was by taking 
notes from reviewing the available documents. 
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5.6.2 Obtaining a permission report from SRO President  
The HHR project was a mega-project. This meant that: a large number of project actors 
were involved in the project execution; various regions and locations could be the target 
for this research; and a huge number of tasks that were executed by different 
departments and project actors. Therefore, in order to avoid the complexity of the 
researcher gaining access to different project actors, locations, departments and offices; 
obtaining a written permission from the project president was considered the right 
milestone. The researcher then started the process of obtaining this permission. A formal 
request was sent from King Abdul-Aziz University (the researcher sponsor) to the SRO. 
The request was then accepted by the SRO, the researcher then was called in for a 
meeting with the SRO President. This permission had no time restriction (i.e. it was given 
with an open date until the completion of this study).  
 
The meeting with the SRO President involved two parts. Firstly, the written permission 
to conduct the data collection for this research was handed in to the researcher. The 
permission instructed all parties involved in the project (i.e. consultants, contractors, and 
client) to respond to the researcher and provide the required information for the purpose 
of this study. In the second part of the meeting, the SRO President was curious to know 
more details about this study. This was the start of a general discussion about this 
research, which involved questions by the SRO President and answers from the 
researcher. The SRO President was interested in this research and interacted with the 
researcher. After receiving a good explanation of this research from the researcher, what 
it was about and the major problems the researcher was looking for; the SRO President 
provided recommendations of the best three areas (one area per contractor) of where 
the researcher could find valuable data that would be relevant to this study. The 
nomination of the areas was based on the area with most number of issues that are 
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related to this study. Thus, this recommendation was taken into account in the case, and 
area, selection process which will be discussed later in this chapter. 
  
5.6.3 Piloting and evaluating the interview method  
As it has been mentioned previously, the first data collection method in this study was 
interviews, which was conducted in the HHR project. This method was piloted in order 
to check the clarity of the questions’ wording, the sequence and finally to ensure that 
there was no ambiguity in understanding the questions throughout the interview 
questionnaire (see Appendix 2). Other reasons behind this piloting process was to 
eliminate questions, if any, which would not reveal usable information; and finally, to 
assess the timing factor for the interviews completion (Hasen and Kamed, 1999). This 
was implemented for the initial and follow up data collection stages.  
 
Following the process of designing the interview’s questions, the researcher was ready 
to start piloting this method. The interviews piloting process involved seven participants 
who volunteered to contribute to this process. The researcher was assiduous in the 
selection strategy of the voluntary participants, as there were different sample categories 
in this study (i.e. client, administration consultant, executive consultant, three contractors 
and project manager). The piloting process involved one of each sample category with 
exception to the contractors – the researcher decided to involve one representative from 
each of the three contractors involved in the project at the time. The main reason for this 
was to use this piloting process in providing the researcher with a general knowledge of 
where the critical area or location of each contractor was within the project – in terms of 
issues and problems – that could be used as valuable data source in answering the 




After completing the piloting process, each participant was requested to provide their 
feedback on the interview, in terms of: clarity of questions’ wording, question order, the 
form of the interview, the timing factor, and any other issues triggered during the 
interview time. After the researcher received their feedback, all the necessary changes 
were taken into account and considered in the execution of this data collection method 
(Hasen and Kamed, 1999) – this included changes to the wording of the interview 
questions. The following table will express the changes that occurred to this method 
following the pilot process.  
 




Changes in interviews 
1 Add personal details for participants. 
2 Increase the interview time.  
3 
Changes the wording of some questions to suit the category of the 
participant.  
4 Expand and clarify some questions to provide better understanding. 
 
Following the changes undertaken by the researcher to the interview method, a second 
piloting for the interview was conducted. This was to ensure that following the 
modifications to the questions, all participants understood the questions and statements 
made by the researcher. Other seven participants volunteered to be involved in the 
second pilot process. It was important to the researcher to select different participants 
from the ones who contributed in the first pilot study, to avoid the impact of the first seven 
participants’ familiarity with the questions on the feedback of the second pilot process. 
At the end of the second pilot process, all participants confirmed that the questions were 




At the time of the pilot process (Phase 2 and 4 in Table 11), the researcher took the 
opportunity to test the two different ways of recording the interviews in order to find out 
which way is more efficient in recording the data and, therefore, to be used in the actual 
data collection stage. Some interviews were recorded by using electrical recorder; others 
were recorded by written notes that were taken by the researcher. The researcher found 
that using the electrical recording device allowed him to fully concentrate on the 
questions and answers from the participants. It also allowed the researcher to focus more 
on the probing questions pursuing the required data. Thus, the researcher decided to 
use the electrical recording device.  
 
5.6.4 Selection of case and locations  
The initial reason for this study was the failure in the delivery of the HHR project within 
the project deadline. The main aim from the start of this research project was to 
investigate on the problem of HHR project failure. The HHR project is situated in the 
same region of the researcher’s homeland. At the time when the project initiation took 
place and the contractors started the project execution, this caused major road closures, 
road diversions and traffic interruptions inside the cities and along the motorways. There 
was a noticeable level of ambiguity and unawareness within the researcher’s family, 
friends, community and the general public about the reasons behind all these road 
interruptions. The researcher had observed the slow work progress in certain areas and 
that incentivised the researcher to enquire about those construction projects. Following 
some enquires and a few discussions with people who work in the project, and a review 
of the available public documents about the project, it was observed that there was a 
delay in the timescale of the project execution. Thus, the researcher then decided to 
conduct this research to investigate on the project failure for various reasons, as follows: 
this project was the first railway project to be built by the SRO in Saudi Arabia; there was 
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a plan to initiate a number of railway projects in other regions of the country; there was 
a future vision for building metro services inside the major cities; and there was a high 
impact and disruption of any failure of these projects on public services and societies. 
 
The HHR project is a mega-project that consisted of four train stations at four major cities 
in the region, with a total length of around 450km of train line. The following table (Table 
13) shows the breakdown of the project parts based on the contractors’ sections. 
 
Table 13: Description of the HHR project’s sections and areas. 
 
Contractor Project section Project area 
Contractor 1 
(Al-Rajhi Alliance) 
Train track line (app. length of 
450 km). 
 










(total number of two stations) 
At the city of Makkah 
At the city of Madina 
Contractor 3 
  (Saudi Oger) 
Train stations 
(total number of two stations) 
At the city of Jeddah 
At the city of Rabigh 
 
 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the design of this research was a single case study 
of the HHR project, which involved a group of three contractors. As we can see from the 
table above, there were a number of areas for each contractor. Those areas were 
scattered across the 450km between the four major cities of the region. Therefore, as 
the primary aim of the design was to include the three contractors, the researcher 
decided to choose three areas (one area per contractor) to be included in the data 
collection process. In order to choose the appropriate area that could add better value to 
this research, the researcher targeted the three areas suffering from the highest failure 




The process of choosing the appropriate areas involved a number of stages, including 
observation process and document review. This was supported by recommendations 
from the SRO President and the voluntary participants in the first and second interview 










Primary process for area selection 
Stage 1 
Researcher observation 
Field work observation: this stage involved visiting the different 
areas and the researcher conducted observation of the work 
progress in those areas to identify the area that is behind 















Document review: the researcher conduced a document review 
process to review the work progress in each area to identify the 

















Meeting discussion: after the researcher explained the concept of 
















Stage 4  
Voluntary participants 
recommendation (from first 
pilot process)  
Interviews discussion: the pilot interviews were not specified on 
certain area of the project. Participants were asked about the 
areas which were behind schedule the most and the following 















recommendation (from second 
pilot process) 
Interviews discussion: the pilot interviews were not specified on 
certain area of the project. Participants were asked about the 
areas which were behind schedule the most and the following 















Thus, after conducting the two primary processes for area selection, the conclusion from 
both processes were identical. Furthermore, the supporting processes that included 
stage 3, stage 4 and stage 5 from the table above produced the same conclusion of the 
selected areas. Therefore, this research is considering the following areas for this study: 
 
 Area 2 for Contractor 1. 
 Makkah Station for Contractor 3.  
 Jeddah Station for Contractor 2. 
 
After choosing the areas for data collection, this lead the discussion to the sampling 
strategy for the three areas.  
 
5.6.5  Sampling strategy 
The sample for interviews involved 21 participants, who were key performers within the 
multiple principal-agent relationships used in this research. The participants were 
selected based on their experience, qualification and proximity to the relationships that 
were investigated in this research. As such, all participants were able to report the nature 
of the relationships. Furthermore, the participants took part in the in-depth interviews and 
the majority of the participants were interviewed more than once. Ceric (2014) 
recommended in his paper that future research in the APs area might consider looking 
into more complex relationships, in comparison to his research which included project 
client, contractor and their project managers. As this research was aiming to investigate 
on project failure in HHR mega-project – mainly by looking at the APs and more complex 
relationships – the project consultant and his project manager were added to the project 
actors who were involved in Ceric’s study (2014) for the purpose of investigation in this 
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study. Therefore, in applying this sample to each of the areas identified above, the 
sample for this study can be demonstrated in Table 15, as follows:  
 
Table 15: Sample table showing the participants and their positions in this study. 
 





































































































































As demonstrated in the table above, each area of the case study involved: client 
representative and his project manager; contractor representative and his project 
manager; executive consultant and his project manager; and finally, administrative 
consultant. The researcher interviewed the same sample in the first data collection trip 
and in the follow-up data collection, however, it was not possible to interview all the 
participants in the follow-up data collection trip because the project was in the final stages 
of its execution and some participants had already left. Furthermore, Appendix 3 
provides more details of the interviews schedule.  
 
5.6.6  Data collection in practice 
5.6.6.1 Interview 
Interviews were one of the data collection methods used in this study. The form of 
conducting them was on a one-to-one basis. This form (one-to-one) created an 
environment of self-disclosure by the interviewees, as some of them felt comfortable to 
expose their own past experiences when working for other organisations or on different 
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projects, and occasionally compared it with the present practices at the time of the 
interview.  
 
In terms of scheduling the interviews, the researcher started by contacting the 
interviewees and scheduling a meeting of around one hour to conduct the interviews. 
This approach did work to certain extent and with some of the interviews. However, as 
the nature of this infrastructure project imposed on project actors to be mobile most of 
the time between their offices, field visits, formal, informal and emergency meetings 
throughout the day; occasionally the researcher had to rearrange an alternative time to 
conduct the interview. Setting a fixed scheduled time was not possible at some 
occasions. This was because project managers, for example, were called for emergency 
field visits or required for other reasons. Consequently, the researcher had to increase 
the level of flexibility during scheduling the interviews. Furthermore, a different approach 
was followed by carrying out an informal friendly visit with the specified interviewee, to 
arrange an interview time. Interestingly, some participants offered to carry on the 
interview straightaway. As the researcher expected this to occur, the interviews were 
carried out and the data were collected successfully.  
 
All interviews were carried out on site (this involved different locations within the project 
area). The length of most interviews was approximately one hour, but it did vary, some 
interviews lasted longer and some shorter than the hour depending on the participant’s 
interaction. As all participants were English speakers, the researcher found it more 
convenient to conduct the interviews in English, which saved the translation time, 
compared to if they were conducted in Arabic. All participants were comfortable and 
happy to be asked and answer the interview questions in English, which eased the 




From the outset of the interview time, the researcher took the time to consider some 
ethical issues and make sure that every participant understood and signed the consent 
form to participate and take part in the interview. This involved three steps: firstly, the 
researcher started by verbally explaining the purpose of this research; secondly, inform 
participants about the researcher’s background; thirdly, interviewees were asked to sign 
the consent form to participate. At this point the researcher turned on the electrical voice 
recorder and the interview commenced. It was exciting to observe two behaviours from 
the participants at this point. The first type of participants started explaining the major 
issues they were facing in their part of the project, here the researcher found that the 
information actually fitted with the first question of the interview in certain situations. In 
others, the researcher had to redirect the conversation in a polite way and started to ask 
the interview questions.  
 
Therefore, this was the start of the analysis stage of the required data as the researcher 
had to make analytical decisions to control and restrict the discussion around areas that 
answer the research question. This was to mitigate the challenge of the transcribing 
process, as the academic calendar time was limited for the researcher to transcribe 
unnecessary data. Gillham (2000) provided a warning around the transcribing process 
stating:  
“Things to be careful about while using interviews: The need for economy in 
interviewing. Even one interview generates a huge amount of work for the 
researcher. As a simple rule of thumb, a one-hour interview (assuming you 
have tape-recorded it) is ten hours of transcription and almost as many hours 





Nevertheless, voice recording the interviews helped in transmitting exactly the same data 
from the interviews and facilitated the interview time as the researcher did not waste any 
time in taking notes. Hitchcock and Hughes (1995) stated:  
“The tape recording of the interview session will produce the most complete 
record of what was said” (p. 170).  
 
Once an interview was completed, the researcher started to transcribe the interview as 
soon as possible. This is because the actions and voices of the participants were still 
memorable to the researcher.  
 
5.6.6.2 Observation 
At the time of the researcher’s presence on the project site, interviewing the participants 
was the first thing in the researcher’s mind. Although, the observation process always 
started once the researcher arrived at the project site. The observation process was 
carried out in the offices (interactions between staff) and in the project’s work field. The 
relevant information of the observation session was noted by the researcher by using 
the field observation notes template (see Appendix 4).  
 
Using this method during the data collection had a huge importance to the validity of the 
data that was collected using the other methods. Gillham (2000) confirmed this by 
stating:  
“The overpowering validity of observation is that it is the most direct way of 
obtaining data. It is not what people have written on the topic. It is not what 




At the time of observation, the researcher did not have a particular schedule for places 
to visit as in someone observing a lecture or a lesson, but followed a ‘fly on the wall’ 
technique (Griffin, 1985). This was partly based on the need to cross-check some claims 
from the data collected through the interview method, or to have further insight about 
certain issues.  
 
The observations were recorded by using the field observation notes templates (see 
Appendix 4). The researcher recorded the location, time and date of the observations as 
well as summary notes from each observation session. These notes were inserted as 
quotations to support the data analysis stage.  
 
5.6.6.3 Document review 
The document review method involved two types of document: public and private 
documents. Public documents included public magazines, newspaper and internet web 
pages. These documents were available for public access. However, there was a 
magazine full of issues related to this project which was not yet publicly available at the 
time of the data collection of this research. This magazine was given to the researcher 
by the client representative at the first stage of the data collection, which helped the 
researcher to form a more detailed insight about various aspects of the project, as well 
as use the information for the benefit of this study.  
 
Private documents involved project planning documents, project management software 
(showing project progress) and project contractual documents. The availability of the 
private documents to the researcher was not an issue for most of the time. Occasionally, 
the researcher had to request to view some documents, and at other times the 
documents were offered to be viewed without request. Some participants preferred not 
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to show the researcher their organisation’s private documents. Therefore, the researcher 
assumed that those documents may not be available for review or even exist. However, 
the accessible documents provided the researcher with valuable information and they 
are as follows: 
1. Local newspaper.  
2. HHR project – special edition magazine.  
3. P1P1 project plan document.  
4. Government Tender and Procurement Law (GTPL) document. 
5. Implementing Regulations of Government Tender and Procurement Law 
(IRGTPL) document. 
6. E- Documents from the SRO website.  
 
At the time of the document review process, the researcher gathered the necessary 
information which considered to be relevant to this study using the template prepared in 
advance to keep record of the notes (see Appendix 5). This template helped in finding 
the required information during the data analysis process.  
 
5.7 Data analysis 
5.7.1 Transcribing the collected data 
After collecting all the data through interviews, observation and document review, the 
researcher moved into the stage of transcribing the gathered information. All the 
interviews were recorded and transcribed after the data collection period, using the 
software called ‘Express Scribe’, which eased the process of following the interview 
records and transcribe them into documents. As the talking speed of the participants 
varied, the software provided a speed control which could slow down the speed of the 
fast-paced conversation, which saved significant time for the researcher. The availability 
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to rewind and forward the recording within the software also assisted the researcher at 
some stages.  
 
The second and third methods of data collection involved taking notes from observation 
sessions and from document review. After completing the data collection, the researcher 
started to transcribe the observation notes. This was followed up by the production of 
observation reports which included pictures that were taken at the time of observations. 
The information from these reports were then entered into the (N-Vivo Software) for the 
thematic analysis. Similarly, the notes that were taken from the document review method 
were transcribed and also used in the N-Vivo software. 
 
5.7.2 Thematic analysis 
Conducting qualitative research results in huge amount of data and information that 
requires analysis. It may be quite difficult and time consuming to do, as the sum of the 
data cannot be quantified and presented as a summary of the whole findings. Therefore, 
one of the most common approaches of analysing qualitative data is by conducting the 
so-called “thematic analysis” (Bryman and Bell, 2011). Miles and Huberman (1984) state 
that data analysis is composed of three activities. The first activity is data reduction: 
hence the qualitative research resulting in too much collected data. A process of data 
reduction should start before the data is collected by making some decisions regarding 
which people to interview, which places to visit, etc. in addition to following the above 
process, during and after the data were collected, the researcher reduced the volume of 
information by producing summaries, writing abstracts, writing memos and coding the 
themes of the collected data. Miles and Huberman (1984) emphasised that these 
activities are part of the data analysis. The second activity is data display: qualitative 
data, usually in the form of a long text that results in unwarranted conclusions in some 
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cases. Displaying the information as some form of network, chart or matrix will assist in 
reducing and analysing the data, and in drawing a justified conclusion for the research. 
The last activity is finding a conclusion and some verification: this activity starts once the 
data collection is started. The researcher will have a sense of what conclusions could be 
drawn, whilst collecting the data and will be looking to firm it up with some evidence and 
addition of emphasising information (Miles and Huberman, 1984).  
 
The researcher followed this approach, to facilitate the data analysis process, by using 
different techniques. This comes after the emergence of significant software that can 
assist in analysing qualitative data, known as computer-assisted qualitative data analysis 
software (CAQDAS). NVivo software was used to organise the qualitative data in this 
research. This software assisted the researcher in coding, retrieving and creating memos 
of the interviews. In general, it did ease the thematic analysis, and organised and 
accelerated the analysis process. Thinking about coding in qualitative research, Gibbs 
(2002) mentioned that the use of coding could be confusing in qualitative research. The 
difficulty emanates from the fact that each interviewee could use a different term for a 
similar situation (Kikooma, 2010). Although, this was managed by the researcher at the 
stage of conducting the thematic analysis. As well as using the software, the researcher 
used the manual coding process. 
 
Both coding methods (through using the software and manual coding) were utilised in 
this research at different stages. Starting with entering the data into the software whilst 
collecting it and also afterwards, in order to be able to code the relative information to 
each theme, insert some memos if needed at some events, and then looking at further 
analytical procedures for the data (based on the variables and measures that were 
explained above). In this way, the researcher benefited from the time factor and 
organised the themes and sub-themes before receiving uncontrollable amounts of 
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information after the data collection. Both coding methods were used after the data 
collection stage to summarise, and also at further stages of analysis. 
Lacey and Luff (2007) stated that there is not a specific correct way that has to be 
followed in qualitative data analysis. In this study, the researcher subscribed to the 
framework analysis approach to deal with the obtained data. This approach provided a 
systematic demonstration of the stages that the research had gone through in the 
analysis process. Therefore, a clear visible picture of the analysis was presented to the 
reader. This approach provided the opportunity to include priori concepts as well as 
emergent issues raised by participants during the data collection process. Framework 
analysis is composed of five stages, which have been adopted in this study. These five 
stages as follows: 
 
 Familiarisation: transcribing and reading the data.  
 Identification: this relates to identifying thematic framework (coding) from priori 
issues and from emerging concepts from the first stage (Familiarisation stage).  
 Indexing: this is the stage of applying and inserting the data into the relevant 
theme within the thematic framework.  
 Charting: the researcher used headings originated from the thematic framework 
in order to create charts related to the obtained data. This eased the process of 
analysing and creating the outcome of this research. Furthermore, there are two 
ways in creating the charts. Firstly, respondent chart which looks into cases of 
each respondent across all headings from the thematic framework. This can be 
demonstrated in Table 16, as follows:  
 
Table 16: Respondent chart. 
 
 Theme 1 Theme 2 Theme 3 Etc... 





The second chart is thematic, which looks into each theme across responses 
from all participants. The researcher subscribed to this type (thematic chart) in 
this study. Table 17 illustrates the form of thematic chart, as follows:  
 
Table 17: Theme chart. 
 
 Respondent 1 Respondent 2 Respondent 3 Etc... 
Theme     
 
 
 Interpretation and mapping: this stage is where the researcher look for 
concepts, explanations and patterns in the data (Lacey and Luff, 2007).  
 
Finally, the expressions of all the evidence gathered from interviews, notes from 
observation and document review are through direct quotations, or otherwise 
summarising and paraphrasing the participants’ perceptions. Moreover, to guarantee 
confidentiality and anonymity of all participants, all participants were given codes and 
their responses were embedded under those codes.  
 
5.8 Validity and reliability 
As this research subscribed to qualitative data only, reliability and validity will be 
discussed and justified within the context of the methodological and philosophical 
position in this study. On the one hand, the key concept that is related to assessing the 
quality of a research is reliability. Reliability is generally concerned with the consistency 
of the collected data (Charles and Craig, 2003; Gratton and Jones, 2007). On the other 
hand, researchers such as Gratton and Jones (2007) and Lacey and Luff (2007) argued 
that when researchers consider the concept of validity, they are required to consider 
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whether the methods which were used in their research were actually measuring what 
they were supposed to measure; and whether the research outcome (conclusion) 
derived through those measures was valid.  
 
In Cohen et al. (2000), Maxwell (1992) argues that in qualitative research replaces 
validity with authenticity. Following Maxwell’s argument, Cohen et al. (2000) discussed 
that the importance of qualitative research comes from the meaning of the data that is 
gained from the research subject, and the conclusions drawn out from the obtained data. 
In this way, qualitative research tends to represent individual’s reality instead of the 
identical reproduction of certain reality. Moreover, Cohen et al. (2000) suggested that 
the term ‘understanding’ is a more suitable one for validity in qualitative research. 
Therefore, although the qualitative research is not generalizable, issues and themes will 
emerge to address the research question, contribute to the existing knowledge and 
suggest further areas of research.  
 
Despite the previous argument, the external validity of this research can be discussed 
from two perspectives, as follows. Firstly, in relation to generalisability (external validity) 
of qualitative research that has adopted a single case study design. Research in this 
form focuses on the nature of the case study. Despite the fact that this research project 
was conducted in Saudi Arabia, it looked at an international phenomenon which is ‘AP’. 
This phenomenon is occurring around the globe, as a result of the separation between 
ownership and control (Charreaux, 2004). This certainly applies in project management 
sector, which is associated with: high levels of complexity and similarities in various 
locations around the globe (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003); poor performance, as nine out of ten 
mega-projects fail (Flyvbjerg et al., 2005); and low success rates, in which success was 
described as ‘rare’ in mega-projects by Flyvbjerg (2014). The poor performance and low 
success rate is partially because of this international phenomenon ‘AP’, which is the main 
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area of investigation in this study. Additionally, the project actors who were the main 
participants in this study are project management organisations who have worked on 
international mega-projects in Saudi Arabia and other countries around the globe. Thus, 
the setting of project management sector around the globe; the cases involved in this 
study; and the organisational nature of the major actors, collectively add certain level of 
external validity to the findings from this research, which can be understood and applied 
to other set of cases where appropriate. The second perspective looks at the significance 
of this research and its relationship to the theory. This is where the researcher outlined 
the outcome of this study and established a relationship between this outcome and the 
theory used in this research (Saunders et al., 2016). To illustrate, the outcome of this 
study will be related to the extent of APs impact on the HHR mega-project failure.  
 
In terms of reliability, this study used specific research techniques to ensure the 
consistency of the collected data and to set aside research errors, subject errors and 
subject bias throughout the research. For example, interviewing and questioning 
participants was conducted in ‘neutral’ time (Charles and Craig, 2003) (i.e. timing the 
interviews after a site visit and after dealing with problems was avoided as much as 
possible). Also, during the interviews, the researcher reminded the participants that there 
are no right, wrong or favourite answers (Rubin and Babbie, 2001; Charles and Craig, 
2003). Moreover, a number of features within the research design and methodology of 
this study were included to increase the reliability as follows: choosing single case study 
with multiple individuals (three different contractors in this case); obtaining the data from 
multiple sources included (client, contractor, consultant, and project manager); multiple 
sites of data collection (dependent on each contractor working site); and multiple data 
collection methods (interview, observation and document review). Thus, all these 
features helped the researcher to ensure that the research findings matched reality. To 
illustrate, the three different data collection methods allowed the researcher to conduct 
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the triangulation approach. Furthermore, there was always the opportunity to investigate 
on certain issues through interviews with other sources (participants). Additionally, the 
data collection process included a follow up data collection. This increased the reliability 
of the data obtained from the initial data collection process, as the follow up data 
collection process contributed to further investigation of priori findings and to the finding 
of more data and information in certain themes through using the same data collection 
methods (triangulation).  
 
5.9 Ethical Consideration 
This research involved a number of ethical considerations, it took into account: The 
University of Birmingham’s Ethical Code of Conduct; the permission for obtaining the 
data from the SRO; and permission from the participants, who were involved in 
interviews. The ethical approval was granted from the University of Birmingham’s Ethical 
Review Committee to the researcher, from the outset of this research (before the 
beginning of any data collection). The application of the ethical approval can be found in 
Appendix 6. There were two applications for each stage of data collection, the 
applications reference number are: initial data collection stage (ERN_15-0617); follow 
up data collection stage (ERN_17-0300). 
 
After the ethical approval to conduct this research was granted by the University of 
Birmingham, the researcher pursued obtaining permission from the SRO to conduct the 
study in the HHR project; outlining that all obtained information from the project will be 
used for the purpose of this study only. This process started by a formal request from 
the researcher sponsor (King Abdul-Aziz University) (see Appendix 7) which was 
forwarded to the SRO. The request was accepted and permission from the SRO 
President was granted (see Appendix 8). This permission granted the researcher access 
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to conduct this study with the specified design and data collection methods (interviews, 
observation and document review).  
 
The last ethical consideration was concerned with the participants’ consent to contribute 
to this study. In order to address all issues in this regard, the researcher showed the 
permission letter provided by the SRO President and then asked each participant to sign 
a consent form if they were still willing to participate in this study (for a copy of the consent 
form – see Appendix 9). The consent form included an introduction to the researcher, a 
brief description of this study and some operational and managerial issues, related to 
the conduct of collecting the data for this study and the process of handling them. At the 
stage, before the participant signed the consent form, the researcher explained and 
clarified these issues in more detail and ensured that the participants understood and 
agreed to participate under these circumstances. Participants were offered the 
opportunity to be provided with an explanation by the researcher in relation to any 
procedure-related doubts. The researcher reminded all participants of their rights to 
withdraw from this study at any time (Charles and Craig, 2003), up until the point when 
the research thesis was submitted to the University. Moreover, participants were 
informed that a report presenting the research results would be sent to those who 
provided their contact details (Pelkonen and Maija, 2004; Crow et al., 2006). In addition, 
those contact details would remain confidential and only used by the researcher for the 
purpose of sending the research outcome report (Denscombe, 2002). Finally, the 
researcher assured all participants that any information and data they provided would 
not be used for any purposes other than this research project and would be dealt with in 
confidence; and that, in line with the University of Birmingham’s Code of Ethics, the data 
and information the participants provided would be kept on a secured computer with a 





The process of conducting this research involved expected and unexpected limitations. 
Some examples of the expected limitations are as follows: whether the researcher would 
have obtained different data from other participants or more data from bigger sample; 
time was another constraint, as there was limited time to choose the sample size, gather 
the data, transcribe and analyse the obtained data and write the outcome of this 
research; through the data collection process, which provided an insight to the case 
through the participants, the researcher was faced with expected contradictory 
statements from one of the contractors, in comparison to what was said by client 
representative and consultant – this caused a concern to the researcher as which 
statement was ‘correct’. Although, the observation and document review provided 
sufficient evidence and the researcher was confident that a realistic picture had been 
established.  
 
There were further unexpected limitations, such as: time-consuming travel between 
different locations of the project, in order to conduct different sessions of observations; 
conducting the interviews with participants; and the documents review. A final 
unexpected limitation emerged while interviewing the participants. In a number of 
interviews, the participants got carried away in speaking about the problems and factors 
which lead to project failures, but which expanded beyond the information required for 
this research. The researcher facilitated the situations and redirected the focus of the 






This chapter started by exploring the research question and the research objectives. It 
outlined the philosophical approach underpinning this study, which included the 
ontological and epistemological position, and explained the paradigm followed in this 
study. Then the chapter identified the theoretical perspective approach and justified the 
subscription to the abductive theoretical approach. The discussion continued to the 
methodology of this research. The effectiveness of the qualitative case study design to 
answer the research question was discussed. This was followed by a discussion around 
the triangulation approach and data collection methods adopted in this research. 
Furthermore, the researcher demonstrated the variables and measures that were used 
in this research, which was essential to understand the origins of the themes of 
investigation and questions that were asked in the interviews.  
 
The next part of this chapter focused on the operational methodology including data 
collection and data analysis process. The data collection section provided an overview 
of the data collection phases: obtaining permission from the SRO President for data 
collection, piloting the interviews, selecting the case and locations for data collection, 
sampling strategy, and finally the undertaking of the three methods of data collection 
(triangulation approach). To continue the narrative of this chapter, the researcher then 
moved to discuss the data analysis stage, starting by the process of transcribing the data 
and conducting the thematic analysis. Other areas were considered in this chapter such 
as the validity and reliability of this study, ethical considerations and the limitations of this 
research. 
 
Now, after outlining all sections of the research methodology chapter and the procedures 
of their application, this thesis will move to the next chapter, which will represent a 
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CHAPTER 6  




This chapter provides a description of the Saudi railway project case from which the data 
used in this research were collected by the researcher. A brief summary of the railway 
history will be provided, including a background of the SRO and its future plans. The 
project that was chosen for the purpose of this research was the Haramain High Speed 
Railway (HHR) line, which was initiated in 2010 and was under construction throughout 
the time of this research. This chapter will discuss the project’s details, such as the 
project phases and the main project actors. Finally, the researcher will provide 
description of this mega-project and evidence of its failures. 
 
6.2 Railways Background in Saudi Arabia 
Historic Railway: The Hejaz Railway 
The Hejaz railway line was built over hundred years ago. The building process started in 
1900 and the completion date was 1908. Billings (2006) has stated that the line 
connected Istanbul and Madina and was used to transport pilgrims. The line was 
supposed to have an extension to the city of Makkah (the proposed route of the HHR 
line), at the bottom right corner of the map in Figure 18; however, this was never 
completed. The total journey time on the line used to be – before the operation was 
suspended – about four days, whereas before the line started to operate it used to take 
























6.2.1 Current operating railway: Dammam-Riyadh railway line 
Despite the fact that the Hijaz Railway was the first railway line built in Saudi Arabia, the 
Dammam-Riyadh railway line is the only current operating railway line. It links King 
Abdulaziz port in Dammam (the east coast of Saudi), through the city of Dammam, and 
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then on to other cities and towns, towards the capital Riyadh. The length of the line is 
approximately 1380km, which includes passenger and cargo lines (SRO, 2014).  
 
The Dammam-Riyadh railway line was proposed and executed by the Arabian American 
Company (ARAMCO) in the 1940s. It was run by Aramco and entrusted to them by 
Ministry of Finance, at which point it was called the Railway Department. On 13th May 
1966, the SRO was established and took full responsibility for operating this railway line 
(SRO-1, 2014).  
 
In December 2010, SRO signed a contract worth about €1 million with German 
International Cooperation, in order to create a master plan for Saudi railways for the 
period 2010-2040. The master plan included 19 individual railway lines, covering 
9,900km, to be implemented in three stages according to priority, as follows:  
 Stage 1: this stage has top priority and covers the period 2010-2025 covering a 
length of 5,500km. 
 Stage 2: this has medium priority, over the period 2026-2033, with a total length 
of 3,000km. 
 Stage 3: this will be within the period 2034-2040, over a length of 1,400km. 
 
The three stages of construction will be at a total cost of 365 billion Saudi Riyal (SAR), 
divided into the three stages as follows: 63 billion SAR, 209 billion SAR and 93 billion 
SAR respectively. This denotes that Saudi Arabia is heading towards a huge investment 
in the railway industry within the next few decades (SRO-2, 2014), which again indicates 




The following map shows the currently operating railway line, as well as other projects 
under construction and also future projects. The project that will be used in this research 
is shown in red colour. 
 
 
Figure 19: Railway lines in Saudi (SRO-3, 2014). 
 
6.3 The Haramain High Speed Railway Mega-Project (HHR) 
The HHR project, therefore, is to be one of the first projects to be constructed and built 
under the SRO’s management (PC-1R). The government of Saudi decided to build this 
railway project to link the two holy cities of Makkah and Madinah, as Figure 19 above 
shows. The total length of the project is approximately 450km and consists of four major 





6.3.1 The Project Importance  
This project is considered to be of high importance in the country because of its value in 
serving the Islamic community (SRO-4, 2014). The HHR will provide a convenient, safe, 
comfortable and fast way to transport pilgrims travelling between the holy cities.  
 
6.3.2 The Project Phases 
The project has been divided into two phases. Phase 1 is looking after the infrastructure 
work and the construction work of the stations. This phase is divided into two packages, 
as outlined below. Phase 2 is concerned with establishing the train system of over 
450km, which will include all the operations and signalling systems. 
 
Phase 1 Package 1 (P1P1) 
Package 1 is the first part of this project which represents the civil work of the track. This 
includes “the design and implementation of project infrastructure works such as roadway 
excavation, backfilling, preparing the ground, constructing bridges, culverts and tunnels 
for laying track” (SRO-4 , 2014, p. 1). There were four bidders for this part of the project. 
His Excellency Dr Ibrahim Al-Assaf, the Minister of Finance, and His Excellency Dr 
Jobarah Al-Seraisry, the Minister of Transport, are the government representatives who 
signed a contract with the Al-Rajhi Alliance, who became the formal contractor for this 
stage of the project.  
 
Phase 1 Package 2 (P1P2) 
This part of the project is related to building of four train stations. The two stations in 
Makkah and Madinah will be the terminus stations and the other two stations will be 
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through stations. Each station contains a departure and arrival concourse alongside the 
main building, a mosque, a helipad, a civil defence fire station, a short and long-term car 
park, a VIP lounge, shops, restaurants and cafes. Each of the stations have been linked 
with public transport services, including buses and taxis, as well as corridors for 
pedestrians heading towards the light rail train station, which is intended to be built in 
these cities (SRO-4, 2014). 
 
In relation to the contractors for this package, there were eight consortia that were pre-
qualified for this part of the project. Binladin Group was signed up to complete the 
construction work of the stations in Makkah and Madinah; the contract for the station in 
Jeddah (the biggest station) was awarded to Saudi Oger (SRO-4, 2014).  
 
Phase 2 (P2) 
This phase is about building an electrified railway, over 450km in length. According to 
SRO: “This Phase of the HHR Project includes the construction of railway tracks, 
installation of signalling and telecommunication systems, electrification, operational 
control centre, the procurement of 35 train sets and the operation and maintenance for 
a period of 12 years” (SRO-4, 2014, p.1). The contract for this phase of the project was 







6.4 Project phases and contractor history 
6.4.1 P1P1 phase’s contractor 
Al-Rajhi Alliance, who is the contractor for the P1P1 part of the project, is a consortium 
formed of three companies, which are as follows: 
1. Al Arrab Contracting Company (ACC). In 2005, Al-Rajhi Alliance acquired a share 
of Al Arrab Group, which expanded the scope of the ACC’s targeted projects to 
work in larger projects and new sectors including civil construction, water, 
aviation and rail. In 2011, Al-Rajhi Alliance increased its share of ACC to 100%, 
which made the company become a totally Saudi company (ACC, 2013).  
2. Mohammed Ali Al Suwailem Group (Masco) is the second company in this 
alliance. This company has been awarded Grade A by the Ministry of Municipal 
and Rural Affairs in the fields of highways, bridges, architecture, dams, electrical 
works and others, to give the company the ability to bid on projects with no value 
limitations. (Masco, 2013). 
3. CRCC is a Chinese group which is rated as first class in railway engineering 
constructions. They are specialists in tunnel, bridge and urban railway transit, 
amongst other works. The contribution of this group has an added value element, 
in terms of their experience in mega-projects around the globe. 
 
6.4.2 P1P2 phase’s contractors 
This phase is related to building the train stations in the four cities and will be 
accomplished by two major contractors, they are: 
1. Saudi Oger, which has worked on many major projects in Saudi, such as 
university projects, major roads, royal projects and other mega-projects. Saudi 




2. Saudi Binladin Group is a very well-known company, working mainly on mega-
projects both nationally and internationally. Binladin Group is regarded as having 
a high level of professionalism in their work in different construction sectors 
(Saudi Binladin Group, 2012).  
 
6.4.3 Phase 2 contractor 
Briefly, as this phase will not be included in the case study, Al Shoula Group is a 
consortium of 15 Saudi and Spanish companies. The work for this phase is being carried 
out in parallel to the Phase 1 execution at certain areas and stages on the project. 
 
6.5 Funding the project 
HHR is a public project funded by the Ministry of Transport. This project has a unique 
priority to the King of Saudi Arabia, as it will be serving the Islamic population around the 
globe who come to perform Pilgrimage and Omrah. Therefore, it was important to 
achieve the fastest possible delivery date. As mentioned previously, the cost of each 
phase is as follow: P1P1, after the scope changed, will be produced at a total cost of 
SAR 10.765 billion; P1P2 – including all four stations within the project (S1, S2, S3 and 
S4) – will be delivered at a total cost of almost SAR 9.4 billion; and the finally Phase 2 at 
a total of SAR 30.8 billion; which makes a total project cost of SAR 50.965 billion. (N.B. 
5.03 SAR = 1 GBP).  
 
6.6 The project team 
This section will present a brief structure of the main stakeholders of Phase 1 of this 
project, which is related to the cases of this thesis as follows: 
 SRO: the SRO is managing the project as the client representative.  
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 Dar Al-Handasa (DH) Performance Supervision Consultancy: DH is a 
consultancy agency which is monitoring and controlling the contractors work 
and co-ordinating the execution between the client and contractors.  
 Contractors: 
o Al-Rajhi Alliance: is the only contractor involved in the P1P1 part of the 
project, and is formed by three major subcontractors, as mentioned 
above. 
o Binladin Group: is the contractor for the train station in the city of Makkah. 
o Saudi Oger: is the contractor for the train station in the city of Jeddah.  
 
6.7 Evidence of failure  
The purpose of this section is to provide an overall assessment of the project 
performance, in order to demonstrate the areas of success and failure that occurred 
during the execution stage and after the project completion. 
 
The HHR project performance in terms of time, cost and quality 
 
 6.7.1 Time 
The time aspect of the iron triangle was the only one where both packages of Phase 1 






Table 18: Estimated and actual project duration (PC-1R, PC-2R and PC-3R – official 









Total project duration 
P1P1 3 years 5 years & 8 months 8 Years 
P1P2 – S1 2 years & 1 month N/A 6 Years 
P1P2 – S2  2 years & 1 month N/A 6 Years 
 
 
P1P1 part of the project was initiated in 2010 followed by P1P2 in 2012. This indicates 
that the project was ongoing throughout the timeframe of this research and was delivered 
in 2018. 
 
Table 18 above shows the estimated project duration and then the actual project 
duration, after execution. It is clear that there is a major failure on this project with regards 
to the project time. The time overrun in the project execution period exceeded the original 
time planned by the client, in terms of delivering the project and starting the service. As 
a result of this delay, the client applied penalty clauses on the contractors, where 
appropriate, which reduced the contractor’s profitability and the ability to bid for other 
projects. Therefore, the time aspect of the project completion was perceived as a failure 
to both the client and the contractors.  
 
Against this, while the time overrun was recognised by the project consultant, this was 
not seen as a failure from its own perspective. The reason behind this, as PC-2R 
commented, was that “there are no liabilities imposed on the consultant if the project gets 
delayed”. PCO-1R agreed, saying “it is for the benefit of the consultant if the project gets 
delayed”. The GTPL document confirms that by stating “a contractor shall bear the cost 
of supervising the execution of the project during the period in which he is subjected to 
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the delay penalty” (GTPL document, article 50, p. 22). Therefore, any time overrun within 
the project will not incur any costs on the consultant. This matter is picked up in a later 
chapter. 
 
6.7.2 Cost  
Project cost is the second aspect which will be used in assessing the failure of the project 
performance. From Table 19 below, it can be observed that the first package of the first 
phase (P1P1) of this project suffered from failure, whereas the second package (P1P2), 
which includes the construction of the train stations, has been delivered according to the 
estimated budget.  
 
Table 19: Estimated and actual project cost (PC-1R, PC-2R and PC-3R – official 











P1P1 SR 6.75 Billions SR 10.765 SR 16.5 Billion 
P1P2 – S1 SR 2.9 Billions N/A SR 2.9 Billion 
P1P2 – S2  SR 3.178 Billions N/A SR 3.178 Billion 
 
In relation to the P1P1 part of the project, there was an increase in the estimated cost in 
comparison to the original cost estimate. This was because of the change in the project 
scope. However, that part of the project still failed to be delivered within the revised 
estimated cost, and the cost overrun reached above 45% of the revised estimated price.  
 
The consequences of the P1P1 project cost failure fell mainly upon the project client. In 
relation to the project contractor, how it was affected by the project cost failure can be 
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explained twofold, as follow: firstly, in cases where the time delay occurred because of 
factors that are related to the contractor, the contractor incurred additional costs for the 
duration of the delay for his staff and the supervision consultant; secondly, in case where 
the time overrun occurred as a result of external factors, the contractor will have the 
grounds to claim for compensation. Finally, the consultant is the actor who was least 
affected from any project cost failure. Again, these matters are picked in a later chapter. 
 
6.7.3 Quality 
This project is of a high level of importance to the government of Saudi Arabia, starting 
from the pre-initial planning, throughout the execution and continuing until the project’s 
completion. One important element the client emphasised was the quality of the final 
product. PC-3R commented that “the most important thing in delivering this project is to 
ensure that we deliver the project specification and to ensure that the standard of the 
service after the project completion is very high”. PC-2P agreed, saying “the client is very 
strict with the contractor when it comes to the quality of the execution”. PECO-2R said 
that “as a supervision consultant, we do not approve any work that the contractor does 
until we ensure that it is following the project specifications and the quality of the work is 
as the client required”. He added: “We do not compromise in the quality of the work, and 
we will ask the contractor to re-do the work if needed”.  
 
Therefore, it is apparent that the quality of the project execution was a priority to the 
project client, and the supervision consultant was strictly monitoring this part of the 
project. Thus, there was no project failure recorded here on the part of the major project 




However, during the project execution period, and due to the large number of road 
diversions and the amount of construction work (e.g. excavations) that were related to 
the project, other public services and businesses were severely interrupted as a result 
of the project. Therefore, the execution of this project had a negative influence on the 
population’s daily life quality and business performance in general. The reason behind 
this was, as PC-1R confirmed, that “the traffic police normally do not allow more than 
one diversion in the highway, for example. We obtained an exemption to this just to 
enable the contractor to carry on his work as he planned”. The failure in delivering the 
project on time exacerbated the problem. Therefore, while there was no quality failure 
on this project, there were externalities to the wider stakeholders within Saudi society. 
 
6.8 Summary 
This chapter started by providing a brief introduction to the railway history in Saudi 
Arabia. This was followed by the provision of background information on the case used 
in this thesis, including the mega-project phases, the contractors for each phase and the 
major project actors of this mega-project. The last section of this chapter then provided 
primary data, both official government data on project delivery performance and 
qualitative interview data from project participants, on the different aspects of the mega-
project failure. This data, highlighting the significant failures affecting this project, 
revealed the importance of this research in investigating the causes of this failure. As 
discussed earlier, there was an obvious failure in the total project time (for Phase 1 of 
the project). The additional cost failure was mainly found in the P1P1 part of the project. 
The next three chapters will, therefore, investigate what were the factors that contributed 
to this project failure, in particular, the extent to which the failure can be explained by AT. 
Indeed, this investigation will start with an investigation into whether there were any APs 




CHAPTER 7  
FINDINGS – AGENCY FACTORS  
 
 
7.1 Brief re-cap of agency theory 
This chapter is presenting the findings and results that are related to AT. AT is the prime 
theory that informed the research question of the thesis. This research question raised 
the possibility that the project failure in the HHR case could be the result of APs, which 
is, by way of definition, the agent’s opportunistic behaviour. This research did indeed 
discover a series of APs in the HHR project. These opportunistic behaviours will be 
analysed in order to assess their impact on the project failure.  
 
Briefly, and as mentioned earlier in Chapter 3, AT was inspired by the separation 
between ownership and control that became established by the early decades of the 20th 
century (Charreaux, 2004). Five components were identified in relation to this theory. 
Firstly, a principal-agent division was the initial reason for the manifestation of AT. 
Secondly, information asymmetry, where Provan (1991) contended that agents have an 
information advantage over their principals. Thirdly, opportunism, which was defined by 
Williamson (1979) as a seeking process for self-interest that is associated with guile – 
the opportunistic behaviour is usually a result of the information advantage which can be 
exploited by one actor towards the other. Fourthly, opportunism management, which 
presents a number of techniques that can reduce the impact of AP, for example, 
establishing trust, monitoring through regular meetings, agent reporting, observations 




The researcher also raised the possibility of multiple APs existing in the mega-project 
environment. As Wu et al. (2010) discussed, it is possible that an AP may appear 
between every two parties within the same project. This research project has 
investigated and identified APs within a specific number of relationships from the mega-
project case, which will be discussed next.  
 
7.2 Project actors’ relationships and APs presentation 
Ceric (2014) demonstrated the multiple APs in her research by including the project 
owner, contractor and their project managers. Ceric (2014) proposed that future research 
should enlarge the scope and include more project stakeholders to investigate the 
multiple agency issue. Therefore, this research was the first to include the consultants, 
as well as the project client and contractor. Due to the context of Phase 1 of this mega-
project case which involved one client, one consultant and three different contractors, 
seven relationships were identified for the scope of this research (see Figure 20). These 
relationships will be investigated and analysed in order to identify APs among them, and 
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Each relationship from the above diagram will be reviewed individually, while at the same 
time there is recognition that opportunism in one relationship might affect other 
relationships. Different interviewees were selected for the different relationships. The 
criteria for interviewee selection were on the basis of seniority, expertise and proximity. 
The interviewees that were interviewed for each relationship are shown in Table 20 
below. 
 
Table 20: List of interviewees for each relationship. 
 
Relationship 
Interviewees and their codes in this thesis 
Interviewee Code 
R1 
Project client representative – area 1 
Project client project manager – area 1 
Project executive consultnt representative – area 1 
Project executive consultnt project manager – area 1 
Project consultant representative – area 1 








Project client representative – area 1 
Project client project manager – area 1 
Project contractor representative – area 1 
Project contractor project manager – area 1 
Project executive consultnt representative – area 1 








Project client representative – area 2 
Project client project manager – area 2 
Project contractor representative – area 2 
Project contractor project manager – area 2 
Project executive consultnt representative – area 2 








Project client representative – area 3 
Project client project manager – area 3 
Project contractor representative – area 3 
Project contractor project manager – area 3 
Project executive consultnt representative – area 3 








Project executive consultnt representative – area 1 
Project executive consultnt project manager – area 1 
Project consultant representative – area 1 
Project contractor representative – area 1 








Project client representative – area 1 PC-1R 
R6 
Project executive consultnt representative – area 2 
Project executive consultnt project manager – area 2 
Project consultant representative – area 2 
Project contractor representative – area 2 
Project contractor project manager – area 2 








Project executive consultnt representative – area 3 
Project executive consultnt project manager – area 3 
Project consultant representative – area 3 
Project contractor representative – area 3 
Project contractor project manager – area 3 








During the data presentation in this chapter, the researcher will only consider the 
relationships which involve AP. Within each relationship considered, one or multiple APs 
may be identified. In the case where a relationship has multiple APs, the researcher will 
start by presenting the pre-contractual APs (adverse selection), followed by the post-
contractual APs (moral hazard). In the process of presenting AP findings, each AP will 
be presented separately from the others, according to the following model in Figure 21 




The discussion around each AP will start by describing the issue, followed by the 
information asymmetry (specifically related to that problem) that existed in the 
relationship. This is followed by a description of the agent’s opportunistic behaviour and 
its impact at the time of the project execution. The intervention stage will then review the 











Figure 21: Agency problems presentation order. 
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a final revision of the outcome after the client’s intervention, assessing whether there 
was a change or not in the agent’s behaviour and project outcome. In order to emphasise 
moving between the stages of Figure 21 during the discussion of the APs, a word or two 
will be highlighted in bold to indicate the beginning of each stage. 
 
7.3 Agency problems 
As an introduction to the APs, Table 21 below presents the eight agency issues that were 
identified from the HHR project case. Each AP is coded and aligned with the relevant 
relationship. The perceived severity of each AP impact on the project failure is illustrated 
(using a qualitative measure) by the number of stars (*= low severity; ****= high severity). 
The four stars rating system had four levels of scoring defined as follows: 
One star (*) – very low severity of impact 
Insignificant cause of project failure that does not require the clients’ intervention 
as it can be resolved in between managements. 
Two stars (**) – low severity of impact 
Low significant cause of failure that does not require immediate intervention from 
the client as there is plenty of time to negotiate a mitigation procedure. 
Three stars (***) – high severity of impact 
Significant cause of failure that requires the clients’ intervention as it might 
interrupt other major project activities and cause project failure. 
Four stars (****) – very high severity of impact 
Major cause of project failure that needs urgent attention and intervention from 
the client as it will result with major project failure and might create other causes 




Finally, the table summarises the principal’s intervention in each AP and the outcome of 
these interventions.  
 









































of his employees 





‘time & cost’ 
Adverse selection was 
harder to observe by 











Late and wrong 
supervision 





‘time & cost’ 
The client’s intervention 
was by monitoring the 















the project cost. 
 
**** 
‘time & cost’ 
Client had no chance to 
intervene as the 
tendering process was 













Contractor 1 took 
over the project 
management 





‘time & cost’ 
It was challenging for 
the client or the 
consultant to intervene 
due to lack of 
awareness of the issue 
at the time. 
Furthermore, the 
contractor’s incentive 
was money, but 
financial incentives did 
not exist. Although, 
penalties were imposed 














workforce to work 
for the project. 
 
**** 
‘time & cost’ 
The client imposed 
penalty clauses for the 
delay and required the 
contractor to increase 
the project manpower 






















‘time & cost’ 
The client applied 
penalty clauses on the 
contractor if any delay 
occurred. Occasionally, 
the client issued 
technical approvals on 

















The client obtained 
exemption for illegal 
workforce for this 
project; the contractor 










failed to submit 
project plans to 
the consultant.  
 
**** 
‘time & cost’ 
 
The consultant 
prepared a detailed 
project planning 
document and it was 









From the table above, it can be observed that there were three scenarios in relation to 
principal (client) intervention. The first scenario was that the principal did not intervene. 
This was mainly in relation to adverse selection by the project consultant (R1) and 
Contractor 1 (R2). This was because adverse selection was hard to detect, in part 
because of the dictates of the Saudi tendering and procurement law. The second 
scenario was that the principal did intervene in an attempt to reduce the AP impact, but 
this resulted in no change to the outcome. This scenario can be seen in APs four and 
five, where the problems were within the contractor’s internal organisational 
management. The final scenario was where the intervention did result in a reduction of 
the impact of the AP on the project failure. The degree to which the impact of the AP was 
moderated, however, was varied. For example, in AP seven, the AP was completely 
eradicated as the two actors co-operated, whereas in APs two, six and eight there was 





7.3.1 Relationship 1 (R1): Client (principal) – Consultant (agent)  
The responsibility of the project consultant was to supervise the execution process of the 
three contractors in this mega-project. This included the construction of the train track 
(P1P1) and the train stations (P1P2). In this relationship, two APs were identified, which 
had a considerable impact on the project failure. The first AP pertained to pre-contractual 
(adverse selection) opportunism and the second was post-contractual (moral hazard) 
opportunism, both of which were performed on the agent side.  
 
 Agency Problem 1 
The first problem related to the project consultant tendering process. PCON-1R stated 
that “there was a problem in employing consultants for this project”. PC-1P clarified, 
saying “some of the consultant’s personnel are good but others are causing serious 
issues within the project progress”. There was evidence that the problem in employing 
the project consultants originated from the information asymmetry between the 
principal and the agent, although it was also facilitated by naive client contracting. In 
short, PC-1R believed that “the consultant represented themselves with higher 
qualification” than was in fact the case, resulting in a classic case of adverse selection. 
There was evidence that this was then compounded by additional moral hazard following 
contract award.  
 
Unsurprisingly, representatives of the agent itself, the consultant, were insistent that their 
organisation had acted appropriately in relation to this matter when asked about the 
selection process of their project team. PECO-2R replied: “We chose the project team in 
this project by finding candidates with relevant experience. We are a consultant party, 




However, this view was not shared by other project actors and, indeed, evidence was 
presented to the contrary. It was concluded by various project actors that the agent had 
behaved opportunistically in the form of misrepresenting its employees’ capabilities 
and qualifications and that this put it in a greater position to win the contract (PC-1R). 
PCON-1P argued further that this facilitation of adverse selection was then compounded 
after the consultant organisation had won the contract as the agent exploited the 
potential for information asymmetry further by “winning the contract and [then] employing 
some [further] consultants with low prices and no experience”, with some of the 
consultant personnel described by PCON-1P and PC-1R as “fresh graduates”.  
 
This opportunistic behaviour by the agent was described by PC-1R as an attempt to 
“decrease the costs”, which was part of the reason for the consultant having a team that 
“have a lack of experience and awareness with regards to the type and size of the 
project” (PCON-1R). PC-2R commented that “this caused project failure, as their 
production was quite bad in certain occasion”. PCON-1R added that “some consultants 
did not have the ability to compromise in certain technical situations during the project 
execution”.  
 
In terms of the client being able to respond to the opportunism when, as was the case, it 
became visible to it, the researcher asked if this dual (adverse selection and moral 
hazard) opportunistic behaviour was manageable. PCON-3R indicated that it was not 
manageable, purely because “the consultant’s contract with the client is ruled by the 
number of employees not by their experience”. PC-3R emphasised that, saying “the 
consultancy firm should not employ fresh graduates just to complete the number of the 
team”, but that the contract did not preclude it. This left the client in a very weak position 




“No Bid shall be excluded on technical grounds as long as it complies with the 
terms and specifications and conforms to the provisions of the Law and these 
regulations.” (IRGTPL document, article 30, p. 18).  
 
There was no question that the experience of the consultant employees mattered. PC-
2P, for example, highlighted the importance of “searching for the right experienced 
consultant, even if it took a longer period, which is better than taking any one from the 
market who might not have the technical experience on this project, which might cause 
project delay”. 
 
Thus, it can be observed that the agent won the bid by employing the right number of 
consultants, but with the wrong qualification, increasing its profitability due to the low 
costs of these employees. Furthermore, the client had no clear intervention to rectify the 
situation prior to the project execution stage, as there was no shortfall in the agent’s 
profile according to the IRGTPL. It goes without saying, of course, that this situation was 
entirely avoidable. The contract should have stipulated the necessity of qualifications 
and experience and this should have been rated during the bidding/evaluation process. 
However, this does not detract from the fact that opportunism took place and had an 
effect. 
 
Thus, the existence of this AP can be established. However, while the researcher was 
conducting qualitative research, it was felt both useful and feasible to explore with the 
interviewees the importance of this AP as a cause of the identified project failure. There 
is a significant element of subjectivity here. However, in order to try to assist with 
interpretation a ‘star’ rating was adopted. The interviewees were asked to rate the 






Table 22: Interviewees’ rating for AP1. 
 








qualification of his 









PCON-1R **** **** 
 
As indicated above, PC-1R rated the severity of this AP with the top score (****) saying 
“the lack of the consultant experience is a major cause of the project failure”. PCON-1R 
agreed, saying “I score four stars for the severity of this cause of delay”.  
 
From the responses above, the researcher came to the conclusion that there was 
evidence to suggest that the importance of this AP, as a cause of the project failure, was 
the highest. Indeed, the impact of this AP was observed in the next one. 
 
 Agency Problem 2 
The major issue in this relationship during the project execution (post-contractual) stage 
was the quality and speed of the consultant’s performance. This was mainly in relation 
to the consultant’s wrong and/or late approvals of the contractor’s work. That 
information asymmetry contributed to the perpetuation of this can be illustrated via 
interviewee testimony on how eventually the situation changed – the consultant’s actions 




“At the moment, the consultant approved some designs which I found to be not 
valid for the benefit of the project; and by reviewing these designs, I believe we 
will save around SR500,000”. 
 
During the interview with PC-1P, the consultant arrived at the interview location and the 
researcher observed: 
 
PC-1P clarified the wrong approvals by the consultant to those designs. The 
consultant accepted the responsibility and agreed to act on rectifying the situation 
(Observation 1).  
 
For a long time, however, moral hazard was facilitated by client ignorance and inaction. 
PC-1P commented on his impressions having started working for the client on this 
project: “After four years [since project commencement], I was surprised that there was 
no one from the consultant side who was monitoring the design of one bridge”. Another 
wrong decision the consultant made, which “the contractor suffered from and caused 
severe delay in his progress” (PC-1R), was approving the wrong amount of work that 
was completed by the contractor. PC-1R “noticed that the contractor completed SR200 
millions worth of work and was only paid SR120 millions”. Furthermore, PCON-1P said 
“the consultant stopped me from carrying out the work on the train track (total length of 
1.5 km) as he heard informally of making a new train station near the airport. This was 
left for over one year with no further approval. Eventually, that train station near the 
airport was found that it was not part of the HHR project. Instead, it will be built as part 
of the new airport project”. Similarly, PC-3P commented that “some of the project delays 





These performance problems, while serious, were not all necessarily the consequence 
of opportunism. However, this research uncovered evidence that, at least in part, they 
were. First, there is the issue above that the senior managers within the consultant knew 
that many of their employees were insufficiently qualified and experienced for the tasks 
they were being given. Second, there was also a perverse incentive (from the client’s 
perspective) for the consultant. PC-2R commented on this, saying “as long as the work 
gets delayed, it is for the benefit of the consultant”. PC-2P concurred, “as far as the 
consultant is concerned, I do not think he is much affected by the project delay. The 
longest the project last, the consultant will get paid for that period”. PCO-1R explained 
further: “The consultant makes money by allocating site engineers and site supervisors, 
not by finishing the project on time. They do not mind if they have to attend a meeting for 
the whole month, even if there was no outcome”.  
 
The impact of this AP can be seen to be of high importance as it caused severe project 
delay. PC-1R highlighted the influence of the consultant’s opportunistic behaviour on the 
project delay: “The consultant’s performance caused a major project delay”. PCON-1R 
agreed, commenting that “at this stage, the consultant is responsible for major part of 
the delay”. The reason behind the consultant’s opportunism was argued to be because 
“at the moment, the consultant does not have liabilities” (PC-2R). However, the IRGTPL 
document stipulated: 
 
“In supervision contracts, if a consultant delays provision of a supervision 
team or defaults in execution of his obligations, he shall be subject to a 
penalty to be determined in the contract, provided that the total penalty does 
not exceed 10% of the total value of the contract” (IRGTPL document, article 




However, it seemed that the consultant was not penalised for the poor performance 
when it was finally recognised because the contractual document between the client and 
the consultant was not properly set up to create the necessary incentives. PC-1R said 
that “the consultant should be accountable on reviewing the design document”. PC-1P 
agreed, saying that “the consultant should be accountable as well in delays in design 
approvals”, adding that “in the consultant contract, he should be allocated a period of 
time to finish the work, otherwise, he should pay the cost of the supervision”. Yet at that 
stage of the project execution, the client was left with no ability to penalise the consultant 
for the performance shortfall. In this case, the impact of the consultant’s opportunistic 
behaviour was said to have “dissolved” in between national culture and project features 
causes of failure (PECO-1R) – that is, their opportunism was explained away by some 
by other factors. 
 
However, while there was limited scope for imposing penalties, the client did, as 
mentioned, eventually intervene in terms of monitoring the consultant. PCON-1P 
commented that “the client got involved and monitored the consultant in those situations 
that caused delay to keep the work going”. The client’s monitoring to the consultant 
did make a change to the outcome of this AP, albeit late in the project duration. PC-1P 
commented: “Now, we started asking questions to the consultant and they started to 
respond and make actions as they feel that they are monitored by the client”. However, 
PC-2R admitted that “monitoring on its own is not enough to eliminate and change the 
impact of this problem in project failure”, although as Table 23 shows, the level of 
importance of AP2 before and after the principal’s intervention is different – intervention 




Table 23: Interviewees’ rating for AP2. 
 






Late and wrong 
supervision 












PC-1R, while rating for this AP, said “I see the level of importance of this problem to 
score four stars. We could reduce the problem’s impact by 50%”. Adding when asked if 
it was possible to eradicate the impact, he commented that “if the consultant gets the 
accountability of such failure as the contractors do, this was not going to be the case”. 
That is, its behaviour would have changed more extensively. Similarly, PC-1P gave the 
rate of four stars and confirmed that “to dissolve this issue, the consultant should be 
penalised for such behaviour”, which of course it wasn’t. It is apparent, therefore, that 
this AP had the highest level of importance on the project failure and could not be totally 
eliminated without embedding a penalty in the consultant’s contract.  
 
Therefore, there is evidence that this relationship has serious APs that had a serious 
impact on the project’s performance. The same can be said for APs found in the next 
relationship to be examined.  
 
7.3.2 Relationship 2 (R2): Client (principal) – Contractor 1 (agent) 
Contractor 1 was executing the construction work of the train track for the full distance 
of the project (P1P1). In this relationship, there were four APs, which were considered 
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as major issues that contributed to the project failure. The first problem was concerned 
with adverse selection opportunism (pre-contractual), and the other three were moral 
hazard opportunism (post-contractual).  
 
 Agency Problem 3 
This AP occurred during the contractors’ bidding process and the awarding of the 
contract by the client. PCON-1R commented that a contractor “might have the need to 
take a certain project for the sake of occupying his workers or to apply for additional work 
visas (to import cheaper manpower from overseas) for his organisation, more than the 
need to deliver a project and this is what may cause serious failure”. If that was the case 
in this project, then one method contractors can use to achieve their organisational goals 
is by misrepresenting the project estimations in order to win the project.  
 
The information asymmetry between the two actors in this relationship started when 
“the contractor provided wrong figures and underestimated the project costs at the 
bidding stage” (PCO-1R). For example, PECO-1P highlighted that “the contractor for 
Package 1 of this project (P1P1) estimated the land reclamation costs [at] less than 20% 
of what the other contractors estimated for Package 2 (P1P2) for the amount of work”, 
adding that “this is an obvious variation between the three contractors in this project. And 
I am surprised that it was not spotted by the bid examination committee”. Moreover, PC-
1P provided his view that “the contractor exploited the client in winning the contract” – 
that is, that the contractor’s under-estimation of the project cost and resources was a 
deliberate act of opportunistic behaviour in the cause of winning the project contract.  
 
This AP had a noticeable impact on the project failure by increasing the delivery period 
and the project cost. This is because the contract was awarded to the lowest bidder with 
wrong project estimations. This bidder also, it turned out, had “some faulty machinery 
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and not enough resources” (PC-2P). The opportunism also potentially deprived (unless 
the second bidder was playing a similar game) the client from selecting the best 
contractor for this part of the project. PCO-1R explained further: “The client signed the 
bidder for 100, then the contractor manages to increase the job cost into 200 but they 
were signed by the client because he was with the lowest figure (100), and the second 
bidder was (120)”. PCO-1R also claimed that during the bidding phase “there were many 
loopholes in the contractual document in which the contractor abused”. For example, 
PC-2R commented: “Unlike before, the contracts these days do not embed a clause to 
check the contractor’s resources and materials”.  
 
Another example can be seen in the GTPL document, which states: 
 
“No bid may be excluded on grounds of its low prices unless it is less by 35% 
(thirty five percent) or more than the government authority’s estimations and 
prevailing prices. The bid examination committee may recommend that the 
bid is not to be excluded after negotiating with the bidder, conducting the 
financial and technical analysis and becoming convinced of the bidder’s 
ability to execute the contract”. (GTPL document, article 22, p. 13). 
 
In addition, the IRGTPL document included: 
 
“If it appears that the bidder is qualified and experienced and the prices 
submitted by him, albeit low, cover the cost of the execution, a 
recommendation to award the bid to him shall be made” (IRGTPL document, 




PC-1R admitted that “the contracting and bidding system in Saudi needs to be revised”. 
He thought that “any contractor who provides estimated prices that lower than 10% 
should be investigated”, adding “the current percentage of 35% causes a greater 
possibility of project failure”. Indeed, PECO-1R went so far as to comment: “With the 
current bidding system, it is difficult to assess the contractor capability for executing the 
project”. This shows that it was not possible for the client to intervene and change the 
outcome of this AP under the rules of the current law. Thus, the level of importance did 
not change throughout the execution of the project as shown in Table 24 below. 
 
Table 24: Interviewees’ rating for AP3. 
 











PC-1R **** **** 
PC-1P *** *** 
PECO-1R **** **** 
PCO-1R **** **** 
 
 
In terms of the impact of the contractor’s underestimation and misrepresentation of the 
project cost, PC-1R, PECO-1R and PCO-1R agreed in giving this AP a “four star” impact. 
PC-1P scored it as “three stars” as he thought “other causes of failure partially dissolved 
the impact of this problem”. From the interviewees’ responses, the average rating led the 
researcher to suggest four stars for the level of importance of this AP due to its impact 
on the post-contractual phase of the project – where it resulted in other opportunistic 






 Agency Problem 4 
This is one of the APs that emerged as a result of the pre-contractual underestimation 
of the project cost by the contractor. Following the project initiation, the contractor aimed 
to reduce the project cost, which resulted in moral hazard opportunism. The issue in this 
AP was the redundancies made by the contractor to some of its staff and that of its 
subcontractors, in order to take full control of the project and to increase profitability.  
 
PECO-1R commented: “This contractor is formed by an alliance between three 
subcontractors, and a Project Management Office (PMO) to facilitate them”. PCO-1R 
explained that “the PMO office consisted of thirty-five engineers who have been sacked 
one after the other and the top management of the contractor took full control of the 
PMO”. PC-1R confirmed that “the client was not aware of the changes in the contractor’s 
PMO, which caused major delays to the project as a result of very poor facilitation and 
wrong decisions”.  
 
This information asymmetry between the contractor and the client resulted in the 
contractor making opportunistic decisions. For example, PECO-1R explained: “The 
contractor’s top management reduced the work scope from one of the subcontractors 
who was experienced in building bridges, and passed it over to the other sub-contractor 
(a sister company of the top management) who was not specialised in delivering that 
job”. The contractor’s justification for this move was provided by PCON-1R: "In some 
contracts, we could not increase the agreement budgets after the national increase in 
the labour fees. Therefore, we had to withdraw the task from some subcontractors and 
we hand it in to other organisations for execution instead”.  
 
This explanation, however, appears unconvincing and this AP resulted in severe delays 
to some of the project tasks and activities. For example, the researcher has observed 
233 
 
two similar tasks on-site, performed by two different sub-contractors. The first 
observation was as follows: 
Severe delay in the construction process of a railway bridge section by non-
specialised sub-contractor. Scheduled to be completed within six months. 
After nine months from the activity start date, the bridge piles have not been 
implanted yet. Therefore, a three month delay already and expectations of 
another six months required for construction (15 months in total) even if it 
starts at the observation date, which does not seem to be the case as the 
machineries onsite are broken and there is lack of manpower. There was 
150% time-delay in this activity (best case scenario) – see Picture 1 
(Observation 2). 
 




Then the researcher observed: 
Clear good progress by another sub-contractor who is specialised in building 
bridges. The task is expected to be delivered ahead of schedule – see 









It is apparent from the two observations above, that the contractor made decisions that 
caused failure to the project in order to reduce the costs of certain tasks. Since the main 
motive of the contractor was to reduce the losses by reducing the costs, PCO-1R argued 
that even after the opportunism was discovered “it was difficult to intervene and take 
clear measurements against the contractor. We cannot take part of the work away and 
give it to someone else, and we cannot throw him out of the job either. The contractual 
situation is not very strong for the client”. PCO-1R added: “The only way I think to 
manage this problem and keep the work alive was by providing incentives to the 
contractor for the early completion, and the main motivator for a contractor is money”; 
but PC-1R admitted that “financial incentives are not existing in this project”. For 
example, it is suggested here that the contractor was not suffering from delays in terms 
of its relationship with sub-contractors. PECO-1P explained that “the contractor 
negotiates the price with the subcontractor, [which doesn’t change] even if the task 




Thus, the lack of financial incentive was seen as a major factor of the delay in this AP, 
which led the contractor to find an unethical way of reducing the project costs. This was 
said to have had a major impact on the project in terms of delays. Consequently, most 
interviewees indicated that this AP had a high level of importance – as shown in Table 
25 below.  
 
Table 25: Interviewees’ rating for AP4. 
 






Contractor 1 took 




PC-1R **** **** 
PC-1P **** **** 
PECO-1R **** **** 
PCO-1R *** *** 
 
 
In summary, therefore, PCO-1R scored the AP with “three stars” and said “the client 
could have provided financial incentives to push the contractor to work”, but didn’t so the 
score stayed at “three stars” after client intervention. Other interviewees such as PC-1R, 
PC-1P and PECO-1R totally criticised the contractor’s behaviour and scored “four stars” 
for this AP, again with no reduction in the scoring after client intervention. So, as the 
majority of the interviewees scored, the researcher suggested four stars for this AP – a 
significant contributor to project failure. Furthermore, as seen below, decreasing the 
contractor’s manpower resulted in other APs at a later stage of the project. 
 
 Agency Problem 5 
The fifth AP again concerned the contractor’s manpower, or lack of it. PECO-1R argued 
that “the main cause of delay in P1P1 stage of the project was the shortage in the 
contractor’s manpower”. The issue arose due to a combination of two factors. First, 
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immigration law. PECO-1R explained: “At this time of the project, the Home Office 
officially prohibited illegal workers and other legal ones to work for anybody other than 
their guarantor”. Second, the profile of the contractor’s manpower. PECO-1P reported 
that “90% of the contractor’s human resources are outsources” (PECO-1P). The result 
was, according to PC-1P, that “a large proportion of the contractor’s outsourced labour 
was found to be illegal and unqualified to execute the project”. PECO-1P believed that 
this situation was completely unacceptable: “A big contractor should have the skilled 
labour to execute the project and outsource additional manpower if he needed to; but, 
this percentage tells that the contractor had a problem and I would say it was a disaster”.  
 
The start of the information asymmetry was from the contractor side. PC-1R mentioned 
that “the client was not aware or informed by the contractor of any illegal or unqualified 
manpower”. Despite the fact that “the contract between the client and the contractor is 
to employ legal workforce according to the government regulation” (PECO-1P), this 
consultant representative agreed that client was correct in saying that “the contractor did 
not inform the client of any illegal workforce”. Interestingly, PECO-1P also said that 
“neither the client nor the consultant will act as a policing unit over the contractor for such 
a matter”.  
 
There is then evidence that the contractor exploited this situation by employing a 
largely illegal workforce which was unqualified to execute the project, but which, of 
course, incurred reduced costs. PECO-1R commented: “Some of the contractor’s 
workforce do not have the capability to execute the specification of the project design; 
we have been in this problem for six months and it is causing major delay at this stage”. 
PCO-1R agreed: “The contractor showed that he has the financial ability in his alliance 





It is apparent that the outcome of this moral hazard opportunism by the contractor, in 
order to reduce the project cost, made a considerable contribution to the project failure. 
After the Home Office prohibited the use of illegal workforce, the manpower problem 
became catastrophic. PCON-1P confirmed this commenting that “I used to have 600 
manpower in this site, which dropped to 90 at the moment and that is a major cause of 
the delay”. Similarly, PCON-1R admitted that “we did not have ready skilled labour”, 
although he also claimed that “we have co-ordinators who are skilled to supervise 
unskilled labour and they move from one site to another to transfer their skills to labour 
in different locations”. 
 
According to PECO-1R, in order to manage the outcome of this problem the client 
intervened. He commented: “The client tried to support the contractor on the shortage of 
manpower, [which occurred] as a result of the new government legislation, by talking to 
the relevant [government] department”. This intervention was said to have been 
successful. PECO-1R added: “Due to the importance of this project, an exemption from 
this legislation was issued to the contractors in this project”. Despite this exemption, “it 
did not change the situation and the contractor still have the shortage in his labour” 
(PECO-1R). 
 
Since there was no co-operation from the contractor, when PC-1P was asked if financial 
incentives would encourage the contractor to deliver, he responded: “Absolutely, for the 
contractor, the most important factor in trying to motivate him I would say is money”. PC-
1R agreed, saying that “giving incentives will encourage the contractor to finish early, 
save money and take the bonus”. Furthermore, PCO-1R said that “you have to keep him 




However, PC-1R, PCON-1R and PECO-1R agreed that financial incentives do not exist 
in this project in terms of good performance and early project completion, which was 
described by PCO-1R when he said “this is very bad, it is important to implement the 
financial motivation”. Contradicting this agreement, one interviewee argued that “the 
contract has penalty clauses in case of delay” (PC-1R). The IRGTPL document states 
that: 
 
“If the contractor delays completion and delivery of work on the specified date 
for delivery, he shall be subject to a delay penalty calculated on the basis of 
the average daily cost of the project by the value of the contract by its period 
in accordance with the following: 
 
a) A penalty for the first part of the delay period at the rate of one quarter of the 
average daily cost for each day of delay until it mounts to fifteen days or 10% of 
the contract term, whichever is longer. 
b) A penalty for the second part of the delay period at the rate of half the average 
daily cost for each day of delay until the two parts amount to thirty days or 15% 
of the contract term, whichever is longer. 
c) A penalty for the third part of the delay period at the rate of the full average daily 
cost for each day of the delay following the longest of the two periods provided 
for in paragraph (b) of this article.  
The sum of the penalties imposed may not exceed 10% of the contract value” 
(IRGTPL document, article 84, p.46). 
 
Further exploration yielded a key factor that explained why the three former interviewees 
took the view they did that there were no financial incentives. PC-2R thought that “the 
penalty clauses in some cases could destroy and kill the contractor”, adding that “when 
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you put penalty clauses of those rates on a project already lost SR100 millions, this 
finishes the contractor”. In some tasks, PC-1P mentioned that “the penalties reached to 
the maximum and the client required the contractor to increase the resources to complete 
the task”. PCON-1R admitted that “to deliver the project tasks in this period, we have to 
increase the manpower and the number of shifts of work to deliver”. However, after the 
extensive penalties that were imposed on the contractor, PECO-1P believes that “the 
contractor is focusing to reduce the damage from the hefty penalties, instead of working 
hard to deliver the tasks”. So, despite the client’s attempts to intervene, the contractor’s 
behaviour did not change. The contract penalties here were largely unenforceable. 
 
There was widespread agreement, as suggested above, that financial incentives would 
have worked, i.e., changed the situation and minimised the delay, if they had been 
enforceable. PCON-1R described this as “excellent”, and “it would have absolutely given 
a huge motivation to the contractor to produce and facilitate the work in a better rate”. 
So, similarly to the previous AP, it is becoming apparent that the contractor’s 
opportunism could have been altered if there was an enforceable financial incentive – 
however there was not.  
 
As can be seen below (Table 26), therefore, there is agreement amongst the relevant 
interviewees that this AP was a significant factor in the project failure and that it remained 








Table 26: Interviewees’ rating for AP5. 
 





‘Moral hazard’  
Contractor 1 
employed illegal 
workforce to work 
for the project. 
PC-1R **** **** 
PC-1P **** **** 
PECO-1R **** **** 
PCO-1R **** **** 
 
 
PECO-1R commented on the frustration with the situation, AP saying: “We have been in 
this problem for six months”. All interviewees considered this AP to have a high level of 
importance to the project failure – with the top score of “four stars”. This AP’s level of 
importance remained the same throughout the project execution because of the lack of 
meaningful client intervention and the continuing effect of the initial project cost 
underestimation, as can be also seen in the next AP. 
 
 Agency Problem 6 
The enduring impact of the pre-contractual underestimation of the project cost by the 
contractor can be observed on the post-contractual selection of the project designer 
(following the redundancies to some subcontractors – described above in AP4). The 
issue in this AP was as described by PC-1P: “This part of the project (P1P1) is a design 
and build package and the contractor here has a designer who is not capable to design 
such a project”. PC-1P commented: “Accepting this designer at the first place should not 
have been agreed by the client”.  
 
In the view of the researcher, the process of the approving the designer by the client 
involved a clear information asymmetry. According to one interviewee: “This contractor 
has done construction project designs but never worked in railway project before. I think 
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the contractor did not provide right and complete information to the client about this 
designer’s capability and ability to build this project” (PECO-1P). PECO-1R added: 
“Giving the railway design to be done by a designer who does not even have a railway 
line in his home country is a disaster for the project”.  
 
The contractor used this information asymmetry to reduce the project cost and employ 
a cheaper designer, despite the designer having no experience in this type of project. 
PCO-1P commented: “This designer is not capable to design this project but at this stage 
we cannot say anything - he is employed by the contractor and there is a contract in 
place”.  
 
The outcome of the contractor’s opportunistic behaviour was seen by PECO-1P as “a 
major factor of project delay”. PC-1R agreed that “the lack of experience by the designer 
is a major cause of the project failure”. For example, it was reported by a client 
interviewee that “in the process of designing the track route, the designer decided to go 
through a newly developed residential area that had new infrastructure (this is a big job, 
it is like cutting an artery and stitching it back again), when they could have found an 
easier route that was agreed on a later stage” (PC-1P). PCO-1R thought that “the 
contractor’s poor decision in employing this designer caused as much as about 30% of 
the project delay”.  
 
It is important to be clear here where the opportunism lay. PCO-1R made this clear by 
stating that “because the designer won the contract with no experience, he had no option 
but to learn on the back of this project”. Therefore, the designer’s own performance was 
perceived as “honest incompetence” not opportunism (Hendry, 2002). PC-1R agreed 
that “the designer is incompetent for this job”, but no worse. The opportunism was on the 




The client’s formal intervention in response to the consequent delays by the designer 
was directed to the contractor as there was no direct contract between the client and the 
designer. PECO-1P commented on this: “When the contractor is late on his deadline, 
then we issue penalties according to the contractual document”. However, as the 
designer was incompetent, there was plenty of client-designer contact. According to PC-
1R: “We always have meetings with the designer, we agree on a solution but the designer 
still fails to deliver”. In some cases, however, PC-1R claimed that “to speed up the 
process of modifying some of the designs, the client did approve some of the technical 
decisions on changing the designs”. In some occasions, as shown in Table 27 below, 
this resulted in a marginal change in the outcome of this AP (PC-1R, PC-1P, PECO-1R 
and PCO-1R).  
 
Table 27: Interviewees’ rating for AP6. 
 









to design this 
project. 
PC-1R *** * 
PC-1P *** ** 
PECO-1R *** ** 
PCO-1R *** ** 
 
 
As mentioned earlier, PCO-1R thought that “the contractor’s poor decision in employing 
this designer caused about 30% of the project delay”. The other interviewees gave “three 
stars” to indicate the level of importance of this AP. This dropped to “two stars” following 
the client’s intervention (PC-1P, PECO-1R and PCO-1R). PC-1R emphasised that “this 
problem caused some delay at the first stages of the project before the client was able 
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to intervene”. Therefore, the researcher suggested that the client’s intervention reduced 
the level of importance of this AP – similar to the case of the next AP.  
 
7.3.3 Relationship 4 (R4): Client (principal) – Contractor 3 (agent) 
 Agency Problem 7 
Contractor 3 was executing the train station in the city of Makkah. Within this relationship, 
one AP emerged, which was pre-contractual (adverse selection) opportunism. The 
problem was that some of the sub-contractors who were employed by the main 
contractor had illegal field workers, although many such represented skilled labour. PC-
3R stated: “The contract between the client and the contractor made it clear that the 
contractor should employ legal workforce”. Despite this, PECO-3R commented: “To be 
honest, the illegal workforce issue has always been there for a long time within all local 
contractors”, adding “it was never appropriately policed by the relevant department in the 
government”, although, PC-3P asserted that “the client always expects the contractor to 
adhere to all contractual terms”.  
 
The information asymmetry between the two actors occurred when the contractor did 
not inform the client of the involvement of illegal workforce in the project (against the 
client’s expectations and the contractual terms). According to PCO-3R, “because the 
government do not have a check list on the human and other resources before the project 
starts, contractors do exploit this point to reduce their costs by appointing cheaper sub-
contractors with illegal workforce”. It is apparent that the contractor took the risk by 
breaching the contract, assuming that the government was not in favour to impose some 
control to this issue. However, it would have been known by the contractor that this 
opportunistic behaviour may cause project failure if the government was to take 




When the contractor was asked about this issue, PCON-3R commented: “This behaviour 
is not unusual between all contractors here; and it was not causing any failure to the 
projects we were involved in”. This was, however, as was always a possibility that there 
would be problems and sure enough there became such when the “Home Office officially 
prohibited illegal workers and other legal ones to work for anybody other than their 
guarantor” (PECO-1R). PECO-3P reported that “following the Home Office decision 
against illegal workforce, the number of its workers was reduced by more than 50%”. 
PCON-3P commented: “According to the project plan, I have to have 5200 workers at 
this time, but now it dropped to 1000-1200 workers”. PECO-3P added:  
 
“If we talk about the skilled workers who operate the machineries and cranes, we 
had an unbelievable threat as most of them did not have visas to work in Saudi 
(most of them were employed by sub-contractors). On-site, I have 24 cranes which 
required skilled workers to operate and most of them disappeared at the time when 
the Home Office released the news. I mean, the unskilled labour can be recovered 
but, on the other hand, the machineries operators are the heart of the project and 
their absence will stop the project”.  
 
Moreover, the researcher carried out a site observation at this period of the project and 
noted that: 
 
Due to the immigration rule that prohibited illegal workers; it was observed 
that due to short of labour (skilled and non-skilled), the cranes and heavy 
machineries on-site had no operators and the progress on the project field 









When the client was asked about their views on this problem, PC-3P commented: “If 
there was delay in delivering the project, there will be financial penalty and it is stated 
clearly in the contract. But, it was a matter of co-operating with the contractor and 
providing our support to avoid severe delays”. Again, the contractual penalties were 
apparently unenforceable. PC-3R added: “After talking with the Home Office about the 
importance of this project, we managed to obtain an exemption from this rule to all the 
contractors in this project”. This was followed by a good reaction from the contractor 
side. PECO-3P said: “The shortage of labour was there just for a month or two, but now 
it has been rectified and the contractor is bringing more skilled labour (even better than 
before) to recover and it was a success”. Thus, with the client’s support and the 
contractor’s co-operation and capability, the impact of this AP was eliminated as shown 




Table 28: Interviewees’ rating for AP7. 
 









PC-3R *** - 
PC-3P *** - 
PECO-3R *** - 
PCO-3R ** - 
 
 
The researcher suggested that the average score of the importance of this AP was three 
stars, which was given by PC-3R, PC-3P and PECO-3R. PCO-1R rated the importance 
of this AP by giving “two stars” as he thought “this contractor is capable to deal with such 
situation. They are executing multiple projects for the government beside this project”. 
As mentioned, however, the existence of a growing relationship that was cooperative 
and collaborative enhanced the way in which this AP was handled (Bhattacharya et al., 
1998). As a result, this AP was eradicated and the client both essentially forgave the 
contractor and escaped the consequences of its own poor management. This moves the 
discussion to the last AP that was found in this mega-project. 
 
7.3.4 Relationship 5 (R5): Consultant (principal) – Contractor 1 (agent)  
 Agency Problem 8 
There was not a contractual document between the two actors in this relationship. But, 
interestingly, moral hazard opportunism was identified, which was performed by the 
contractor. The issue here was the fact that the contractor was not submitting the right 
information to enable the project consultant to conduct the required supervision and 
monitoring of the contractor’s work. The asymmetry of information between the two 
actors was mainly related to the project and activities plan. The contractor failed on 
numerous occasions to submit the project execution plan to the consultant. PECO-1P 
commented: “The contractor had a baseline plan, but it did not move to the next level as 
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in what PRIMIVERA software allows you to do, such as taking the plan into more detailed 
breakdown of the structure and activities”, adding “the contractor does not have this 
document as we have requested a detailed plan and we never received it”.  
 
Further investigation was conducted by the researcher by asking the contractor’s staff if 
they could show an example of the project plan document that demonstrates a detailed 
breakdown structure of some of the project activities. All responses were evasive and no 
documents were provided in any case. The researcher observation was that: 
 
Contractor 1 was not responsive to the researcher’s request to show one of 
their planning documents, whereas the other two contractors had the 
initiative to offer and show the researcher their detailed planning documents 
as well as the software used in the project planning. Consequently, the 
researcher assumed that Contractor 1 may did not want to share this 
information or otherwise the document may never have existed as PECO-1P 
stated (Observation 5). 
 
Therefore, opportunistically, the contractor pretended that the project progress was 
according to their plans, when it was actually not. PECO-1P took a clear view on the 
matter: “The contractor is trying to hide most of the information in order to escape from 
the consultant’s monitoring and supervision. This was because the contractor was not 
confident that he can follow the actual project plan”. This was said to be purely a result 
of the fact that “the contractor had an obvious shortage of resources (labour and 
machineries), as well as the existing unqualified workers” (PC-1P). The result of this 
opportunistic behaviour by the contractor, as PCO-1R commented, was to “exacerbate 
the difficulty of monitoring the contractor’s progress”. He added: “Without a planning 
document you cannot measure the progress; and things that cannot be measured, 
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cannot be managed”. PC-1P confirmed that “this issue caused a major delay to the 
project mainly in Area 2 of P1P1 part of the project – throughout the first two years of the 
project execution”.  
 
Managing the delay caused by this AP required intensive work from the consultant. 
PECO-1R said: “Our role as a consultant was to assess, inspect and approve the 
contractor work, although as a result of the contractor’s weak performance, we were 
deeply involved within the contractor’s work, to [the point] where we knew more about 
the project than the contractor itself. I mean, in order to complete this part of the project, 
we had no option but to lead the contractor”.  
 
The researcher was present in a meeting between the consultant and the contractor at 
the client’s office and observed that:  
 
A detailed WBS and activity planning document prepared by the consultant 
was handed in to Contractor 1 to execute activities in Area 2 of P1P1. As a 
result of the contractor’s failure to produce the required information itself, the 
decision was made by the client, and agreed by the contractor, to use the 
new plan document for that part of the project (Observation 6). 
 
Therefore, the researcher asked the interviewees to rate the importance from one to four. 






Table 29: Interviewees’ rating for AP8. 
 






Contractor 1 failed 
to submit project 
plans to the 
consultant. 
PECO-1R **** ** 
PECO-1P **** ** 
PCO-1R *** ** 
PC-1R **** ** 
 
 
PECO-1R, PECO-1P and PC-1R gave this AP the highest level of importance, “four 
stars”. However, the client’s intervention did result in a change in the outcome and the 
consultant was able to measure the contractor’s progress. As a result, all interviewees 
suggested that the level of importance of this AP dropped to “two stars”. But, the impact 
of the other APs discussed earlier (which were related to Contractor 1) still caused failure 
to achieve the plan document provided by the consultant to the contractor.  
 
7.4 Summary of impact of agency issues 
In line with the first stated objective of this research, the researcher identified specific 
APs which occurred within the HHR mega-project. This included multiple APs which have 
been identified from the HHR Project, as discussed above. These APs occurred at 
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Figure 22: Project lifecycle – 8 APs. 
 
The figure above can illustrate the project stages and the APs that occurred on each 
stage. As discussed earlier in this chapter, there were three adverse selection (pre-
contractual) opportunistic behaviours which occurred in the project pre-initiation stage. 
The other five APs were moral hazard (post-contractual) opportunistic behaviours – two 
occurred at the designing stage, one at the project planning stage and two at the 
execution stage.  
 
These eight APs, from four different relationships, were found to have a prominent role 
in the project failure, as described by a number of interviews. However, the severity of 
the impact of different APs did vary. Some APs had a high level of importance and 
caused a considerable project delay and failure; for example, and as described by PC-
1R (in AP two), that “the consultant’s performance caused major part of the project 
delay”. Other APs had a lower level of importance toward the project failure, either 
because of the nature of the AP or because the principal (client) did manage, once the 
opportunism became apparent, to successfully or partially successfully intervene in an 




This variation in the outcomes of the client interventions was, according to PECO-1R, a 
result of the existence of other factors causing the HHR project failure – these factors 
were said to have interrupted the principal’s intervention. Some of these factors were 
found to be cultural factors. Further reflections on the AP within this project, therefore, 






FINDINGS – CULTURAL FACTORS 
 
 
8.1 Brief re-cap of cultural theory  
National culture has been widely defined. A recent definition was provided by Hofstede 
(2011), which stated that “culture is the collective programming of the mind that 
distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from others” (p. 3). 
Previously, it had been argued by Ferraro (1990) and Hofstede et al. (2010) that national 
culture is transmitted through the learning process in an environment from one person 
to another and not by the genetic process.  
 
There were six national culture dimensions used in Hofstede et al.’s (2010) study – PD, 
UA, individualism/collectivism, masculinity/femininity, long-term vs. short-term 
orientation, and indulgence vs. restraint. Bjerke and Al-Meer (1993) used the first four 
dimensions to identify the nature of the Saudi culture. This classification broadly matched 
Hofstede’s (1984) classifications. Saudi society was found to possess high PD, high UA 
and be collectivist and feminine in nature. Hofstede (1984) also considered the last two 
dimensions, describing Saudi national culture as short-term oriented and indulgent in 
nature.  
 
8.2 Cultural causes of project failure  
Hofstede’s national culture dimensions and his classification of Saudi national culture 
were used in this research into the causes of failure on the HHR project. While the main 
theory accessed by the researcher was AT, he also wished to identify the extent (if any) 
of the impact of the Saudi national culture on mega-project performance. The reason 
why this was felt necessary was because the make-up of the project team is actually 
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largely homogenous – largely made up of Saudi organisations and management 
personnel. As such, the thesis assesses whether certain common cultural tendencies 
within Saudi Arabia provide an alternative or complementary explanation for the mega-
project failure seen in the case study. 
 
The findings, as presented here, show that there did seem to be something of a national 
cultural element to the project failure, with one dimension in particular, high PD, 
appearing to have played a significant role in the failure. Two other cultural dimensions, 
short-term orientation and indulgence, were also seen to have caused aspects of project 
failure, although to a lesser extent. UA, femininity and collectivism were found to have 
no relation to the identified causes of failure in this case of mega-project, which make 
them redundant dimensions in this context.  
 
A minimum of two causes of project failure were related to each of the three national 
culture dimensions discussed in this chapter. Some of the dimensions include a larger 
number of causes of project failure, which occurred at different stages of the project. 
Therefore, as demonstrated in the following model (Figure 23), the cultural causes of 
failure are going to be presented in this chapter according to how they affected the 
different project stages, starting with the pre-initiation stage and finishing with the project 
execution stage. Where a cultural dimension does not affect a project stage it is omitted. 
The movement of the discussion to the next project stage will be indicated by a bold 
highlighted word. 
 
Pre-initiation stage Designing stage Planning stage Execution stage
Figure 23: Project lifecycle – cultural data presentation order.  
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To start the presentation of the evidence in this chapter, Table 30 summarises all the 
causes of project failure that are related to the cultural dimensions. It provides an 
indication of the impact of each cause that led the project to fail, as follows: 
 























The client’s (project owner) underestimation of 
the project period and imposing that wrong 





Private lands were retained from the project’s 
land acquisition committee, which required 




The first project director’s decision not to use 
project management tools and techniques in 





In Contractor 1, the project director has very 
limited authority in making financial decisions. All 
financial decisions have to come from the top 








Limited and short-term vision by the client to the 
project’s milestones.  
*** 
CC6 
Contractor 1’s short-term mentality in earning 
profit from this project and his failure in building a 








Low percentage of skilled manpower within the 





Lack of co-operation from utility companies in 
monitoring their infrastructure, and attempting to 




Analysis of these cultural causes of project failure will follow. Starting with the first project 
stage (pre-initiation), the first cultural dimension (high PD) presents important causes of 




 8.2.1 High power distance  
The Saudi society was categorised as a high PD society, according to Hofstede’s study 
(1984). In this research project, there were a number of issues attributed to this cultural 
dimension, which were found to be important causes of project failure. The first issue 
was related to the determination of the project duration by the project owner. The 
relationship to high PD was that those who had the power and authority in the client 
organisation were able to and decided to impose a particular period on the project 
contract without referring to a professional body. It proved to be a highly inaccurate 
imposition, as can be seen below. 
 
PCON-3R clarified that “generally in Saudi projects and mega-projects, to be more 
specific, there is a serious issue that is related to underestimating the actual time 
required to complete a project”. After investigating this issue, the researcher was told by 
PCON-2R that “our problem is the fast decision made by the project owners to initiate 
the projects – which you mainly find in government projects”. The fast, authoritative 
decision to initiate a project by the owner was observed to have a direct negative impact, 
which resulted in project failure purely because “the project period has not been validated 
effectively and it was not realistic” (PCON-2P).  
 
PCON-1R confirmed this and also argued that the national culture in Saudi meant that 
such hasty and ill-informed decisions were hard for experts lower down the power 
structure to challenge: “The client asks you to finish the project in two years when the 
project cannot be delivered in less than three years. We cannot challenge the client’s 
decision on the project duration. All we can say is ok, we bid for the project according to 
the specified period and then deal with that during the execution stage”. PCON-1R 
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added: “Let me tell you what is going on in another example. If this cup of water needs 
five minutes to be boiled; the client comes and says I want it in two minutes. Nobody will 
say it cannot be done, everyone say ok we will do it and then you end up with project 
delay”. 
 
The second critical factor in this dimension was related to the project designing stage. 
In P1P1, at the designing stage of the route of the train track, there were specific areas 
and private lands that were not possible to penetrate within the route design. PC-1R 
explained further: “The designer produced a design for the route of the train track. That 
design passed through private land, which was found to be un-practical for the project 
execution period”. As a result, PC-1P admitted that “one of the major causes of delay in 
the project designing stage was the need to re-design the route of the train after the client 
found that the initial design penetrated certain areas. The designer had to redesign the 
route and this issue caused a large proportion of the delay in the designing stage”.  
 
There was evidence that this was due to the land belonging to people within Saudi 
society whose wishes overruled the powers of the land jurisdiction committee, powers 
that had been sufficient to effect the requisition of other land on the route. The researcher 
observed that:  
 
These areas are of high level of importance and some of them were privately 
owned. The owners have the authority and power to retain their property from the 
project’s land acquisition committee (Observation 7). 
 
PCO-1R commented on this saying: “the contractor of P1P1 should have studied the 
feasibility of the route design before the execution stage. This is to avoid the need of 
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changing that design of the track route because of practical difficulties on the acquisition 
process of private lands”.  
 
After the project designing stage, and during the project execution, there were two 
further causes in this cultural dimension that contributed to project failure. The first one 
was related to the client’s internal project management; the second was from the 
contractor side.  
 
The first issue was related to the project’s director from the SRO and his management 
style. The director was making decisions paternalistically, which were not showing a 
positive impact on project monitoring and control from the client’s side. For example, 
PCO-1R commented: “For instance, the first director we had in this project from SRO 
was not interested in any project management structure, responsibility matrix, incentive 
system or liquidated damage clauses”, adding “if the project manager has a proposal, it 
was difficult for the project manager to approach the director in an effective manner”. 
Furthermore, PCO-3R said: “For the last two and a half years, it was insisted internally 
that we should do risk assessment workshop. So all those uncertainty issues go on 
paper, which will allow the client to be aware of all the project risks, mitigate them and 
manage them more efficiently. This was not done until this moment”.  
 
Why such risk assessment started to be undertaken was due to the appointment of a 
new director from the SRO – who was aware of the importance of changing the project 
management style from the previous one. PC-1R confirmed that “now with the new 
director and for the first time, we are having a risk assessment workshop”. The 





The researcher observed that: 
During the workshop, the Client’s management reviewed the project 
schedule in that workshop, identified the risk areas, identified the risk 
register, looked for mitigation actions and then assigned someone to own 
each risk. It was observed that this was done for the first time in this project 
as the workshop involved creating a new system of monitoring the risks. 
(Observation 8). 
 
However, although the risk assessment practice is different with the new director, it only 
changed because he made that decision – the project team is still expected to follow his 
orders. Nevertheless, PCO-1R commented that the improvement in the risk assessment 
taking place occurred as “the new project director has been requesting more frequent 
meetings related to different areas within the project. This is actually helping him to make 
decisions for the benefit of the project”. PCON-3P agreed by saying: “Now, we are having 
regular visits – every two weeks – from the project mainly to check on the project 
progress”. However, the resistance to bottom-up advice remains – it was just fortuitous 
that the current director was well-informed. Despite the different personalities and 
management styles of different project directors, this resistance illustrates the remaining 
nature of the Saudi culture (high PD) and its potential impact on the project. 
 
The second cause of project failure during the execution stage within this dimension was 
related to Contractor 1’s (P1P1) internal management. The issue was that the 
contractor’s financial decision-maker (top management) had a lack of awareness of all 
the technical issues and decisions, yet the high PD in the organisation meant that only 
he could make decisions. PC-1P commented on the consequences of this: “You find the 
financial decision-maker is different from the technical decision-maker. So, to transfer 
the technical picture to the financial decision maker or the financial situation to the 
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technical decision maker takes time. In other occasions, misunderstandings occur and 
this causes the work to stop completely”.  
 
For example, PECO-1P said: “I found that one of the subcontractors was not working for 
a period of time and, after investigating this issue, I found that they stopped working 
because they did not get paid by the main contractor. Then I went to the main contractor 
and tried to find out the reason of this late progress payment; after many attempts, I 
found that the amount they owed the subcontractor (SR 250,000 on this occasion) is 
more than what the contractor’s project director can authorise. And the reason for the 
late payment was because of the late approval from the contractor’s top management”.  
 
From this example, it is apparent that decision-making authority on the contractor side 
resided with a small number of people in the top management. The contractor’s project 
director had no authority to approve more than SR 200,000 for any financial order, which 
is a very low amount for such a mega-project. PCON-1P admitted the limited authority 
within Contractor 1’s project team by saying: “The financial authority within the project 
site is very limited. All decisions have to come from the top management in the head 
office”. PECO-1R emphasised that “no one from the contractor side has the financial 
authority to facilitate the work. It is all in the hands of the chief finance officer in the 
company’s headquarters, who is not an engineer”. Consequently, PECO-1P said: “You 
find the contractor team on one island and the top management on another”. PECO-1R 
added: “The site team members from the contractor side are living the reality of the 
project, whereas the top management are totally not aware of this reality. There is a huge 
gap especially in the decision-making process”. This was perceived as a considerable 




Thus, four causes were identified within this dimension. These causes were in line with 
the characteristics of high PD society, as Saudi Arabia culture was classified by Hofstede 
(1984) and Bjerke and Al-Meer (1993). However, while the researcher was conducting 
qualitative research, it was felt both useful and feasible to explore with the interviewees 
the importance of these causes of failure. There is a significant element of subjectivity 
here. However, in order to try to assist with interpretation, a ‘star’ rating was adopted. 
Throughout the five dimensions, the relevant interviewees were asked to rate the 
importance from one to four. Table 31 below shows the interviewee responses. 
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As the previous table indicates, different causes of failure had different levels of 
importance in relation to the project failure, but overall the issue of high PD within Saudi 
society was reported to have been significant in the overall project failure.  
 
8.2.2 Short-term orientation 
Scoring 36 in Hofstede’s index, Saudi Arabia was viewed as a short-term oriented society 
(Hofstede et al., 2010). One of the key features of a short-term oriented society is that 
individuals consider what happened in the past, or what is occurring in the present, as 
the most important events – less attention is given for future events (Hofstede, 2001).  
 
One of the causes of project failure (which was observed in the planning stage of the 
project) is directly related to what was described by Hofstede. PCO-2R described the 
client thus: “They do not want to look at issues too far ahead”, adding: “For example, we 
are building a train right now; but if I say how about the ticketing system in four years 
when the project is finished, there is no reaction or serious thinking about such issues 
from the client side. I mean, this is serious and it needs to be addressed from now; but 
the horizon of thinking is rather short-term, to be honest”.  
 
Another example regarding the perspective of the client was given by PCO-1R: “I was 
discussing a long-term issue which was essential. One day, I received a response to 
postpone it as the minister is visiting the site which was claimed to be more important 
right now. It is important but still you cannot lose sight of the long-term issues as well”.  
 
Another factor that led to project failure concerned Contractor 1’s short-term mentality. 
PECO-1P explained: “As the contractor won this size of project, I think he should build 
himself up for the purpose of this project and future projects through signing manpower, 
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training them, and keeping them for future projects. But the mentality of the contractor’s 
top management is very short-term. They are not concerned about the project 
construction as much as they are concerned about their profit”. PECO-1P described the 
contractor’s mentality as “banking mentality”. For example, PECO-1R said: “With the 
construction of a bridge, they think to hire cheaper manpower to reduce the cost and 
increase the profit. In construction, you cannot think only from this angle”. PC-1P added: 
“Even if the contractor hired cheaper labour, we do not compromise on the quality of the 
final product. If the quality is below the specifications, we will ask the contractor to re-do 
the work”. Thus, the contractor’s “banking mentality” may not have done any good to the 
project or to the contractor himself. Various interviewees envisaged the Contractor 1’s 
short-term mentality to be of high importance to the project failure as indicated in the 
following table.  
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8.2.3 Indulgence  
According to Hofstede et al. (2010), Saudi Arabia was categorised as an indulgent 
society, after scoring 52 in this dimension’s index. Indulgent societies do not consider 
maintaining order within the society as of a high importance. In this project, this 
dimension was found to explain two factors of project failure. 
 
One factor was at the project planning stage, and the second was during the project 
execution. During the project planning stage by the client, it appears that the client 
optimism affected the process of the project team selection. PCO-1R illustrated the issue 
of the project team in percentages; “Let’s say the project host is 100%; right now, 
engineers/consultants and PMO are forming less than 5%, whereas in Europe they form 
a minimum of 10%. Let’s talk about Saudi for an instance, in the Kingdom Tower (private 
project) which is being built in Jeddah. The PMO – made up of multinational 
organisations (not Saudi organisations) – on its own forms 5%”.  
 
From the previous example and this case of HHR mega-project, it can be observed that 
the low percentage of engineer/consultants and PMO (less than 5%) is mainly associated 
with three Saudi contractors who are largely made up of Saudi organisations and Saudi 
management personnel. The failure to form a team with the right percentage of expertise, 
and the failure to maintain the correct order of the common organisational formation 
structure within the project management field, is arguably, therefore, attributed to cultural 
factors. 
 
PCO-3R illustrated the influence of this in another example by saying “the cost of the 
train station in the city of Makkah and the Kingdom Tower are almost the same. In the 
station in this project (Saudi contractor), there is one activity scheduler who is working 
as part-time, whereas in the Kingdom Tower (multinational organisation) they probably 
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have around ten schedulers working full time for the project”. This indicated that the 
human resource infrastructure in this project is weak and given little attention by Saudi 
contractors (a result of the national culture). This can be used, partially, to explain the 
project failure.  
 
Moving on to the execution stage, the second factor of project failure was the lack of 
co-operation from utility companies, following the provision of the wrong as built maps to 
the contractor. PC-1R commented that “utilities such as electricity and water companies 
wanted to take advantage of this project. They tried to renew part of their infrastructure 
on the back of this project”. PC-2P agreed, saying “[it was] the same with Aramco, they 
tried to take advantage of this project”. This issue, that the utility companies tried to take 
advantage of this project, was a result of the lack of their infrastructure records, which 
was tolerated by the project client as it was perceived as a cultural matter. PC-1R 
confirmed that by saying: “most of the utility companies in Saudi do not have as built 
maps for their infrastructure work”. PECO-1P added: “even if they have the as built maps, 
they are mainly for the major lines and still not really accurate”. Consequently, because 
this issue is conceived as cultural, the client was not in a position to enforce 
accountability on these utility companies after they refused to take accountability for the 
short and wrong information they had provided. The negotiation process between the 
client and utility companies to settle some risks related to this issue caused project delay 
at certain stages of the project execution. 
 
Table 33 evaluates the importance of the two causes of failure within this dimension – 
























Low percentage of skilled 
manpower within the project team, 
including (engineers, consultants 
and PMO). 
PC-1P ****  





Lack of co-operation from utility 
companies in monitoring their 
infrastructure, and attempting to 
take advantage of the project.   
PC-1R **  





8.3 Summary on cultural factors impact 
Using the CT as a subsidiary theory in this research did help in understanding the causes 
of project failure for the HHR project case. Across three cultural dimensions, 8 causes of 
failure were identified and related to different cultural dimensions. These cultural causes 
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The level of importance of different cultural factors that caused the project to fail varied. 
However, all the aforementioned cultural causes of project failure were described to have 
less impact on the project failure in comparison with the eight APs discussed in Chapter 
7. This indicates that the cultural causes of failure had lower importance and effects on 
the project failure. However, there were other causes of project failure which were 
considered to have more level of importance. These causes are related to project 





FINDINGS – PROJECT MANAGEMENT FACTORS 
 
9.1 Brief re-cap of project management perspectives  
It is equally important to understand project management in theoretical terms as it is to 
understand it in practical terms (Söderlund, 2004). This is in order to route the findings 
into theoretical explanations. Therefore, Chapter 2 of this thesis looked at theoretical 
aspects of project management, where (effective) project management was defined by 
the APM (2016) as a process of applying certain methods, processes, skills and 
knowledge with previous experience in order to achieve project goals and objectives. 
Söderlund (2013) looked at a project as a temporary endeavour, undertaken to deliver a 
unique product or service. In order to deliver this product or service, Lundin and 
Söderholm (1995) explained that POs tend to create TOs, which contain personnel that 
are specialised in project management.  
 
Lundin and Söderholm (1995) identified four concepts that differentiate temporary multi 
organization (TMO) from POs. These concepts are temporality, task, team and transition. 
In this case study, the four concepts were utilised as major categories to identify causes 
of project failure. In this chapter, findings are presented that are related to this project 
management perspective, which should help in providing further explanations for the 
failure of the HHR project. 
 
9.2 Project management causes of project failure  
In addition to the eight cultural causes and eight APs identified in Chapter 8 and Chapter 
7 retrospectively, there were other causes of delay attributed to the concepts that 
differentiate TMO from POs. Three of the concepts were relevant here (temporality, task 
and team) and included at least one cause of failure that had a direct influence on the 
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HHR project failure. The forth concept (transition) was found to have no relation to the 
identified HHR project failure in this mega-project, which makes it a redundant concept 
within the analysis in this chapter. Figure 25 presents the order of the project stages that 
will be used in the presentation.  
 
 
Figure 25: Project lifecycle – project management data presentation order. 
 
Similar to the format adopted in the last chapter, where any TMO concept generates 
more than one cause of project failure, these causes will be presented starting from the 
pre-initiation stage, design stage, planning and finally the execution stage. The beginning 
of each stage will be indicated by a bold highlighted word. Table 34 summarises the ten 
causes of failure that are related to the project management perspective. It also provides 
an indication of the severity of their impact.  
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P1P1 Preliminary design failure by the 
contractor’s unexperienced designer.  
**** 
PMC6 Poor project planning by the project client.  **** 
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Failure in the selection process of the 
project management team (PMT) 




Failure in selecting Contractor 1, who had 








Following this table, this chapter will review the project management concept’s factor of 
failure, starting with the first concept, which is temporality.  
 
9.2.1 Temporality 
The concept of temporality was interpreted by Söderlund (2013) as a limited or short 
length of time in which to achieve organisational goals, and to achieve the required 
integration and participation between the project actors (Lanzara, 1983). This concept 
helped in explaining some of the causes of the project failure of the HHR project in this 
research.  
 
The project temporality (and misjudgements regarding it) was conceived as a major 
reason of the project failure by PECO-1P: “The initial project period which was decided 
by the client was very short in comparison with the work that had to be delivered”. PCON-
1P confirmed that “the client required the project to be delivered in the allocated deadline. 
This was not possible, that deadline is unrealistic; I mean, even the project scheduling 




So, it was agreed that the project had too short a length of time to achieve the project’s 
deliverables. However, if there was positive side-effect of this misjudgement it was in 
increasing the focus of the project team toward the project execution. As PC-1R 
commented: “The short project period urged the project team to the execution of the 
project and try to recover the delay that had occurred already”. Nevertheless, overall the 
misjudgement regarding time was a negative, promoting causes of failure at the pre-
initiation, planning and execution stages, as follows. 
 
The first cause of failure was the lack of time – at the project pre-initiation stage – to 
look for a project consultant who was sufficiently capable, qualified and experienced to 
deliver such a unique project in the region. PC-3R admitted this, saying: “From the start 
of the project, we did not have the time to look for the experienced consultant” – at the 
time there was not an experienced consultant in the whole region, as this project is the 
first of its kind in the Middle East. PC-3R added: “We were so committed to operate the 
train by certain date as the client requested; and we had to catch up with the work we 
missed already”. So, project temporality can be perceived as a reason behind choosing 
the inexperienced consultant for the project. PC-1R highlighted the importance of the 
consultant’s role on the project failure: “From my experience in previous projects, if the 
project consultant is right for the project, then the project will progress well; but, if the 
consultant is weak, then the project will suffer from delay and maybe failure”. Therefore, 
we can see both the cause and the impact of choosing the right consultant, which was 
found to be a major cause of project failure.  
 
The second cause of failure was at the project planning stage. The project temporality 
prevented the contractor from assessing the project uncertainties to bring about more 
effective risk management and project planning. PC-1P commented: “[Many things were 
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not clear at the beginning of the project. And the urgency of delivering the project by a 
certain date … distracted the contractor from delivering the project on-time”. PCON-1P 
admitted that “the planning stage for this project was around six months only”, adding 
“this is not enough time to plan for a normal mega-project”. 
 
Related, PECO-1R described the contract for this project as “abnormal”. This was 
because of the sheer number of changes to the project scope. As PECO-1R said, “We 
had major changes to the scope of this project in which the contractor was not the party 
to blame. The change of scope was because of a number of reasons such as: difficulties 
in obtaining approvals from government committees, difficulties on performing land 
acquisition, redesigning the route of the train, and increasing the project scope”. The 
project temporality simply did not provide enough time to clear all the project 
uncertainties, and that led to multiple changes in the project scope which eventually 
contributed to the project failure. 
 
The last cause of failure from the project temporality perspective was during the 
execution stage. There was not enough time for the project stakeholders to integrate 
and establish shared knowledge about the project. The level of integration between the 
major stakeholders (client, consultant and contractors) and minor stakeholders (i.e. civil 
defence, utility companies and government authority) was not established effectively, 
which affected the level of co-operation between them in order to deliver a successful 
project. PC-2P said: “The lack of co-operation between stakeholders caused project 
delay; for example, when we request certain approvals, we get late responses from 
government authorities and civil defence, and sometimes we do not receive any 
response” PC2P believed that “this was due to the authorities’ lack of knowledge on the 




PCON-1P confirmed the impact of project temporality on establishing the utilities 
infrastructure knowledge by the contractor, saying “most of the as built maps we received 
from utility companies were incomplete or include wrong information. As the contractor, 
we had to figure out a solution for this problem ourselves in a very tight and unrealistic 
period of time”. He added: “The utility companies were not collaborating with us and that 
increased the difficulties”. 
 
Thus, the major stakeholders did not have the time at the execution stage but had to 
deal with the situation and proceed with little or no co-operation from utility companies 
who actually “wanted to take advantage of this project” (PC-1R), for example, by 
replacing their worn-out infrastructure cables (PECO-1P). Such an issue can be seen, to 
a degree, to be a ‘knock-on’ result of the pre-execution stages’ causes of failure within 
the temporality concept – the client signing a project consultant with more adequate 
experience and qualification could have resulted in reducing the level of the existing 
project uncertainties, and, therefore, such causes of failures could have been dealt with 
more efficiently at the execution stage. 
 
Furthermore, while the researcher was conducting qualitative research, it was felt both 
useful and feasible to explore with the interviewees the importance of these causes of 
failure. There is a significant element of subjectivity here. However, in order to try to 
assist with interpretation a ‘star’ rating was adopted. Throughout the four concepts, the 
relevant interviewees were asked to rate the importance from one to four. The table 
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Within this concept of temporality, the three factors of delay discussed above were found 
to be of a high level of importance for the project failure. Therefore, dealing with the 
project temporality was a major issue in the HHR project management practice. Other 
causes of failure of a similar importance were found in the next concept (task).  
 
9.2.2 Task 
By their very nature, tasks in mega-projects are complex and unique (Davies and 
Mackenzie, 2014). This complexity can be managerial and/or technical (Gidado, 1996). 
In relation to this, PCO-3R agreed that planning is a major project management element 
to mitigate project complexity. However, in the case of the HHR project, right back at the 
pre-initiation stage, PCON-1R clarified that “taking the time to prepare an effective 
planning was missing”, adding that “this occurs mainly in government projects”. PC-3R 
confirmed this: “Unfortunately, we are not applying the project requirements in planning 
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effectively and efficiently”. PCO-1R commented: “The failure to plan for the project is one 
of the main factors that led the HHR to fail”. Therefore, the client’s failure to plan 
effectively for this unique project – in order to reduce the level of project complexity and 
to deal with the issue of task interdependencies – before the initiation stage is a major 
cause of failure in this project.  
 
The next cause of project failure was related to the designing stage for the route of the 
train track (P1P1 design), which was given to the contractor as a design and build 
package. PC-1R highlighted a key reason for the project failure during the designing 
stage, by saying: “The delay in our project is a result of the preliminary design failure by 
the contractor. I mean it was obvious that there was not a comprehensive vision for the 
project by the contractor, which resulted in poor design”. PC-2R added: “After the 
contractor produced the first project design, many issues appeared which were not taken 
into account. These issues caused major part of the project delay during the execution 
stage of the project and this is a large proportion of the delay”.  
 
The evidence collected suggests that the contractor underestimated the level of 
complexity that was associated with executing the first project design (including the 
interdependencies of the tasks associated with that first design). As PC-1P commented: 
“As you heard me speaking in the meeting, many changes are taking place within the 
project because of that weak preliminary design and the poor vision in conducting that 
design by the contractor”. This confirms that the contractor did not effectively evaluate 
the project complexity. Furthermore, during the meeting that was referred to by PC-1P, 
the researcher observed that: 
A discussion between the client and the consultant was taking place with 
regards to changing the route of the train track that was provided in the initial 
design by the contractor. Mainly because the design of the route was 
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penetrating a residential area and it was a challenging job to disconnect and 
reconnect the complex utilities’ lines and pipes in that area. This was at the 
time when a new possible route was an easier option. To execute that was 
not reviewed by the contractor’s designer (Observation 9).  
 
Following this observation, it was apparent that the designer of P1P1 underestimated 
the project task complexity of executing that design as he did not consider any other 
possible option for the route during the initial designing process, and the failure of this 
initial design was one reason of the project failure.  
 
After the designing stage, the project did not go through an effective task planning 
stage. PC-2P highlighted that “to avoid the project failure, the project planning has to be 
effectively completed, clear and realistic”. PC-1P confirmed that the task of project 
planning was given less than the required attention, which affected the quality and the 
outcome of the project planning stage.  
 
Further examples of the client’s and the contractor’s poor planning will be categorised 
under the relevant project planning areas, which arose from Söderlund (2013) and which 
were discussed in Chapter Two, they are: 
 Task and content. 
 Task and process. 
 Social organisation and content. 
 Social organisation and process.  
 
Starting with the client’s side, the poor project planning was observed mainly on the P1P1 




In terms of task and content, after the project initiation and the project-designing phase, 
the client realised that there was a need to increase the scope of the design. PC-1R 
commented that “at a later stage in the project, we realised the need to expand the width 
of the area surrounding the track in order to add additional service lanes which were 
initially forgotten because of the poor planning for the project”. Another example was 
given by PECO-1P: “The client had to increase the project scope when the contractor 
was asked to build ducts across the track line for future utility companies’ infrastructure 
(which was not agreed at the initial project scope) and redesign some of the road 
bridges”.  
 
These examples of the incomplete project planning led to producing incomplete contracts 
between the client and Contractor 1 (PC-3R). The failure in the task and content area 
had a direct influence on the task and process area. The failure in planning the required 
task of the project resulted in the failure of using project management methods effectively 
to plan for the process of executing certain tasks. PC-2R admitted that, saying 
“unfortunately, we are not applying the project management tools and techniques 
effectively and efficiently”. PC-3R agreed: “We are not applying the project requirements 
in planning effectively”.  
 
This failure extended to the area of social organisation and content. The failure in this 
area can be observed when the client failed to prepare the organisational responsibility 
plan internally, and plan the communication channels with external stakeholders, which 
increased the uncertainty level of who is doing what within the project team. PCO-1R 
highlighted that “under the first project director from the SRO, there was no responsibility 
matrix within the project team which slowed down the project progress as a result of the 
high ambiguity of the project team roles”. PECO-1P added: “It was not clear who was 
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responsible to establish certain contacts and follow up with government authorities to 
obtain certain approvals”. Therefore, because the first SRO director did not pay enough 
attention to this area, the hold-ups in obtaining approvals and permits from different 
government authorities were important factors that caused project delay (PECO-1P).  
 
Next, the failure of planning from the contractor’s side will be discussed. Out of the three 
contractors in this project, the failure in planning for the project complex tasks was mainly 
observed within Contractor 1, who was working on P1P1. Starting with the task and 
content area, the main factor that caused the project to overrun the initial period was 
related to the contractor’s failure to minimise the uncertainty level and to prepare an 
effective plan that could have reduced the task complexity and led to a successful 
execution of the project tasks. PCON-1P commented: “If the project risks were allocated 
and the utilities’ as built maps were tested before planning for the project, then we can 
say that the project could be delivered within the allocated period; but this did not happen. 
We just started working and designing the route without testing the as built maps or even 
checking if they were accurate or not, and I think this was a major cause of the project 
failure”.  
 
PECO-1R elaborated on the complexity related to testing the as built maps that was 
provided by the utility companies by saying: “It was not possible because the track of the 
train run within the city’s ring road, and the police did not permit this task while the ring 
road was operating for health and safety issues, and closing the ring road to execute this 
task was not possible”. So, the failure to plan for the actual tasks had a direct effect on 
planning for the process of execution. This takes the discussion into the next area, task 
and process. PECO-1P comment on shortcomings here: “The contractor should be 




The last area which was found to have a direct effect on the project failure was 
organisation and content planning. The failure to plan for the project tasks and activities 
– due to the project’s uniqueness and the contractor’s underestimation of the project 
complexity – had a major influence on organising and planning the human resources 
required for the project execution. As a result of the high uncertainty level in this project, 
PCON-1R complained about “the amount of obstacles which had no instant solution”. 
PCON-1P explained that “our manpower work for few days and then we have an obstacle 
and the work stops, and they are getting paid for doing nothing at this time”. Therefore, 
these obstacles led the contractor management to consider manpower redundancy as a 
solution for a certain period of the project, as PCON-1R said: “We thought, is it worth 
having all this workforce financially to the contractor when they were not working? The 
answer was no. So, we tried to find a moderate solution and keep all workers who can 
work for all hours. I mean, I can increase the manpower in this area to a thousand; but 
we do not know what other obstacles we will face soon, which might cause loses to the 
contractor”.  
 
Thus, the failure of project planning by the contractor resulted in this poor project 
performance, which led to project failure (PC-1R). Furthermore, the four causes of failure 
appear to have a major contribution to the failure of this project. Table 36 shows the 
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In addition to the aforementioned issues in relation to project planning, the project team 
selection process raised other important causes of the project failure. This will be 
discussed in the next project management concept. 
 
9.2.3 Team  
There were two causes of project failure that were found within the project team selection 
during the project pre-initiation stage. Firstly, the process of selecting the PMT (project 
consultants and PMO). Secondly, the selection of Contractor 1. Both were connected to 
some of the failures in executing P1P1 part of the project.  
 
In relation to the selection process of the PMT prior to the project initiation, PCO-1R 
mentioned (as was noted in the previous chapter in relation to ‘indulgence’) that in this 
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project, the project team including “engineers/consultants and PMO are forming less than 
5% of the project team. Whereas in Europe, they form a minimum of 10%”. This was 
purely a result of the client’s refusal to spend the required financial budget in the selection 
process to achieve the (10%). PCO-1R commented: “From the beginning of the project, 
I said: the project is costing around fifty billion; if we take 10% of that to employ PMO, 
architect, supervision consultants and quality control, then we need to spend five billion 
on this. The response I got was: that is too much”.  
 
In addition to the client’s refusal to spend five billion, all three positions – including site 
supervision consultant, drawing review consultant and PMO – were given to one 
company (Dar-Alhandasa). This caused PCO-2R to question that saying: 
“Why has the Kingdom Tower (in the private sector) ended up with the project 
management company who built the Shard in London, which was formed by the 
project manager (Mace), together with the best surveying company (EC Harris), 
working on the project of a total cost of SR4.6 billion; and this project which costed 
almost ten times was given to Dar-Alhandasa, who had no experience in similar 
projects and never done real project management before. That type of decision 
is crucial and important”.  
 
This decision, however, (as a public project) was ruled by the GTPL that states “Priority 
shall be given to national manufactured goods, products and services and to those 
treated as such” (GTPL document, article 5, p. 9).  
 
The impact of this type of decision was observed in the consultant’s performance. For 
example, as the consultant did not have any previous experience in similar types of 
projects. PC-1R commented that “when conflict happens, the consultant hardly 
differentiated the approach that they had to adopt between two different types of a project 
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P1P1 (design, build and transfer), and P1P2 (build and transfer)”, adding: “I mean in 
P1P2, where the design was produced by the owner, the liability of the design remains 
with the client not with the contractor; whereas in P1P1 the contractor is required to 
design and deliver the project according to the client’s specification and all liabilities go 
back to the contractor. The consultant should have adopted a different approach in 
dealing with the liable party in facilitating the work which was not done”. PCO-2R argued 
that this indicates the consultant’s manifest failure in understanding different types of 
projects and how to handle them to avoid project failure – mainly because the 
contractor’s lack of experience in project management.  
 
The client’s selection of Contractor 1, who had no previous experience in similar types 
of projects, was another issue which caused the project to fail. This was a result of the 
following: firstly, the contractor’s selection of the wrong project designer – who was 
unqualified and had no experience in similar projects – was critical to the project. As PC-
1P highlighted: “One of the problems of the design and build projects is that as a result 
of any failure during the designing stage, the whole project will fail”.  
 
Furthermore, as a result of the ineffective selection of the field workers, the failure of the 
contractor’s performance extended to the execution stage. For example, PECO-1P 
complained about the number of skilled labourers the contractor employed on-site saying 
“if you have five fieldworkers onsite, you need to have one of them who is skilled and 
understands the work to be done. I mean, on average skilled workers should be 1/5 or 
1/10 at worst case scenario; but 1/30 is a disaster”. PC-1R confirmed that “the lack of 
skilled labour in P1P1 was a major cause of project failure”. The lack of skilled labour 
resulted in failure to deliver the task within the right specifications or at the right time. 
Collectively, the three causes of failure in this concept were observed to have a 
considerable impact on the project failure (Table 37 indicates the interviewees’ scores 
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for these causes); but, they were found to have a lower level of importance in contrast to 
the previous two concepts (temporality and task).  
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PC-1R ***  
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9.3 Summary on project management factors and their impact on project 
failure 
In addition to the eight APs and the 8 cultural factors which led to the HHR mega-project 
failure, as identified in previous chapters, there were more causes related to the inherent 
features of project management, which occurred at different stages of the project (see 
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Figure 26: Project life cycle – 10 PMCs of failure. 
 
Thus, across the three concepts (temporality, task, and team), 10 issues were found to 
be of high importance as causes of the HHR project failure. From the evidence above, 
the researcher can conclude that the importance of these ten causes which attributed to 
project management practices were found to be of higher influence toward the HHR 
mega-project failure than the cultural causes of failure. However, they were not as 
important as the eight APs, which were major causes of the HHR mega-project failure.  
 
Having said this, PECO-1R emphasised an overlap between the three-fold (AT, CT and 
the ‘4Ts’) causes of the HHR mega-project failure. This overlap will be discussed further 







10.1 Introduction  
The previous three chapters have presented the findings, which included a range of 
factors that caused the HHR project to fail. This chapter aims to summarise the research 
framework, as well as discuss the links and overlaps discovered in the research between 
the three areas of literature used to explore the project failure – AT, CT and project 
management perspectives. This is achieved by presenting a model that was drawn by 
the researcher to illustrate this research.  
 
To start with, by using this model, the researcher aims to discuss and summarise the 
literature review that was explored in this research. Following the same outline, the 
researcher then aims to discuss the importance of the findings from the three areas. 
Finally, the last section of this chapter presents a discussion of the overlap between 
these two aspects, and the overlap between the three areas.  
  
10.2 Three perspectives of HHR project failure 
In this thesis, the literature review has explored AT (primary theory), CT and PMT 
(subsidiary theories) in order to investigate their impact on mega-project failure in Saudi. 
The following model (Figure 27) is used to assist in explaining how the researcher has 


















Figure 27: Three perspectives of HHR project failure.  
 
 
In order to address the research question, AT (the first area) was considered as the 
primary theory of this research. This theory is concerned with the agent’s opportunistic 
behaviours, and how to manage them (Mitnick, 2013; Steinle et al., 2014). The agent’s 
opportunistic behaviour can occur mainly when the information asymmetry between the 
two actors (principal and agent) is high. Ceric (2014) suggested that part of the gap in 
AT literature as it is applied to projects concerns the issue of multiple principal-agent 
problems (from multiple principal-agent relationships within a project) and its impact on 
project failure. This highlights the importance of this research, which aims to fill the 
knowledge gap around AT and project failure by investigating a more complex set of 
relationships, as suggested by Ceric (2014). This includes the client, contractors, 





While it was felt that AT was an appropriate primary theory for the thesis, not least 
because of the numerous principal-agent relationships in the project, the researcher felt 
that the location of the case within Saudi Arabia should not be ignored, as previous 
studies have shown that certain aspects of Saudi national culture can inhibit the 
successful completion of projects (Hurn, 2007; Kardes et al., 2013). National CT, 
therefore, became a subsidiary theory. In order to explore the national cultural aspect of 
Saudi Arabia and how it can be distinguished from the Anglo-Saxon culture, Hofstede’s 
(1984) six cultural dimensions were employed.  
 
Furthermore, as part of the literature review, and in order to address the research 
question, as this research was conducted within a Saudi mega-project, it was also 
necessary to review the impact of project management factors on project failure. 
Therefore, PMT was the third and final area that was considered in the literature review 
(as shown in Figure 27). This area discussed the theory of TMO and the four concepts 
(temporality, task, team and transition) that differentiate it from POs (Lundin and 
Söderholm, 1995).  
 
The findings of the research have revealed that all three of the theories and models 
discussed within the literature (and illustrated in Fig 15) played a role in the project failure. 
To a degree, these factors of project failure were also found to be interrelated in various 
ways to varying degrees. To state this in another way, the primary theory informing the 
research question, AT, was indeed seen to be an important factor in the project failure, 
justifying the decision to seek to expand the research that is based upon the theory in 
the project management literature. However, AT did not explain the whole of the project 
failure, there were other factors causing the failure as well. Furthermore, the different 
explanations of failure frequently overlapped.  All this will be discussed next, as follows.  
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10.3 Summary of the findings 
10.3.1 Agency theory and causes of failure 
Table 38 shows the APs discovered to be causes of the HHR project failure. 
 






















The consultant misrepresented the qualification of his 





Late and wrong supervision approvals by the project 
consultant. 
R2 AP 3 
‘Adverse selection’ 
Contractor 1 underestimated and misrepresented the 
project cost. 
R2 AP 4 
‘Moral hazard’ 
Contractor 1 took over the project management after 
liquidation of qualified staff. 
R2 AP 5 
‘Moral hazard’ 
Contractor 1 employed illegal workforce to work for the 
project. 
R2 AP 6 
‘Moral hazard’ 
Contractor 1 misrepresented the designer capability to 
design this project. 
R4 AP 7 
‘Adverse selection’  
Contractor 3 employed illegal workforce. 
R5 AP 8 
‘Moral hazard’ 




Toor and Ogunlana (2010) perceived the construction industry to be highly goal-
conflicted, due to the large number of different stakeholders involved. Wu et al. (2010) 
speculated that APs may appear between every two parties within the same project 
(multiple APs). In this study, there were eight APs identified from the HHR project that 
contributed to the project failure (see Table 38). Three APs were difficult for the principal 
to detect at the critical time, which resulted in the principal’s failure to intervene in those 
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problems (AP1, AP3 and AP4). However, the principal eventually successfully 
intervened in the other five APs, by using several techniques such as establishing trust 
with the agent that led to a co-operative and collaborative relationship (Crosby et al., 
1990; Coulter and Coulter, 2002), monitoring and a realignment of the contractual 
document (Steinle et al., 2014). The outcome of the intervention varied from one AP to 
another, which helped in identifying the main APs based on their impact after the client’s 
intervention.  
 
It was apparent that the main APs occurred between the client from one side and both 
the Consultant (R1) and Contractor 1 (R2) from the other side. In line with what Caers et 
al. (2006) suggested, there was a conflict of interest between the client and his agents 
in both relationships (R1 and R2). The client’s main priority was the successful execution 
and delivery of the project within the allocated deadline. Whereas, firstly in R1, it was 
found that one of the consultant’s interest was mainly to win the contract and increase 
the financial profitability (PC-3R). This caused the emergence of AP1 that also led to the 
occurrence of AP2, both of which were found to have high impact on the project failure. 
Secondly in R2, the contractor’s main motivation and interest was the financial profit 
(PECO-1P). This conflict of interest between the client and the contractor resulted in a 
number of APs with high impact on the project failure; this included AP3, AP4 and AP5. 
  
Thus, the consultant’s and contractor’s indifference towards the client’s interest could be 
described as a selfish opportunistic behaviour, as defined by Lai et al. (2005). These 
opportunistic behaviours by the consultant and Contractor 1 had a major contribution to 
the project failure (as indicated in Figure 27). Moreover, there was evidence to suggest 
that these causes of project failure (APs) were substantial, with PECO-1R and PC-1R 
positing that APs were the major causes out of the overall identified causes of failure in 




10.3.2 Cultural theory and causes of failure 
Table 39 outlines the national cultural causes of the HHR project. 
 















The client’s (project owner) underestimation of the project 
period and imposing that wrong decision in the contract. 
CC2 
Private lands were retained from the project’s land acquisition 
committee, which required changing the design of the train 
route.  
CC3 
The first project director’s decision not to use project 
management tools and techniques in monitoring and 
controlling the project from the client’s side. 
CC4 
In Contractor 1, the project director has very limited authority 
in making financial decisions. All financial decisions have to 










Contractor 1’s short-term mentality in earning profit from this 
project and his failure in building a company that is capable 






Low percentage of skilled manpower within the project team, 
including (engineers, consultants and PMO). 
CC8 
Lack of co-operation from utility companies in monitoring their 




Throughout the analysis of the findings, the second group of causes of the HHR project 
failure was found to be cultural factors. Collectively, there were 8 cultural causes of 
failure found from this case study (see Table 39), all of which had different levels of 
importance. Three causes of failure, however, were found to have the highest level of 
importance. Furthermore, while this study utilized Hofstede’s six cultural dimensions, the 
analysis identified variation in the importance of different dimensions. The most 
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prominent was PD, with the high PD of Saudi Arabian culture believed to be unhelpful to 
the quality of decision-making in key aspects of the project. 
 
Hofstede (1984) and Bjerke and Al-Meer (1993) classified Saudi Arabia as high PD 
society. The analysis suggested that this had a negative impact on the HHR project. Four 
causes of failure were identified; two of them were given the highest score by the 
interviewees when they were asked to rate the causes of failure level of importance. The 
two causes were as follows: firstly, the client’s project director’s decision not to use 
project management tools and techniques in monitoring and controlling the project; 
secondly, Contractor 1’s top management decision to restrict all financial decisions to 
one person – off the project site – who had no knowledge of the technical aspects of the 
project, which severely influenced the project execution stage. The client’s project 
director was willing to listen to no counsel on the problems with these decisions for the 
project / believed his view to be impeccable and final. 
 
Also worth noting is the indulgence dimension. Hofstede (2011) categorised Saudi as an 
indulgent society. Within this dimension, there was a third cultural cause of failure that 
scored the top level of importance, and that was the low percentage of skilled work force 
within the project team, including engineers, consultants and the PMO. This cause of 
failure as expressed by PCO-1R and, in line with the literature by Hofstede (2011), 
showed the low priority of maintaining order within the society.  
 
Thus, there was evidence to suggest that these cultural causes of failure (CCs) were not 
as substantial as the APs toward the project failure, with PECO-1R and PC-1R positing 
that cultural factors were the least important out of the overall identified causes of failure 




10.3.3 Project management theory and causes of failure 
Finally, Table 40 charts the project management-related causes of failure. 
 







Causes of project failure 
PMC1 
Temporality 
Lack of time at the project pre-initiation stage to look for 
a capable, qualified and experienced project consultant. 
PMC2 
Lack of time to assess the project risks and uncertainties 
by the client and the contractor in order to achieve more 
effective project planning.  
PMC3 
Short time for the project stakeholders to integrate and 
establish shared knowledge about the project. 
PMC4 
Task 
Client fails to apply effective and efficient project 
requirements in planning for the project.  
PMC5 
P1P1 Preliminary design failure by the contractor’s 
inexperienced designer.  
PMC6 Poor project planning by the project client.  
PMC7 Poor project planning by Contractor 1 (P1P1). 
PMC8 
Team 
Failure in the selection process of the PMT (Consultants 
and PMO).  
PMC9 
Failure in selecting Contractor 1, who had failed to 
employ an experienced project designer. 
PMC10 
Lack of skilled labour in Contractor 1.  
 
 
As Figure 27 demonstrated, the project management perspective yielded the final 
causes of failure that were found in the HHR project. While reviewing this literature, it 
was shown that Lundin and Söderholm (1995) identified four concepts that differentiated 
TMO from PO, and they are: project temporality, task, team and transition. These 
differentiating features of projects were used to explore the potential existence of project-
related causes of HHR. In the event, 10 causes of failure were identified from the HHR 
project (see Table 40). Seven out of the 10 causes were given the top score for their 
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level of importance by the interviewees. The concept of task was the most prominent 
concept in this area, followed by the project temporality concept.  
 
In line with arguments in the literature from Lundin and Söderholm (1995), Kardes et al. 
(2013) and Davies and Mackenzie (2014) the HHR project task involved a high level of 
complexity and uniqueness. This was because of the fact that it is the first railway mega-
project of its kind in the Middle East (SRO-4, 2014), and because of the surrounding 
environment (the influence of private lands on the route design and the lack of 
information with regards to utilities’ infrastructure) that was dealt with during the planning 
and execution stage. The high level of complexity and uniqueness exacerbated the 
difficulties of the planning stage for the project, as it was apparent from the findings that 
all four causes of failure related to this concept were associated with the complexity of 
project planning. 
  
The second concept that was deemed to have an almost similar level of importance was 
project temporality. Within this concept, there were three causes of failure which scored 
the top level of importance. The first two causes of failure were related to the first 
dimension of temporality as identified by Bluedorn and Denhardt (1988), who 
emphasised the use of meaningful events and human activities as an indication of time. 
In line with this, the analysis indicated that there was a short period of time that was 
available prior to the start of the project, which contributed to the selection of the wrong 
consultant, and also during the execution stage, which led to the failure in reducing the 
uncertainty level in this project. The second dimension conceived temporality as a short 
length of time available to achieve the required integration and participation in between 
project actors (Lanzara, 1983; PMI, 2013), which explains the third cause of failure within 
this concept – that starting from the project initiation stage, there was not enough time to 




The last cause of failure (of a top level of importance) was related to the concept of team. 
Contrary to what was suggested by Pinto (2016) and Larson and Gray (2014) – that the 
selection of team members should be on the ground of competency – the main cause of 
project failure in this concept was related to an incompetent designer employed by 
Contractor 1.  
 
Thus, this area involved seven causes that were classified as having the top level of 
importance. This means that project-related causes of failure were also an important 
aspect of the overall project failure, alongside agency and cultural factors. Indeed, 
according to PECO-1R, for example, all three areas of analysis (i.e. AT, CT, and project 
management perspective) played a significant role in the HHR failure.  
 
What PECO-1R also argued, however, was that there was “overlap between different 
causes of failure”. PC-1R, PC-1P and PCO-1R concurred with this. The possibility that 
there was some interrelation between the three sets of factors identified as causing the 
HHR project failure is explored below. 
   
10.4 Interrelation between the three causes of failure  
What has been set out in 10.3 is a summary of the findings in chapters 7, 8 and 9. What 
this section of the discussion chapter aims to do is to go beyond this and explore whether 
the three sets of causes of the project failure were interrelated in any way. By this we 
mean, first, whether an apparent cause of project failure was really a symptom of a 
different, deeper cause. Second, whether one type of cause might have facilitated 
another type of cause. Third, whether certain causes of project failure might have been 
‘masked’ by other causes of failure. For example, PC-1R and PC-3R argued that the 
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APs (including the consultant’s and the contractor’s opportunistic behaviours) were the 
most prominent factors that caused the HHR Project failure. However, PECO-1R also 
remarked that:  
“[The agents] were lucky, because other factors were considered to be major 
causes of delay in the project. So, the delay that was caused by the contractor’s 
opportunistic behaviour in certain situations was dissolved in between other 
external causes of delay”. 
 
Therefore, it is important to discuss the links between the three areas of findings. The 
following model (Figure 28) gives an illustration of the interrelation between each two of 






























Figure 28: A model presenting the inter-relation between the three causes of 
failure. 
 
10.4.1 Interrelation between agency problems and cultural factors 
There did indeed appear to be an overlap between these two causes of failure. This was 
suggested by a number of the APs. Starting with AP2 (late and wrong supervision 
approvals by the project consultant), PC-2P stated: 
“As far as the consultant is concerned, I do not think he is much affected by the 





This AP had a direct link with two cultural causes of failure, which facilitated its 
occurrence. Firstly, CC3, the decision not to use project management tools and 
techniques in monitoring the project (PD dimension); and secondly, CC7, the low 
percentage of skilled labour within the project team (indulgence dimension). These two 
outcomes of cultural factors reduced the client’s ability to monitor and manage the 
consultant’s behaviour and performance from the early stages of the project.  
 
These two culturally-derived causes of failure (CC3 and CC7) also facilitated the 
opportunistic behaviour of Contractor 1 (in R2). Due to the lack of project management 
tools and lack of skills within the client’s project management, the client was unable to 
conduct the required skilled analysis and monitoring of the project needs. Borisova and 
Yadav (2015) suggested that this is one of the scenarios where information asymmetry 
can emerge. Hence, it did exist between the client and Contractor 1. Contractor 1 then 
opportunistically exploited the existing information asymmetry by liquidating some of 
their skilled staff in the cause of reducing the project expenses - AP4. For example, 
PECO-1R explained:  
“The contractor’s top management reduced the work scope from one of the 
subcontractors who was experienced in building bridges, and passed it over to 
the other sub-contractor (a sister company of the top management) who was not 
specialised in delivering that job”.  
This was while the client was disabled from effectively monitoring and managing the 
project.  
 
Thus, due to the impact of the two cultural causes of failure, these two APs (AP2 and 




A further, similar, overlap was found between AP3 (Contractor 1 underestimating and 
misrepresenting the project cost) and the seventh cultural factor (CC7), the low 
percentage of skilled manpower employed within the client’s project team including 
(engineers, consultants and PMO). In this situation, CC7 exacerbated the client’s 
difficulty of assessing the contractor estimates’ accuracy. The impact of this cultural 
cause of failure then increased when the contractor opportunistically used the existing 
information asymmetry – managerial and technical (Caers et al., 2006) – to 
underestimate and misrepresent the project costs to the client (AP3). This supports what 
was suggested by Provan (1991), that there is a positive relationship between the 
existence of information asymmetry and the likelihood of the agent’s opportunistic 
decisions. Once again, therefore, cultural characteristics facilitated opportunism. 
 
10.4.2 Interrelation between agency problems and project management factors 
The relationship between AT and the four concepts arising out of the project 
management perspective (temporality, task, team and transition) presents an important 
discussion around the area of trust and its impact between project stakeholders during 
project execution. As discussed in Chapter 3, one way of managing the agent’s 
opportunistic behaviour is via the establishment or strengthening of trust between the 
principal and the agent. Lamming (1996) suggested that when trust is the relationship’s 
norm, problems that might occur are targeted for solution - opportunism is removed from 
the equation. This trust can exist from an on-going relationship, or otherwise the two 
actors can seek to establish trust in new relationship (Bhattacharya et al., 1998). A 
project’s often short duration (temporality), however, can increase the complexity of 
building the required trust, as it can hinder the two actors in a relationship achieving the 




One way round this has been described as the two parties developing ‘swift trust’ in the 
relationship (Bryman et al., 1987). The significance of the concept of ‘swift trust’, is 
explained by Meyerson et al. (1996), who state that ‘swift trust’ “is capable of managing 
issues of vulnerability, uncertainty, risk and expectations” (p. 167). The existence of swift 
trust between both actors is said to reduce the client’s vulnerability from any information 
asymmetry, unify both actors’ goals, which will help the agent to effectively execute the 
project and meet the client’s expectations and mitigate the risk of any possible 
opportunistic behaviour by the agent. However, there is some scepticism about this 
concept – there is a sense that it is a contradiction in terms (Alsedairy, 1994).  
 
Either way, the importance of establishing the trust factor in TMO, in order to avoid 
opportunistic behaviours, can be articulated from the findings of this study. Out of the 
seven relationships that were included in this research, according to PECO-1R, PC-1R, 
PECO-2R, PC-3R and PCO-3R, trust was said to have existed in four of them (R3, R4, 
R6 and R7) (see Figure 20). The findings also showed that none of the eight APs that 
had contributed to the project failure were within these four relationships. Instead, they 
were within the other three relationships (R1, R2 and R5).  
 
Cox and Thompson’s (1997) suggestion, in line with the issue of temporality, can help 
us understand this as they stated that “opportunism is curbed as the supplier is given the 
incentive of future work” (p. 134). In the HHR project, the agents from the four trust 
relationships (R3, R4, R6, and R7) were well established in the construction industry for 
a long duration, with trust existing with the client prior to this project, and thus were 
incentivised by the client to win future projects. By contrast, the agents from the other 
three relationships (R1, R2 and R5) were new to mega-projects of this scale and trust 
was yet to be established. The occurrence of opportunistic behaviours in R1, R2 and R5 
is, therefore, arguably explained by the lack of trust (existing from previous projects or 
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new trust that was not established in this project due to the project temporality), and also 
by the agent’s lack of incentive to take future projects. With respect to this latter point, 
Contractor 1’s lack of incentive was explained by PECO-1P: 
“The mentality of the contractor’s top management is very short-term. They are 
not concerned about the project construction as much as they are concerned 
about their profit”.  
PECO-1P also described this short-term mentality as a “banking mentality”.  
 
These findings, therefore, highlight the importance of trust, but also emphasise how trust 
requires certain conditions to be feasible, which the project environment, with its 
temporality, can make a challenge. The temporality of the HHR project did not prevent 
trust existing in four of the relationships, because the agents in those relationships had 
a past in the industry and a concern for the future. These agents’ desire to win future 
projects influenced their behaviour, as suggested by Cox and Thompson (1997). The 
other three agents treated the project, however, as if it was a ‘one shot game’ and sought 
to maximise profitability in that game, including via acting opportunistically (causing the 
APs). What we see here, therefore, is a link between the temporality characteristic of 
projects and opportunistic behaviour. The short duration, in part, encouraged 
opportunistic behaviour. 
 
There were also three other overlaps between APs and project management factors, this 
time relating to team and task. Firstly, within the concept of team, there was a lack of 
skilled labour in Contractor 1’s project team. This can be linked directly to the 
employment of illegal workforce by Contractor 1 during the project execution (AP5), 
again a deliberate opportunistic act in the cause of reducing the project cost, which 
resulted in another cause of project failure (PMC10). This suggests that it would be a 
mistake to simply ascribe this matter as a problem of ‘team’, as the project management 
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perspective might be tempted to do. The team deficiencies were simply an outcome of a 
deeper cause of opportunistic intent. Thus we seek a link between team and 
opportunism. 
 
Secondly, in relation to the concept of task, Contractor 1 opportunistically 
misrepresented the project designer’s capability to design the project (AP6), an act 
aimed to reduce the project cost and which led to the failure of P1P1 preliminary project 
design (PMC5). PC-2R commented on the designer’s work saying 
“After the contractor produced the first project design, many issues appeared 
which were not taken into account, these issues caused major part of the project 
delay during the execution stage of the project and this is a large proportion of 
the delay”. 
 
Therefore, PMC5 (as a cause of the project failure) was arguably a symptom of a deeper 
cause (AP6). Again, there is arguably a link, this time between task and opportunism. 
 
Thirdly (within the task concept again), due to the high project complexity and 
uniqueness, the client and Contractor 1 failed to produce an effective planning document 
(PMC6 and PMC7). This failure was considered as a major reason for the project to fail. 
Furthermore, it contributed to the initiation of a number of APs, such as AP4, AP5 and 
AP8. The client’s poor planning (PMC6) exacerbated the difficulties of tracking and 
monitoring the agents (contractors and consultants) in this project. This eased the 
process for the agents to act opportunistically. For example, late and wrong approvals 
by the consultant (AP2), and uncertainty in the quantity and quality of workforce required 
for the project execution (AP4 and AP5). Moreover, Contractor 1’s poor planning (PMC7) 
clearly led to the contractor’s failure to show and submit the required document to the 
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consultant (AP8) as well as (AP4 and AP5). This is another situation where there was a 
link between task and opportunism.  
 
These failures in planning for the project can also be related to cultural factors, which will 
be discussed in the next section.  
 
10.4.3 Interrelation between cultural and project management factors  
Saudi national culture was found not have been the most significant contributor to the 
project failure. However, it did play something of a role and there was also one overlap 
between Hofstede’s cultural dimensions and the concepts of project management in 
TMO, proposed by Lundin and Söderholm (1995). The overlap existed between the 
concept of project temporality and high PD. According to Söderlund (2013), projects have 
very limited and short length of time as it is. With HHR, this project’s temporality factor 
was further exacerbated by the client’s high PD-driven decision in relation to the wrong 
project duration period that was imposed in the contract.  
 
Taking into account the fact that this project was defined as a unique mega-project with 
a high level of complexity, the client’s erroneous decision (CC1) compelled the contractor 
to spend less than the required time for the planning stage (PMC2). As PCON-1P stated: 
“The planning stage for this project was around six months only”, adding: “This is not 
enough time to plan for a normal mega-project”. The cultural dimension of high PD 
resulted in the principal’s attitude that he can make decisions without referring to the 
expert consultancy, and that these decisions were not allowed to be challenged (for 
example, the short and unrealistic duration for the project planning and execution). Thus, 
such decisions increased the complexity for the contractor to both plan and execute the 




10.4.4 Interrelation between the three areas of findings  
As well as the interrelations discussed above between ‘pairs’ of causes of failure, there 
were also aspects of the project where there appeared to be interrelations between all 
three causes. These were in R1 (interrelation A) and R2 (interrelation B & C), which were 
both found to be of high importance in relation to the project failure in this research. This 
can be explained as follows.  
 
Firstly, one interrelation (interrelation A) between the causes of failure was identified in 
R1 (see Figure 29 below) – between the client and the consultant. In this interrelation, 
two APs had a major impact on the project failure. One was pre-contractual (AP1 - 
consultant misrepresented the qualification of his employees to win the tendering 
process) and one post-contractual (AP2 - late and wrong supervision approvals by the 

















Figure 29: Three causes of failure interrelation A in R1. 
 
As suggested by Lamming (1996), these APs can be a result of the lack of trust. 
However, as has been mentioned, it was challenging to establish the required level of 
trust due to the project temporality – which exists in every project executed by a TMO 
(Palisis and Bartolomeo, 1970) – at the project pre-initiation stage, planning and 
execution stage. The project temporality in these three stages was found to be a cause 
of the HHR mega-project failure, as illustrated in PMC1, PMC2 and PMC3. Now, 
interrelation A started from the high PD cultural norm in the client’s attitude that made 
him make critical decisions (while nobody was expected to challenge them) in relation to 
the project duration (CC1) without taking into account the experts’ consultancy. Such 
decisions urged the client representative to initiate and execute the project and that 
resulted in the following. Firstly, a lack of time at the pre-initiation stage to look for the 
right project consultant (PMC1); secondly, lack of time to assess the project uncertainties 
(PMC2); and thirdly, short time for the project actors to integrate and establish shared 
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knowledge (PMC3). It also required the consultant to deliver the project within a shorter 
duration than the realistic period the project required, which increased the level of stress 
(Turner and Müller, 2003) and distanced the two actors in this relationship from 
establishing a trusting relationship. Hence, we can see the three sets of causes of project 
failure working together.  
 
Secondly, in R2 – between the client and Contractor 1 – two interrelations (interrelation 
























Figure 30: Three causes of failure interrelation B & interrelation C in R2. 
 
In interrelation B, the interrelation occurred between AP3, CC1 and PMC6. The 
connections can be explained as follows. Contractor 1 opportunistically underestimated 
and misrepresented the project cost at the project pre-initiation stage (AP3). PECO-1R, 
for example, commented that “the contractor provided wrong figures and underestimated 
the project costs”. Analysing AP3 in the context of this interrelation, it can be described 
as a symptom of the underestimated project period the project client imposed on the 
bidders for cultural reasons (CC1) in order to cope and address the bid requirements 
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(see Section 8.2.1). Contractor 1’s opportunistic behaviour was not spotted nor 
intervened by the client, mainly because the client had no idea of what were the 
reasonable time and cost estimates as the client failed to produce effective project plan 
document (PMC6). The client’s poor project planning lacked baseline estimates for the 
project costs. Consequently, the project client could not test the feasibility of Contractor 
1’s estimates. Hence, AP3 occurred. Therefore, again, we see the three sets of causes 
combining. 
 
In interrelation C, the interrelation occurred between AP4, AP5, CC4 and PMC10. 
Contractor 1’s opportunistic behaviour in AP4 (the liquidation of the qualified staff) in 
order to reduce the project cost occurred as a result of the lack of a trusting co-operative 
and collaborative approach in this relationship (R2) and the influence of restricting all 
critical decisions to the contractor’s top management only (CC4) – high PD cultural norm. 
PCON-1P said that: 
“We thought, is it worth having all this workforce financially to the contractor when 
they were not working? The answer was no. So, we tried to find a moderate 
solution and keep all workers who can work for all hours”.  
 
The financial based decision from Contractor 1’s top management to (CC4) to liquidate 
the qualified staff (AP4) resulted in the lack of skilled labour within the contractor’s project 
team (PMC10). Furthermore, after the client’s intervention to optimise the project 
execution process, Contractor 1 had to take an action and employ more staff to rectify 
the situation. However, another problem emerged and that was described by PCON-1R 
saying: 
“In some contracts, we could not increase the agreement budgets after the 
national increase in the labour fees. Therefore, we had to withdraw the task from 
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some subcontractors and we hand it in to other organisations for execution 
instead”.  
 
The attempt to find cheaper organisations to execute certain parts of the project, 
however, this led Contractor 1 to conduct another opportunistic behaviour by choosing 
subcontractors who employ illegal workforce (AP5) without informing the client, as 
PECO-1P confirmed that “the contractor did not inform the client of any illegal workforce”. 
Therefore, again, we see the three sets of causes combining. 
 
10.5 Summary 
At the outset of this chapter, the researcher presented a model that re-capped the three 
perspectives of HHR project failure (Figure 27). The model illustrated the emergent 
themes from the literature which were then used throughout the analysis of the findings. 
Throughout the investigation in this research, AT was used as a primary theory. 
However, it was supplemented with national CT and PMT as subsidiary theories.  
 
The research into the HHR project failure highlighted the importance of the prime theory 
of AT to mega-project management research. Multiple APs were seen to be an important 
factor in the HHR project failure. This is an important contribution to an under-developed 
part of the mega-project literature. However, the research also revealed that there were 
other factors behind the failure – 8 cultural and 10 project management factors. This 
reflects other parts of the project management literature.  
 
As means of summary, Figure 31 below presents a comprehensive picture of the 
conceptual framework of this research study and the findings regarding the HHR project. 
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It shows both the causes of the HHR project failure that are attributed to individual factors 
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Figure 31: Finalised conceptual framework – Agency theory and project failure 
model. 
 
The framework above articulates the three areas – explored in the literature – that were 
found to have major contribution to the failure of the HHR mega-project. The number of 
factors of mega-project failure varied with relation to each single area. As illustrated in 
the figure 31 above, the causes of failure can be explained in threefold. Firstly, APs, 
cultural factors and project management factors led to the HHR mega-project failure on 
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their own rights. Secondly, there were dual inter-relations between each two of the three 
areas that were found to have significant impact on the project failure. This can be 
observed on Figure 31 above as links between each two areas indicated the inter-
relations. In this case, some factors were root cause of other factors, some were just a 
symptom of others and the importance of some factors was reduced as a result of the 
existence of other factors. Finally, three inter-relations between all three areas – which 
were referred to as IR-A, IR-B & IR-C as shown in Figure 31 – delivered the third form of 
causes of HHR mega-project failure.  
 
Furthermore, this finalised framework captures how this research study has expanded 
the limited existing research applying AT to mega-projects in relation to construction 
infrastructure projects. It has, through the investigation of multiple relationships between 
the project client, its project manager, the project contractor, its project manager and the 
project consultant, examined the impact of multiple principal-agent problems in a 
construction mega-project. According to Ceric (2014), the context of this research may 
be considered as unprecedented. It has also provided the first research on mega-project 
failure in Saudi Arabia that has aimed to assess the extent to which project failure was 
caused by APs and/or Saudi national culture and project features. That APs have been 
seen to have played a prominent role in the HHR failure justifies the decision to include 
AT and adopt it as the prime theory. 
 
The research has also provided a study that shows the relative contribution to mega-
project failure of APs, national culture factors and project features. It has shown that in 
the HHR project the contribution has varied between the three. APs were judged to be 
major causes of HHR mega-project failure. Project features were also seen as significant 
causal factors, with national culture adding to the picture as well. This justifies the 




The research also revealed interrelations between different sets of causes of failure (see 
Figure 31 above). These interrelations were seen to have occurred at different stages of 
the project life cycle and across different groups, as will be illustrated in the next two 
figures (Figure 32 and Figure 33) below. The researcher has used colour coding to ease 
the recognition of different causes of failure. The green bars for APs, yellow bars for 
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Figure 32: Project lifecycle – interrelations across the three areas of findings.  
 
Figure 32 shows three groups of interrelations. Firstly, three interrelations between APs 
and national culture causes of failure (CCs). Secondly, four interrelations between APs 
and project features causes of failure (PMCs). Finally, one interrelation between national 




Further interesting interrelations were found between all three causes of project failure 
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Figure 33: Project lifecycle – interrelations between the three areas of findings.  
 
Figure 33 above demonstrates the three interrelations (A, B and C) that occurred 
between all three causes of failure throughout the project life cycle.  
 
These findings of interrelations and their impact on the HHR mega-project failure promise 
a further contribution to the project management literature. This is because it has been 
shown that some problems with projects may well actually be a manifestation of other 
factors. For example, teams can be problematic, but this can actually be because of 
agent’s opportunistic behaviour. This was seen in the HHR project. A similar situation 
was also seen in relation to the project concept of temporality. This case research has 
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shown, therefore, the need to look deeper into the root causes of project failure. Care 
needs to be taken in mega-project research to make sure that what you are looking at 
and recording as evidence is not simply a symptom of deeper causes. 
 























The main aim of this chapter is to provide a summary of this research importance. This 
starts with a brief of the three areas that were reported in the literature, and the headline 
findings for each area. The second section outlines the contribution to the knowledge of 
this research, including both theoretical and practical recommendations. Then, the 
researcher aims to highlight the limitations of this research project and reflect upon the 
experience of conducting this research. Finally, the researcher will provide further 
directions of potential future research.  
 
11.2 Synopsis 
This thesis has reported three areas (theories) within the literature review, advanced as 
they were deemed to potentially explain the HHR project failure. It was established in 
section 6.7 that the HHR mega-project failed in two respects: firstly, the project failed to 
be delivered on-time (see Table 18). Secondly, the project failed to be delivered within 
the allocated budget (see Table 19).  
 
The primary theory considered within this research was AT, which focuses on how some 
agents exploit the information asymmetry that occurs between them and their principal 
by behaving opportunistically. There were then two subsidiary theories in the review 
advanced as potential further contributors to project failure. First, national CT. Hofstede’s 
six national cultural dimensions were utilised to identify and explain the Saudi national 
culture characteristics. These dimensions were used in the categorisation of the cultural 
causes of HHR mega-project failure. Second, the project characteristics. The theory of 
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project management suggested four major concepts (temporality, task, team and 
transition) to differentiate between PO and TMO. These four concepts were also 
advanced as potential causes of failure.  
 
The key findings from the three areas of literature that were used to investigate the HHR 
project failure are as follows. There were the following causes of project failure in the 
HHR case:  
 
11.2.1 Agency problems 
Relationship 1: Client – Consultant  
 Adverse selection (with additional moral hazard) – the project consultant 
misrepresented the qualifications of his employees in order to win the project 
tendering process.  
 Moral hazard – the project consultant provided incorrect and late supervision 
approvals, which affected the work quality and delayed the financial payments to 
Contractor 1.  
 
Relationship 2: Client – Contractor 1 
 Adverse selection – the contractor underestimated and misrepresented the 
project cost to win the project contract.  
 Moral hazard – Contractor 1 took over the project management role from the 
existing PMO after the liquidation of their qualified project management staff. 
 Moral hazard – Contractor 1 employed illegal workforce to work for the project. 
 Moral hazard – Contractor 1 misrepresented the designer’s capability to design 




Relationship 4: Client – Contractor 3 
 Adverse selection – Contractor 3 employed illegal workforce to reduce the project 
costs.  
 
Relationship 5: Project Consultant – Contractor 1 
 Moral hazard – Contractor 1 failed to submit the project plan document to help 
him avoid the consultant’s monitoring and control in the project execution stage.  
 
11.2.2 Cultural causes of failure 
High PD  
 The project owner (client) imposed an unrealistically short project duration in the 
contract.  
 Retaining some private lands from the land acquisition committee. This required 
changing the design of the train route.  
 The first project director decided not to use project management tools and 
techniques in the project monitoring and control from the client’s side.  
 Contractor 1’s top management did not delegate any financial authority to the site 
project director.  
 
Short-term orientation 
 Limited and short-term vision by the client to the project’s milestones. 
 Contractor 1’s short-term mentality, which was described as a ‘banking mentality’.  
 
Indulgence 
 Low percentage of skilled manpower within the project team.  
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 Lack of co-operation from utility companies in monitoring their infrastructure, and 
attempting to take advantage of the project.  
 
11.2.3 Project management causes of failure 
Temporality 
 Lack of time at the project pre-initiation stage to look for a capable, qualified and 
experienced project consultant. 
 Lack of time to assess the project risks and uncertainties by the client and the 
contractor in order to achieve more effective project planning. 
 Short time for the project stakeholders to integrate and establish shared 
knowledge about the project.  
 
Task 
 Client fails to apply effective and efficient project requirements in planning for the 
project. 
 P1P1 preliminary design failure by the contractor’s inexperienced designer. 
 Poor project planning by the project client. 
 Poor project planning by Contractor 1 (P1P1). 
 
Team 
 Failure in the selection process of the PMT (consultants and PMO). 
 Failure in selecting Contractor 1, who had failed to employ an experienced project 
designer. 




The findings chapters provided analysis and explanations of these contributors to the 
HHR project failure, with each one of the three areas was considered separately. In 
the discussion chapter, however, a discussion of the overlap between the three sets 
of causes of project failure was provided, which demonstrated the link of how each 
area influenced the others in certain instances, and how that also needed to be 
considered in an analysis of the HHR project failure (and in any reflection on the 
project management literature). Overall, the investigation throughout the three areas 
– to find the causes of the HHR project failure – worked well in understanding this 
case study, as well as in addressing the research question and achieving the 
research objectives. This will be discussed further, as follows.  
 
11.3 Addressing the research question and objectives 
The research question: 
RQ. To what extent can agency theory be utilised in the analysis and 
explanation of the mega-project failure of the Haramain High-Speed 
Railway (HHR) project within Saudi Arabia? 
 
From the research question, it is apparent that AT was the primary theory of this 
research, in order to investigate the HHR railway mega-project failure. This was 
supported by two subsidiary theories relating to national culture and the inherent features 
of projects. In this context, the research objectives were established. Further discussion 
of how the researcher addressed each one of these research objectives and, therefore, 






Research Objective 1 
 To identify the specific APs (if any) that occurred within the HHR mega-
project.  
 
In order to address the research question, it was imperative to identify APs which 
occurred within the HHR mega-project. The scope of investigating the APs included a 
complex and extensive range of relationships, as Ceric (2014) suggested was required 
in future research. In this research, seven relationships were investigated. These 
relationships involved the major project actors who were project client, consultant, three 
contractors and their project managers. Following the data collection and the analysis of 
the findings, eight APs were identified within four of the seven relationships. These APs, 
however, were found to have different levels of importance toward the HHR project 
failure, which leads the discussion into the next research objective. 
 
Research Objective 2 
 To investigate the extent to which these APs explain the HHR project failure.  
 
The discussion around the level of importance of the APs findings can be explained two-
fold, as follows. Firstly, the researcher – with the interviewees – aimed to assess the 
importance of each one of the APs separately. In order to assist with interpretation, a 
‘star’ rating was adopted. Interestingly, there was variation in the extent to which different 
APs influenced the HHR project failure. As illustrated and explained in Chapter 7, 
relationships 1 and 2 were the main relationships containing the APs of most importance 
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Secondly, it was felt both useful and feasible by the researcher to explore with the 
interviewees the level of importance (prominence) of APs as a cause of the HHR project 
failure – that was, by asking the research participants about the relative importance of 
these APs (using a qualitative measure) by the number of stars (*= low severity; ****= 
high severity). It was, however, recognised that the participants come from different 
stand points. Therefore, the researcher has used his own knowledge and judgement – 
based on the participants rating – to score for the causes of failure. This rating process 
was applied on all three causes of failure (APs, CCs and Project feature factors).  
 
It was concluded that the area of APs was a prominent area that led to the project failure. 
Some of these APs were actually causes of failure in their own right, for example AP1 
and AP3. Others were seen to be the root cause of other causes of project failure, for 
example, Contractor 1’s opportunistic behaviour to employ illegal workforce for the 
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project (AP5) resulted in the lack of skilled labour in Contractor 1 (PMC10), which was 
one of the important factors of the HHR project failure.  
 
Research Objective 3 
 To evaluate the influence of Saudi culture and the project management context 
on the HHR project failure. 
 
Despite the fact that the identified APs were major causes of the HHR mega-project 
failure, there were other factors that contributed to the failure which were related to the 
Saudi culture and project features. In this case, eight cultural factors and ten project 
features causes of failure were identified, all of which varied in their level of importance 
to the failure. Generally, some of these factors were actually causes of failure in their 
own right. Others were found to be symptoms of some of the APs.  
 
While delivering this research objective, the causes of failure attributed to the two 
subsidiary theories (national CT and PMT) provided a deeper insight into the HHR mega-
project failure than could have been provided by AT alone. Indeed, they have 
supplemented the findings of the underlying issues of APs.  
 
 Research Objective 4 
  To explore potential linkages between APs, cultural factors and the project 
management context. 
 
Three causes of the HHR mega-project failure, including APs, national cultural causes 
and project features causes were identified. These causes had different levels of impact 
on the HHR project failure. Interestingly, during the analysis of these different causes in 
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Chapter 10 of this thesis, a number of interrelations emerged between the three causes 
of failure. This provided a critical insight of the analysis of the HHR mega-project failure 
and delivered a better understanding of the linkages between APs, national cultural 
factors and project features factors. Some of these causes were actually the root cause 
of other factors, some were just a symptom of others and the importance of some factors 
was reduced as a result of the existence of other factors. 
 
Overall Meeting of the research Objectives 
Thus, the successful completion of meeting these research objectives has allowed the 
researcher to answer the research question and conclude that AT explains, to a 
significant extent, the HHR mega-project failure. However, there were also other causes 
that were related to national CT and project management context. These causes were 
of a lower level of importance toward the project failure than the APs, and in some cases 
were the consequence of deeper APs.  
 
11.4 Contribution to knowledge 
The theoretical context of this research study aimed to fill the current gap in the literature 
with regards to AT and its relationship with mega-project failure. A number of researchers 
have used AT in looking at the issue of project failure in various project management 
sectors. For example, Wilhelm et al. (2016) in supply chain management; Clipsham et 
al. (2011) and Teo and Koh (2010) in IT; Bardsley (2001) in educational research project; 
and Ceric (2012 and 2014) in construction projects. Ceric (2014), however, confirmed 
that her research was the first to address four project actors in investigating the AP and 
its impact on project failure – no other research existed that addresses more than these 
four participants (project client, contractor and their project managers). Interestingly, 
there was also not any existing previous research that addressed the issue of multiple 
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principal-agent problems in Saudi Arabia and its effect on mega-project failures. 
Therefore, the theoretical context of this research is conducted in order to fill this 
theoretical gap. 
 
11.4.1 Theoretical contribution 
This research study expanded the current literature in its context as a result of the 
following three points. 
 It is the first research study that utilised AT to investigate multiple principal-agent 
relationships to this degree, which included seven relationships composed of 
client and his project manager, contractors and their project managers, and 
project consultants – an even more complex set of relationships than those which 
were included in Ceric’s study in (2014). 
 The first research study in Saudi Arabia to investigate the AP and its impact on 
construction mega-project failure.  
 The first research that added to the limited literature on AT in construction mega-
projects – the impact of multiple APs as causes of infrastructure construction 
mega-project failure and/or national cultural factors and project features factors.  
 
Following the expansion of the current literature discussed above, the core contribution 
to the knowledge can be linked to the research objectives as follows:  
 
 Objective 1: in this research project, and through the analysis of the findings from 
the seven relationships, the researcher identified eight APs that resulted in the 
failure of the HHR mega-project. The successful achievement of this research 
objective demonstrated that multiple APs do exist within the mega-project context 




 Objective 2: this objective provided an insight into the level of importance of APs, 
and deeper understanding of the prominence of APs as a major cause of mega-
project failure. The findings confirmed the following: firstly, different APs vary in 
their importance and impact on mega-project failure; secondly, APs make a 
significant contribution toward mega-project failure, albeit alongside other minor 
cultural and project features factors. Applying better project management 
practices by the client (such as sufficient project feasibility study duration) might 
minimise the occurrence of APs at the pre-contractual and post-contractual 
stage. 
 
 Objective 3: the contribution to the knowledge derived from this research 
objective can be expressed as follows. Firstly, as claimed by PECO-1R and PC-
1R, a minor part of the causes of construction mega-projects failure are attributed 
to national cultural dimensions – in this case of HHR mega-project high power 
PD, short-term orientation and indulgence. Secondly, other factors of HHR mega-
project failure were attributed to the inherent features of projects (temporality, 
task, team and transition). Therefore, better project management skills (for 
example, project planning and better communication…etc.) are crucial in the 
reduction of the causes of megaproject failure.  
 
 Objective 4: a further contribution to the literature derived from the emergent 
outcome of the analysis in this research. Firstly, multiple Principal-agent 
problems exist in mega-projects, this needs to be researched. Secondly, while 
there were cultural factors and project feature factors behind the failure, some of 
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these were actually symptoms of APs. This is something that needs to be better 
recognised in an often descriptive project management literature.  
 
Finally, a contribution of the research is to emphasize that the project management 
literature needs to acknowledge the existence and significance of opportunism much 
more than is currently the case. 
 
As well as more accurately identifying the underlying root causes of project and mega-
project failure, it will also assist with theoretical generalisability – the lack of which is a 
frequent criticism of the project management literature in terms of it often being too 
descriptive (Dyer and Paulson, 1976; Packendorff, 1995; Thomas, 2000; Cooke-Davies 
and Arzymanow, 2003; Padalkar and Gopinath, 2016). It is argued that this makes such 
literature lacking in theoretical generalisability. In this thesis, the researcher has sought 
to identify the more fundamental, underlying causes of project failure, which are 
theoretically generalisable. It has been identified in Chapters 7-10 that a number of 
causes of the HHR failure are at root APs, problems of national culture or problems 
generated by the fundamental features of project (temporality, task, team and transition). 
Indeed, there were occasions in the HHR project that saw these underlying causes 
combining to generate a contributor to the overall project failure. This suggests 
theoretical generalisability.  
 
11.4.2 Practical recommendations 
The HHR mega-project was the first railway mega-project of its kind that was executed 
under the SRO management. According to the SRO master plan, there are many similar 
railway mega-projects to be initiated in the future in order to expand the railway lines in 
Saudi Arabia (SRO-2, 2014). Therefore, this section provides practical recommendations 
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for the client to take into account while making decisions that are related to the execution 
of similar type of railway projects in the future – while taking into account that an 
important feature of this type of project is the project temporality (Söderlund, 2013), 
which has an influence on every aspect of the project execution. This was articulated in 
the discussion on the overlap between project temporality and the client’s high PD 
decisions (see Section 10.4.3). Therefore, it is suggested that the client addresses the 
negative impact of high PD decisions – related to the time factor – on the project 
performance, and take the following recommendations into consideration: 
 
Project management and culture related recommendations 
 Clients need to recognise the possibility of opportunistic agent behaviour.  
 Provide the consultant with a reasonable time to study the project and measure the 
project uncertainty and complexity. Once the consultant is able to effectively assess 
the project in its early stages, then the client will be able to establish a plausible 
project time and cost estimates. This will result in a more realistic time scale for the 
project execution, and allow the consultant to establish the required knowledge to 
monitor and control the project in planning and execution stages. Establishing 
sufficient level of knowledge would enable the consultant to more efficiently monitor 
any potential opportunistic behaviour by the contractor that can cause the project to 
fail.  
 Provide the contractor with adequate time to plan for such a unique and complex 
mega-project. This will enable the contractor to reduce the shortage of information 
(utilities infrastructure information), and the high level of uncertainty associated with 
such a complex and unique project. It will also help in exploring the unforeseen risks 
and allow the contractor to plan for mitigation and contingencies. This will result in a 
smoother execution stage for the project and eradicate the need of opportunistic 
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behaviours by the contractor which might be triggered due to the lack of sufficient 
knowledge held by the contractor to execute the project. 
 The client may consider the segregation of the project design contract from the 
project execution contract, instead of combining both stages in design-build-transfer 
type of projects – specifically in railway projects; and allocating realistic project 
durations for each stage. This is because railway mega-project runs hundreds of 
kilometres through rural and urban areas; where in this case, utilities infrastructure 
maps were wrong and missing a lot of important information.  
 The client should allocate the required time to choose the project agents before the 
project initiation. From this case study, choosing Contractor 1 and an unqualified and 
inexperienced project consultant were deemed as high level of importance causes of 
failure. In this scenario, the unqualified and inexperienced contractor and consultant 
may behave opportunistically to buy themselves some time to be able to learn at the 
back of the project, which occurred in the case of this study (HHR mega-project). 
Thus, the client’s decisions for the agents’ selection are crucial. 
 
This latter recommendation emphasises the importance of the project team selection 
process. Selecting the right team for the project will ease the team’s journey through 
Tuckman’s four stages (1965), to reach to the required level of trust and integration 
where all team members share the same goals, which will allow the team members to 
perform. Lamming (1996) suggested that when trust is the relationship’s norm, problems 
that may occur are targeted for solution. In this case, opportunism is removed from the 
equation. In this case study, and based on the consequences of lack of trust between 
the client, the project consultant and Contractor 1 (see Section 10.4.2), the following 




The lack of trust issue related recommendations 
  Employ sufficient numbers of skilled engineers, consultants and project managers 
who are capable and qualified to plan and execute the required work.  
 The client should spend the required time before the project initiation to choose the 
right consultant, who has the qualifications and experience of similar projects.  
 It is recommended that the client should impose in the contractual document that the 
project consultant’s staff should be selected based on their quality (qualification and 
experience) rather than quantity (as occurred in this project).  
 It is suggested that the client should alter the bidding regulations in terms of the 
percentage of excluding a bid. The GTPL document states that “no bid may be 
excluded on grounds of its low prices unless it is less by 35% (thirty five percent)”. 
This suggestion comes after PC-1R admitted that “the contracting and bidding 
system in Saudi needs to be revised”; he thought that “any contractor who provides 
estimated prices that lower than 10% should be investigated”, adding “the current 
percentage of 35% cause a greater possibility of project failure”. 
 
The selection of the wrong project team based on the lowest cost appears to have 
affected the possibility of establishing the required level of trust with the client, which 
increased the occurrence of APs, as discussed in the overlap section between AT and 
cultural factors (see Section 10.4.1). Therefore, further recommendations emerge as 
follows: 
 
Agency problem and culture related recommendations 
 The client may impose additional penalties on the project consultant in the case of 
poor project performance. For example, the consultant should pay the cost of 
supervision if the consultant was found liable and accountable to certain delays (as 
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it is occurring with the contractor). In this case study (HHR mega-project), it was 
observed that the consultant had shared benefits with Contractor 1 in delaying the 
project where both of them acted opportunistically (see Section 10.4.1). Therefore, 
imposing additional penalties on the consultant would eradicate such an issue and 
the consultant would be in a position to resolve any project delay as a result.  
 
 The client should review the financial incentive policy for the project agents 
(consultant and contractors). This is because the findings from this research 
demonstrated the importance of financial incentives where APs were a major part of 
the project failure and how this type of incentive could have changed some 
opportunistic behaviours.  
 
Thus, the client taking the recommendations provided above into consideration, may 
result in more efficient project management execution through more effective project 
management practices, planning, monitoring, control and motivation for better 
performance by the consultant and contractors. These recommendations were provided 
within the context of mega-project to provide theoretical rationalisation to cut out the 
avenues for APs to appear and that should, theoretically, reduce the likelihood of mega-
project failure.  
 
11.5 Limitation and reflection (researcher’s account for personal experience 
and learning) 
This research has an unprecedented context. However, this gives rise to a number of 




Firstly, the findings of this research emerged from a single case study within the 
construction industry. More specifically, an infrastructure public railway mega-project in 
Saudi Arabia. This begs the question as to what extent these findings are representative 
to other mega-projects in other sectors (for example, IT mega-projects, education meg-
projects, etc.); and whether the findings would be the same if this research was carried 
out within a different sector. Furthermore, a wider study in other mega-project sectors 
could be beneficial in terms of the robustness of the findings of this research.  
 
Secondly, the HHR mega-project was sponsored by the government (public project). 
However, the first phase of the project, including P1P1 and P1P2, were executed by 
three contractors and monitored and controlled by a consultant, all from the private 
sector. This brings to our attention another limitation of this case study research, which 
is the fact that the project client’s voice which was heard throughout the clients’ 
interviews was related to the public sector only. There was no client’s voice from the 
private sector.  
 
Thirdly, this research was keen to investigate multiple relationships and hear the voices 
of different actors within the project – who were considered mainly to be the top 
management (i.e. client representatives, contractors, consultants and their project 
managers). Due to lack of access, however, the researcher was unable to include other 
project actors such as sub-contractors, project designers, lower level stakeholders and 
potentially minor stakeholders, such as utility companies and other government bodies.  
 
Fourthly, the Saudi cultural regulation allows only men to work in the construction 
infrastructure sector. As a result, all participants who were interviewed in this research 
project were men. A similar research in another country, where participants could be 
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from both genders, may demonstrate whether women would have reacted differently to 
similar causes of mega-project failure mentioned in this research.  
 
The final limitation identified within this research concerns the qualitative methodological 
approach. This approach helped the researcher to identify and investigate different 
causes of failure in order to identify APs and achieve the research objective. However, it 
did not enable the researcher to identify specific and precise measurements in relation 
to the levels of importance of the causes of the HHR project failure – including APs, 
cultural causes and project management causes – individually or collectively per area. 
 
Nonetheless, this research has provided in-depth analysis and insight to the HHR mega-
project failure, while using AT as a primary theory, which has not previously been done 
in Saudi Arabia. Consequently, this research led the researcher to have a series of 
personal reflections. Firstly, the researcher had the prior perception that contractors were 
the major project actors causing project failure, mainly during the project execution stage, 
which was found to be untrue. This study also emphasised the major role of project 
consultants on mega-project failure. Secondly, it has become clear to the researcher 
from the discussion of this study that the existence of contractual penalties to the 
contractor – as a deterrent from any project delay or failure – is not enough for a 
successful project execution. It is essential to the contractors to have financial incentives 
in order to successfully deliver the project – mainly within projects that have high level of 
uncertainty. Thirdly, being a Saudi national was an essential factor while conducting this 
research (mainly during the data collection period) in understanding the views of Saudi 
participants, particularly when some information was related to the Saudi culture. 
Furthermore, being an English language speaker enabled the researcher to conduct this 
research in English, which provided the researcher with a broader database of literature 
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around the theories used in this research. This would also provide the researcher with 
better opportunities for future research.  
 
11.6 Future research direction  
This research has provided a starting point for future research. It has raised a number of 
debates, all of which require more research.  
 
Firstly, looking at the current Saudi bidding system and its stipulations, the GTPL 
document states that “no bid may be excluded on grounds of its low prices unless it is 
less by 35% (thirty five percent)”. This percentage was perceived to be rather high and 
it is one of the causes of choosing the wrong contractor and leading the project to fail. 
Therefore, interesting future research could be to investigate the current bidding 
regulations and their impact on construction mega-project failure.  
 
Secondly, as this research heard the client’s voice from the public sector only, there is 
an opportunity of future research that conducts a comparison case study between both 
public and private projects. The research may consider focusing on comparing the 
client’s approach, attitude and project management practices between the two sectors, 
in order to conclude whether the nature of the sector influences the client to act in a 
certain way that has an impact on the project failure.  
 
Thirdly, a continuing research that includes a larger sample size. Is it possible to find 
more APs when a higher number of relationships is included? Do culture and project 
management practices in that region influence the occurrence of APs? What are the 
levels of importance of these APs and other causes of failure? Are there further links and 




Fourthly, another continuing research could use quantitative methodology to examine 
the level of importance of the causes of mega-project failure that were found in this 
research (HHR case study). Conducting this future research would require a larger 
sample size in order to investigate and find precise and measured figures in relation to 
the level of importance of the causes of failure, to find out the following: what are the 
precise measurements of the level of importance of APs, cultural causes and project 
management causes of failure? Which aspect between the three is the most prominent 
one? What are the numeric variations of the overlap between the three aspects?  
 
Finally, the conclusion in this research study is derived from the construction 
infrastructure railways mega-project. An interesting further area of research could be 
looking at repeating this research study in other mega-project sectors, such as 
manufacturing, IT, education, etc. Would there be any similarities in the findings in 
comparison to this research? To what extent? Would other mega-project sectors come 
up with different APs, cultural factors and project management causes which can explain 
mega-project failures? 
 
Examining the findings derived from this research – in the form of secondary data 
analysis – in future research conducted within construction infrastructure railway mega-
projects would provide a great help in testing, as well as revising the outcome of this 
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Temporality: Starting and finishing 
point is the major factor that 
differentiates project organisations 
from normal business organisations 
(Hanniff et al., 2015). Time 
restrictions create difficulties to 
establish co-operation, collaboration 
and shared knowledge, which may 
affect the project performance 
(Morley et al., 1977). 
Objective time (quantitative): short 
quantified duration to achieve 
organisational goals – based on the 
clock (Palisis and Bartolomeo, 1970). 
The impact of short project 
duration on team integration 
performing complex tasks. 
Impact of time temporality on 
actors’ level of urgency, stress 
and project performance. Subjective time: qualitative time 
(Starkey, 1989). Short time to 
establish team integration and shared 
knowledge among project actors 
(Lanzara, 1983). 
Task: Project organisation exists as 
a result of task complexity 
(Goodman et al., 1976). Task 
complexity can be managerial and/or 
technical (Gidado, 1996). The 
complex task may have occurred 
before, or otherwise it would be  
unique for a certain project (El-
Rayes and Moselhi, 1998). Task 
management component has two 
distinctions identified by Söderlund 
(2013) and they are as follows: 
firstly, project activities was divided 
into actual tasks and actor’s social 
perspectives. Secondly, this 
distinction is between content and 
Task and content: much research has 
paid attention to the content of project 
tasks, which covers areas like scope 
management and WBS. 
The first three areas have been 
much considered in the 
literature of project 
management. Whereas, the last 
area, which is social 
organisation and process, was 
given very little attention in 
project management research 
(Söderlund, 2013). Therefore, 
project management tools and 
techniques including WBS, 
critical path, earned value 
techniques are important, but it 
is necessary to supplement 
them with project management 
soft skills (that includes issues, 
such as feeling, emotions, trust, 
Task and process: similarly, research 
in project management has 
addressed processes related to tasks, 
which can be seen through Gantt 
charts and planning techniques. 
Social organisation and content: this 
element of the project organisation 
has been implemented through 
project documentation, which shows 
the distribution of responsibilities, 
interdependencies between project 

















process. These two distinctions 
result in four measures sub-sections.  
Social organisation and process: this 
includes a number of examples, such 
as team temporary relationship, team 
dynamics, timing norms and 
deadlines. 
conflict, power and learning) 
and leadership, in order to 
achieve task completion 
effectively. Furthermore, all four 
measures are explored through 
various methods. 
Team: this variable concern with 
team selection and operation. A 
number of authors suggest to select 
a project team based on their 
technical skills and competency 
(Pinto, 2016; Larson et al., 2014). 
Another suggestion added the 
importance of interpersonal skills 
(Bryman et al.,1987). However, 
Baykasoglu et al., (2007) highlighted 
the critical importance of team 
members’ capability and eligibility in 
achieving effective project outcome. 
Furthermore, there are three 
measures that can influence team 
effectiveness (diversity, size and 
organisational team functionality) 
  
Diversity: can push team 
effectiveness either way. It can create 
a supportive dynamic among team 
members (Larson and Gray, 2014; 
Pinto, 2016), or otherwise create a 
level of ambiguity, uncertainty and 
conflict within the team members 
(McGrath, 1991). 
The impact of team size and 
diversity on the team 
effectiveness are measurable 
factors which were addressed in 
previous researches. Although, 
they will be explored in relevant 
situation throughout this study. 
On the other hand, 
organisational functionality 
cannot be measured. Bennis et 
al. (2005) stated “the things 
routinely ignored by academics 
on the grounds that they cannot 
be measured” (p. 3). Therefore, 
organisational team 
functionality will be explored 
and identified if it is an area 
leading to AP.  
Size: Baykasoglu et al., (2007) 
debated that once the number of team 
member exceeds (12-14) members, 
the performance will drop. 
Organisational team functionality: this 
measure is about project actors’ 
ethics, morals and behavioural 
aspects. A clear organisation culture 
and structure is necessary, which 
defines the employees position, roles 
and responsibilities within the 
organisation (Trompenaars, 1993) to 
avoid the risk of project employees 
finding themselves in the middle 
between employing and project 
organisation and to whom they should 




Transition: Lundin and Söderholm 
(1995) identified two meanings for 
transition. Firstly, the practical 
transformative transition for the 
permanent organisation, in terms of 
the change which occurred to the 
organisation from before to after 
conducting certain projects. The 
second definition is concerned with 
the changes during the project 
execution, including operational and 
functional aspects within the TO. 
Within this component, there are two 
sub-sections that present two 
different measures of transition. 
Permanent to TO transition: this 
transition occurs once per project 
where the permanent organisation 
finds the importance to form and 
delegate the project to a TO due to 
the complexity and the need for 
certain expertise to conduct the 
project. 
Bakker (2010) argued that little 
research has been done in the 
area of transition. However, 
Burstrom and Jacobsson (2012) 
argued that transition process is 
associated with operational 
complexities (e.g. functional, 
strategic and operational). This 
study aimed to explore these 
complexities within the two 
positions of transition.  
Operational multiple-transitions within 
TMO: this position occurs within the 
project execution stage where certain 
expertise is required for limited period 
only. This creates multiple transition 
points that might add tension and 
conflict within the project team (Hall 




























Principal-agent division: This component was the initial reason for the manifestation of AT. This division 
existed as a result of the separation between ownership and control (Charreaux, 2004) 
Information asymmetry: its origin 
comes from the information 
advantage the agent has over the 
principal (Provan, 1991). With less 
information, it is difficult for the 
principal to assess the agents’ 
decisions. There are two types of 
information asymmetry: the first one 
occurs within public information 
when the principal fail to interpret 
them in the right way, and the 
second one is through private 
information that is difficult to be 
obtained by the principal. These two 
types will be assessed through the 
Pre-contractual: this study is dealing 
with the information asymmetry that 
occurs between principal and his 
agent based on the contractual status 
between the two actors. The first 
measure was related to information 
asymmetry that occurred before 
signing the contract (pre-contractual).  
This study has explored the 
pre-contractual information 
asymmetry from public and 
private information the agent 
holds in relation to issues that 
may assist the principal in 
making critical decision (e.g. 
assessing and selecting 
contractors) 
Post-contractual: the second measure 
was related to post-contractual 
information asymmetry. This started 
from the moment of signing the 
contract and continued throughout the 
project execution stage.  
Post-contractual information 
asymmetry is another area 
which was explored. This area 
is concerned with managerial 


















following measures (pre-contractual, 
and post-contractual). 
agent had during the execution 
stage. 
Opportunism: this component is a 
result of the information asymmetry 
that existed between the actors. 
Williamson (1979) defined it as a 
seeking process for self-interest that 
is associated with guile. It occurs 
after the agent exploits the 
advantageous position they are in by 
withholding additional information 
(Lai et al., 2005). Opportunism has 
many forms which was described as 
weak or strong, and subtle or blatant 
(Anderson, 1988). Two types have 
been identified for opportunism, 
based on the contractual stage 
between the two actors (Ceric, 2012; 
Caers et al., 2006). These two types 
are used as the measures of this 
variable in this study.   
Adverse selection is the type of 
opportunism that occurs before 
signing a contract. At this stage of a 
project, the principal may not have 
sufficient information about the agents 
before setting up the contract. Which 
can allow the agents pre-contractual 
opportunism (Caers et al., 2006). 
This study aimed to investigate 
on the impact of this type of 
opportunism (adverse selection) 
on the principal’s decisions 
before the project is actually 
initiated and before the 
contractual document is 
prepared to be signed.  
Moral hazard (post-contractual 
opportunism) can occur once the 
contract is signed. The agents’ 
actions and intention, which are 
difficult to detect by the principal, can 
lead to this type of opportunism 
(Alparslan, (2006).  
This area of opportunism was 
explored in this research in 
order to identify specific APs in 
the Saudi context and their 
effect on project failure was 
analysed. 
Opportunism management: there 
are two possible outcomes once 
there is division between ‘principal 
and agent’, and the information 
asymmetry exists. Firstly, when trust 
is the moral norm between the two 
actors, then the potential of 
opportunism is excluded. The 
second outcome is where there is 
lack of trust between the two actors 
and that is when the notion of 
opportunism needs to be addressed. 
Relationship nature: this approach 
deals with opportunism by changing 
the agent’s attitude toward dealing 
with the project principal – mainly by 
establishing trust between the two 
actors and creating a co-operative 
collaborative relationship 
(Bhattacharya et al., 1998). 
After identifying specific APs 
from the case of this study, the 
researcher’s aim was to explore 
the mechanisms used by the 
actors to establish trust and 
increase the level of co-
operation and collaboration and 
reduce the potential of the APs 
affecting the project outcome. 
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There are two mechanisms to 
manage opportunistic behaviours 
(presented as sub-sections in this 
table). Failure in executing these two 
mechanisms leaves no option but to 
accept opportunism – and this is the 
third sub-section under this 
component.  
Contractual nature: this approach aim 
to change the agent’s behaviour 
through certain mechanisms such as 
realignment of the incentives for the 
agent. Steinle et al., (2014) suggested 
other mechanisms such as 
monitoring, signalling and screening.  
This is the second area to 
explore in this study, whether 
the method of re-setting 
incentives, signalling and 
monitoring were followed to 
deal with opportunistic 
behaviours or otherwise not and 
why? 
Opportunism acceptance: is when the 
principal fail to use the opportunism 
management mechanisms. There are 
several explanations for not dealing 
with the risk of opportunism and they 
are: risk refusal, avoidance, delay or 
risk ignorance (Kutsch and Hall, 
2005). 
In the situation where principals 
have produced no actions to 
deal with the agents’ 
opportunism, this study aimed 
to explore the reasons behind 
accepting this behaviour from 
the agent. 
Multiple principal-agent problem: 
AP occurs when a principal 
delegates a task to an agent (Wu et 
al., 2014). Certain industries involve 
more than one party to take the 
principal role, as well as the agent 
role, and these industries are 
perceived to be ‘highly goal 
conflicted’ – such as the construction 
industry (Toor and Ogunlana, 2010) 
because of the involvement of 
numerous stakeholders.  
Ceric (2014) demonstrated multiple 
APs in his research by including the 
project owner, contractor and their 
project managers. Ceric (2014) 
proposed that future researches 
should enlarge the scope and include 
more project stakeholders to 
investigate the multiple agency issue 
This study considered Ceric’s 
proposal and included more 
stakeholders to explore the 
effect of multiple APs on the 
project performance. In addition 
to the stakeholders involved in 
Ceric’s research, this study 
added further stakeholders for 
the investigation and that is the 







Power Distance (PD): is “the extent 
to which the less powerful members 
of organisations and institutions (like 
High (PD): high PD societies have 
opposite certain characteristics such 
as inequality between members in 
AT originated from America and 
developed in Europe. As this 
























the family) accept and expect that 
power is distributed unequally” 
(Hofstede, 2011, p. 9). The notion of 
PD does not exist only in the work 
place, it extends further to other 
institutions (for example, family and 
whole society). So, because there 
are different levels of PD, societies 
can be described as high or low PD. 
These two types are used as sub-
sections in this table. 
organisations, authority and power 
are for certain people, etc. Saudi 
Arabia was classified in this type of 
power resistance (Bjerke and Al-Meer, 
1993). 
to analyse project failures in 
Saudi, the researcher aimed to 
find the impact of the Saudi 
culture (as High PD society) on 
the use of AT, which was 
originated and developed in an 
opposite cultural type (Low PD 
society). 
Low (PD): this type has opposite 
characteristics, for example equality 
between members in organisation and 
managers make decisions after 
consulting with subordinates, etc. 
American (USA and Canada) and 
most European countries were listed 
in this category by Hofstede (1984).  
Uncertainty avoidance (UA): is 
related to the amount of stress a 
society may suffer from uncertain 
future. This dimension identified two 
types of UA societies and they are 
high UA society and low UA society. 
High (UA): Hofstede (2001) observed 
that in this type, managers are been 
given a lot of power and authority to 
maintain more control on others 
behaviours. As a result, managers 
may exploit the authority and power to 
make decisions for their own 
interests. Bjerke et al., (1993) in their 
research presented Saudi Arabia in 
the category of high UA with a score 
of (73). 
 
Similar to the (PD) variable, in 
this variable (UA), Saudi cultural 
type was classified opposite to 
the cultural type of AT’s place of 
origin and development. Thus, 
this study will consider the 
cultural differences in the 
analysis of Saudi project failure. 
Low (UA): less power and authority 
are given to managers in these 
categories. American (USA and 
Canada) and most European 
countries were listed in this category 
by Hofstede (1984). 
 
Individualism/collectivism:  is 
related to the level of integration of 
individuals into a group or a society. 
This dimension describes “the 
Individualism: an example of the 
characteristics of this type of society 
is that managers do rate autonomy as 
more important in their job. American 
This study aimed to explore if 
there was an impact of different 
type of societies (individualist 
and collectivist) on utilising AT 
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relationship between the individual 
and the collectivity” (Hofstede, 2001, 
p. 209), in more particular terms the 
“extent to which people are 
autonomous individuals or 
embedded in their groups” (Triandis 
and Gelfand, 2012, p. 499). Two 
types of society identified in this 
dimension and they are individualism 
and collectivism.  
(USA and Canada) and most 
European countries are listed in this 
category by Hofstede (1984). 
to analyse project failures. 
Certainly in a society where 
people tend to avoid taking 
accountability for their decision 
and the smallest unit of survival 
is groups instead of individuals 
as it is the case in Saudi.  
Collectivism: this type of society is the 
opposite (i.e. managers consider job 
security and job positions as more 
important). Bjerke and Al-Meer (1993) 
presented Saudi Arabia as a 
collectivist society. 
Masculinity/femininity: is related to 
the level of division between the 
roles of men and women. This the 
fourth dimension of Hofstede’s 
cultural dimensions. It discussed the 
masculinity versus femininity across 
the whole society, not per 
individual’s characteristics. Two 
types were identified as follows: the 
assertive side has been described as 
‘masculine’ and the caring and 
modest ‘feminine’ (Hofstede, 2001).  
Feminine society finds that men and 
women must be caring and modest, 
both should balance between work 
and family, give sympathy for the 
weak and others (Hofstede,1984). 
Saudi Arabia was considered as a 
feminine society (Bjerke and Al-Meer, 
1993). 
This study aimed to explore 
whether Saudi Arabia being a 
feminine society (with all the 
society’s characteristics) 
influences the use of AT in the 
analysis of project failure. The 
reason behind this is the fact 
that the AT was created and 
developed in a masculine 
society.  
Masculinity society finds that men 
must be assertive and women may be 
as well, work is prevailed over family, 
admiration for the strong and so on. 
American (Canada and USA) and 
most European societies were found 
to be masculine.  
Time orientation is related to the 
option to focus on people’s effort 
whether in the (past, present or 
future). This dimension is the only 
one out of the five that is connected 
to economic growth (Hofstede & 
Bond, 1988). 
Short-term: short-term oriented 
societies are stuck with their social 
obligations, respect their traditions 
and care about personal stability and 
steadiness at work (Hofstede, 2011). 
Examples of short-term oriented 
societies are USA, Latin America, 
Muslim and African countries.  
In this variable, Saudi was 
classified the same as some 
American societies (USA and 
Latin America) to be short-term 
oriented societies. Although, the 
long-term oriented societies 
included other European 
countries. As long-term oriented 
societies are characterised with 
better economic growth, this 
study will explore the impact of 
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Long-term: Long-term oriented society 
is said to result with better economic 
growth; this society is characterized 
with perseverance, ordering 
relationships based on status, and 
have a sense of shame (Hofstede, 
2011). Examples for long oriented 
countries are East Asia, Central and 
Eastern Europe.  
 







Indulgent society: “Indulgence stands 
for a society that allows relatively free 
gratification of basic and natural 
human desires related to enjoying life 
and having fun” (Hofstede, 2011, p. 
15) 
Hofstede (2011) claimed that 
this dimension complements the 
previous one – time orientation. 
Saudi Arabia was classified to 
be an indulgent society, where 
population have less controlled 
gratification to their natural 
human desires in contrast with 
their work life.   
Restraint society: “Restraint stands for 
a society that control gratification of 
needs and regulates it by means of 






APPENDIX 2: INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE 
  
 
University of Birmingham 
 
 
Haramain High-Speed Railway project 
Interview 
 
The conduct of the interview is for the purpose to investigate in the HHR project failure. 
Personal Details 
 
Name (optional):  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Position: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Email: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 





Semi- Structure Interview Questionnaire 
 
Q1: How effective the agent is in providing information that will help 
the client in evaluating the agent’s competency to execute this project 
before the project starts?  
 
Q2: what is the nature of the relationship between principal and agent? 
And how does that nature help in avoiding factors that may cause project 
failure? 
 
Q3: what the principal does to measure the agent’s eligibility and 
capability to execute the project? 
 
Q4: Do you think that the agent’s knowledge about project complexity 
can affect his behaviour towards moral hazard opportunism? And how? 
 
Q5: How would you describe that changing the agents’ attitude to be 
more co-operative and collaborative can decrease the opportunistic 
behaviours? 
 
Q6: Describe the importance of financially incentivising the contractors 
for project completion and apply penalties for failure of completion? 
 
Q7: Mega-projects has a complex structure, do you think that multiple 











Code First data collection schedule Follow up data collection schedule 










PC – 1R 10/11/2013 90 Minutes 09/04/2017 40 Minutes 
2 Client project 
manager 







































PC – 2R 18/11/2013 72 Minutes 
 
11/04/2017 47 Minutes 
9 Client project 
manager 






















26/11/2013 65 Minutes 13/04/2017 25 Minutes 
14 Consultant 
representative 











PC – 3R 18/11/2013 70 Minutes 17/04/2017 60 Minutes 
16 Client project 
manager 






















19/12/2013 65 Minutes 18/04/2017 50 Minutes 
21 Consultant 
representative 
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publication 
Paragraph Page number 
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APPENDIX 6: ETHICAL APPROVAL 
 
Ethical approval for data collection (first trip) 
 
FW: Ethical statement 
 
Christopher Lonsdale 
Sent: 27 March 2017   16:11 
To: Abdullah Alsabban; Mark Alexander Hall  
Cc: Christopher Lonsdale  
  
Statement Regarding Research Ethics 
  
The research data collected in January 2014 (phase 1 of the data collection undertaken by the 
candidate) has been subjected to a University management review. This review concluded that 
there had not been any significant ethical breach in the conduct of the research and that the 
data collected in this period could be used in the thesis ‘Mega-projects in Saudi Arabia: an 
agency theory perspective’. On this basis I am happy to support the submission of this work for 
examination. 
  
Professor Glyn Watson 
Dean, Business School 

















Ethical Approval for data collection (second trip) 
 
UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM 
APPLICATION FOR ETHICAL REVIEW 
 
 
Who should use this form: 
 
This form is to be completed by PIs or supervisors (for PGR student research) who 
have completed the University of Birmingham’s Ethical Review of Research Self 
Assessment Form (SAF) and have decided that further ethical review and approval is 
required before the commencement of a given Research Project. 
 
 Please be aware that all new research projects undertaken by postgraduate 
research (PGR) students first registered as from 1st September 2008 will be 
subject to the University’s Ethical Review Process. PGR students first 
registered before 1st September 2008 should refer to their 
Department/School/College for further advice. 
 
 
Researchers in the following categories are to use this form:  
 
1. The project is to be conducted by: 
o staff of the University of Birmingham; or  
o postgraduate research (PGR) students enrolled at the 
University of Birmingham (to be completed by the 
student’s supervisor); 
2. The project is to be conducted at the University of Birmingham by 
visiting researchers. 
 
Students undertaking undergraduate projects and taught postgraduate (PGT) 









 An electronic version of the completed form should be submitted to the Research 
Ethics Officer, at the following email address: aer-ethics@contacts.bham.ac.uk. 
Please do not submit paper copies. 
 If, in any section, you find that you have insufficient space, or you wish to supply 
additional material not specifically requested by the form, please it in a separate 
file, clearly marked and attached to the submission email. 




  Before submitting, please tick this box to confirm that you have consulted 
and understood the following information and guidance and that you have 
taken it into account when completing your application: 
 











UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM 
APPLICATION FOR ETHICAL REVIEW 




1. TITLE OF PROJECT  
A study on analysing project failures in Saudi Arabia by using agency theory.   
 
 
2. THIS PROJECT IS:  
 University of Birmingham Staff Research project  
 University of Birmingham Postgraduate Research (PGR) Student project  
          Other    (Please specify): 
 
 
3. INVESTIGATORS  
 
a) PLEASE GIVE DETAILS OF THE PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATORS OR 
SUPERVISORS (FOR PGR STUDENT PROJECTS)  
 
Name:      Title / first name / family name Mark Hall 
Highest qualification & position 
held: 
PhD Senior Lecturer 
School/Department  Birmingham Business School 
Telephone: 0121 4148577 
Email address: m.a.hall.1@bham.ac.uk 
  
Name:      Title / first name / family name  
Highest qualification & position 
held: 
 
School/Department   
Telephone:  
Email address:  
  
b) PLEASE GIVE DETAILS OF ANY CO-INVESTIGATORS OR CO-
SUPERVISORS (FOR PGR STUDENT PROJECTS) 
 
Name:      Title / first name / family 
name 
Chris Lonsdale 
Highest qualification & position 
held: 
PhD Reader 
School/Department  Birmingham Business School 
Telephone: 0121 414 7593 
Email address: c.m.lonsdale.ieb@bham.ac.uk 
 
 
c) In the case of PGR student projects, please give details of the student 
 









 Course of 
study: 





Mark Hall   
 
 Name of student:  Student No:  





   
 
  
4. ESTIMATED START OF PROJECT 
 





List the funding sources (including internal sources) and give the status of each source. 
   
Funding Body Approved/Pending /To be 
submitted 
 








If you are requesting a quick turnaround on your application, please explain the 
reasons below (including funding-related deadlines). You should be aware that 
whilst effort will be made in cases of genuine urgency, it will not always be 
possible for the Ethics Committees to meet such requests.  
 
I request a quick turnaround on this application for the following reasons: 
- At this stage of my research, further follow up data collection is required for 
the benefit of the research. And the time is strictly limited to be at 
beginning of April.  
- The limited time available to incorporate the previously collected data with 
the required follow up data, and conduct a full analysis and then starting to 
write up the findings, analysis and discussion chapter. (N.B. the deadline 









Date:   05/04/2017 
Date:    27/04/2017 
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5. SUMMARY OF PROJECT 
 Describe the purpose, background rationale for the proposed project, as well as the 
hypotheses/research questions to be examined and expected outcomes. This description 
should be in everyday language that is free from jargon. Please explain any technical terms 
or discipline-specific phrases.   
 
The research is looking at project management field. The case study of this research is 
looking at the Harmain High Speed Railway Project in Saudi Arabia.  
 
Project failure is an issue affecting a large percentage of projects that has been executed 
and under construction around the world. This failure can be seen in forms such as delivering 
the project within the allocated budget, within the allocated deadlines and/or the required 
specifications. Furthermore, the failure can be in other areas as well, such as health and 
safety, ethical behaviours...etc. This research aims to investigate in the problem of project 
failure in Saudi Arabia and find issues that are causing these failures and analyse them with 
the primary theory of this research.  
 
Researchers in the area of project management have looked at this problem of project failure 
by using a number of theories such as: optimism bias, governance theory, risk theory, and 
others. This research is focusing on using agency theory as the primary theory of the 
research. Throughout the literature review stage, it has been recognised that agency theory 
was originated in North America, and developed in Europe. As this research is studying 
project failure in Saudi Arabia, where a country with different culture to where agency theory 
started and developed; the cultural theory is considered as the subsidiary theory in this 
research.  
 
Thus, the problem this research is trying to address is looking at the extent agency theory 
can be applied in a country with different culture of its origin. 
 
Furthermore, Agency theory is looking at the agent’s opportunism toward the principal as 
result of information asymmetry between the two actors. Previously, researchers looked at 
the issue of multiple agency problems which can occur. Previous research addressed Client, 
contractor and their project managers in the studies. Ceric, (2014) suggested that further 
research may look into more complex relationships within projects. This research is aiming 
to include additional project actors (i.e. Client, Contractor, Consultant and their project 
managers).  
 
Therefore, The research question that will be addressed in this investigation is: 
RQ. To what extent can agency theory be utilised in the analysis and explanation of 




1. To identify the specific APs (if any) that occurred within the HHR mega-project.  
2. To investigate the extent to which these APs explain the HHR project failure.  
3. To evaluate the influence of Saudi culture and the project management context on 
the HHR project failure. 
4. To explore potential linkages between APs, cultural factors and the project 
management context. 
5. To develop a new framework that illustrates factors of mega-project failure, and 
any potential linkages between the three factors (APs, cultural factors and project 
management factors).  
The expected outcome of this research is one of the following three: 
Agency theory cannot be used in analysing project failure in Saudi Arabia.  
Agency theory can be used in analysing project failure in Saudi Arabia. 





6. CONDUCT OF PROJECT 
 
 Please give a description of the research methodology that will be used  
 
This research will be conducted in Saudi Arabia, in the Haramain High Speed Railway 
Project. This research will be a case study research Employing a qualitative data. The data 
collection methods will include: semi-structured interviews, field notes (observation), 
Document review (notes taking). This data collection is a follow up to the collected data 
previously. 
 
The methodology will consist of the following steps: 
Semi-structured interviews: 
- The participants will be interviewed individually.  
- The semi-structured interviews will be voice recorded to be used for the purpose of 
this research only. 
- All interviewees are English speakers. Therefore, all interviews will be conducted in 
English language.  
- The semi-structured interviews will be transcribed and analysed within the research 
themes. 
- The analysis will include the gathered noted from the observation and document 
review.  
- All notes to be taken by the researcher will be noted in English language.  
- Field notes and document review data collection methods will be conducted to 
collect data that will substantiate the data analysis from the semi-structured 
interviews to answers the research question.  
- Observation notes will include: notes from construction sites, general practices and 
from general meetings.  
- Document review will include: reviewing planning documents, project management 
software and general project document – in areas and themes required for this 
study. 
- This study is investigating in stakeholders relationships (agency theory); the 
participants are not required to have any previous knowledge about agency 
theory. All terms will be used in the process of data collection (including the 
consent form) are general managerial terms that are understandable and do not 




7. DOES THE PROJECT INVOLVE PARTICIPATION OF PEOPLE OTHER THAN THE  
RESEARCHERS AND SUPERVISORS? 
  
          Yes    No     
 
Note: ‘Participation’ includes both active participation (such as when participants take part in 
an interview) and cases where participants take part in the study without their knowledge and 
consent at the time (for example, in crowd behaviour research). 
 
If you have answered NO please go to Section 18. If you have answered YES to this 
question please complete all the following sections. 
 
 
8. PARTICIPANTS AS THE SUBJECTS OF THE RESEARCH 
Describe the number of participants and important characteristics (such as age, 
gender, location, affiliation, level of fitness, intellectual ability etc.). Specify any 







The semi-structured interview sample will comprise 21 participants in three different 
locations within the project; Three administration consultants (employed by the client), 
client representative and his project manager * 3 locations, contractor and his project 
manager *3 locations, and executive consultant and his project manager *3 locations. 
 
- The gender of all participants is male – due to cultural and traditional principals in 
this field of work. 
- All participants are aged over 18. 
- All participants are located within the area of the project and physically fit.  
- All participants are intellectually able to contribute to the research and specialised 
in their area of work.  
 
9. RECRUITMENT 
Please state clearly how the participants will be identified, approached and 
recruited. Include any relationship between the investigator(s) and participant(s) 
(e.g. instructor-student). 
 




The researcher has been given a written permission from the President of the project 
(Harmain Project President – Saudi Railway Organisation) to conduct the data collection 
within the Harmain High-speed Railway Project for the purpose of this research. This 
permission has been obtained after an official request has been submitted from the 
researcher’s sponsor (King Abdul Aziz University).  
 
Both letters Attached.  
 
10. CONSENT  
 
a) Describe the process that the investigator(s) will be using to obtain valid 
consent. If consent is not to be obtained explain why. If the participants are 
minors or for other reasons are not competent to consent, describe the proposed 
alternate source of consent, including any permission / information letter to be 
provided to the person(s) providing the consent. 
 
 
A signed consent form (Copy attached) will be obtained from the participants who agree 
to participate in the research. This is in order to work with and voice-record the semi-
structured interview.  
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     Note: Attach a copy of the Participant Information Sheet (if applicable), the 
Consent Form (if applicable), the content of any telephone script (if 
applicable) and any other material that will be used in the consent process. 
 
  b) Will the participants be deceived in any way about the purpose of the study?
 Yes  No  
 
 If yes, please describe the nature and extent of the deception involved. Include 








11. PARTICIPANT FEEDBACK 
Explain what feedback/ information will be provided to the participants after 
participation in the research. (For example, a more complete description of the 
purpose of the research, or access to the results of the research). 
   
 
After the completion of this project, I will provide the Saudi Railway organisation with a 
written report of my findings. Also, the participants may receive a copy as well. My contact 
details will be on the consent form for any feedback.  
  
12. PARTICIPANT WITHDRAWAL  
a) Describe how the participants will be informed of their right to withdraw from 
the project.  
 
 
The right to withdraw from participating in the semi-structured interview will be explained 
in the consent form. If for any reason, any participants prefer not participate after the 
interview has started, I will remind them of their right to withdraw. 
 
N.B. The last date (deadline) for participants to wish to withdraw the data they have 
provided for the purpose of this research is the date of the thesis submission (31/08/2017).  
 
b) Explain any consequences for the participant of withdrawing from the study 
and indicate what will be done with the participant’s data if they withdraw. 
 
 
There will be no consequences for the participants; their opportunity to withdraw will be 












Will participants receive compensation for participation? 
i) Financial        
 Yes  No  
ii) Non-financial        Yes  No 
 










14. CONFIDENTIALITY  
     
a) Will all participants be anonymous?     
 Yes  No  
 
b) Will all data be treated as confidential?     Yes 
 No  
 
Note: Participants’ identity/data will be confidential if an assigned ID code or 
number is used, but it will not be anonymous. Anonymous data cannot be 
traced back to an individual participant. 
 
Describe the procedures to be used to ensure anonymity of participants 
and/or confidentiality of data both during the conduct of the research and in 
the release of its findings. 
 
 
I will allocate numbered labels to all participants (e.g. PC – Staff 1; PCO – Staff 1; PCON 
– Staff 1). These numbered labels will be used throughout the research (collecting and 
presenting the data). A list with the participants’ names and labels will be kept in a secure, 
locked location. The list will be kept for 10 years after the project completion. The list will 
be accessible only to the researcher. Nothing will be included in the report, which might 
identify any of the participants.  
 
Although there is a low number of participants involved in this study, it is impossible that 
participants will be identifiable to other participants in the study for the following reasons: 
- The organisation which is targeted for the data collection is a very large organisation, 
composed of multiple number of contractors and field sub-contractors who are 
allocated in multiple locations (field sites and offices), and performing different 
tasks.  
- This is the second stage of data collection trip for the purpose of this research.  
- The selected sample does not involved two participants from the same department. 
- The researcher will keep the confidentiality and anonymity of participants thoroughly 






If participant anonymity or confidentiality is not appropriate to this research 
project, explain, providing details of how all participants will be advised of the 









15. STORAGE, ACCESS AND DISPOSAL OF DATA 
 Describe what research data will be stored, where, for what period of time, the 
measures that will be put in place to ensure security of the data, who will have 
access to the data, and the method and timing of disposal of the data.  
 
 
In accordance with the university’s code of practice for research all data collected will be 
preserved and accessible for ten years after the completion of the project. All forms of data 
(notes, voice records, correspondence and list of participants) will be preserved in a secure 
location. The researcher will be the only person having access to these forms of data. After 
ten years, the documents will be destroyed.  
 
Any data provided by participants will not be held against them, or shared with any third 
party within their organisation in any circumstances. The researcher will keep all 
participants’ information anonymously. Therefore, there are no negative consequences for 





16. OTHER APPROVALS REQUIRED? e.g. Criminal Records Bureau (CRB) checks or 
NHS R&D  
             approvals.  
 
 YES  NO  NOT APPLICABLE 
 





Outline the potential significance and/or benefits of the research  
 
 
- To identify areas, where agent’s opportunistic behaviour lead to project failure.  
  
- To identify week project management practices, which increase the potential of 
agent’s opportunism. 
 
- To find out if agency theory addresses the identified agency problems in Saudi Arabia. 
 


















 a) Outline any potential risks to INDIVIDUALS, including research staff, research 
participants, other individuals not involved in the research and the measures that 




Some participants may feel concerned or uncomfortable of being voice recorded 
while being interviewed. The researcher will take steps to allay any concerns by 
stating clearly the purpose of the research, by assuring confidentiality, 
anonymity, by telling them that the researcher is the only person to review the 
data, and by allowing the interviewee to withdraw at any time.  
 
 b) Outline any potential risks to THE ENVIRONMENT and/or SOCIETY and the 
measures that will be taken to minimise any risks and the procedures to be 











19. ARE THERE ANY OTHER ETHICAL ISSUES RAISED BY THE RESEARCH? 
 
 Yes  No  
 
 If yes, please specify 
 
 
Saudi Arabia is a country with strict social codes that include privacy and confidentiality. 
The researcher is a Saudi citizen and will ensure that all approvals from the relevant 
authority will be obtained prior to commencement.  
 
 
20. EXPERT REVIEWER/OPINION 
 
You may be asked to nominate an expert reviewer for certain types of project, 
including those of an interventional nature or those involving significant risks. If 
you anticipate that this may apply to your work and you would like to nominate an 




























Please mark if the study involves any of the following: 
 
 Vulnerable groups, such as children and young people aged under 18 years, those with learning 
disability, or cognitive impairments  
 
 Research that induces or results in or causes anxiety, stress, pain or physical discomfort, or poses 
a risk of harm to participants (which is more than is expected from everyday life)  
 
 Risk to the personal safety of the researcher  
 
 Deception or research that is conducted without full and informed consent of the participants at 
time study is carried out  
 
 Administration of a chemical agent or vaccines or other substances (including vitamins or food 
substances) to human participants.  
 
 Production and/or use of genetically modified plants or microbes  
 
 Results that may have an adverse impact on the environment or food safety  
 
 Results that may be used to develop chemical or biological weapons  
 
 
Please check that the following documents are attached to your application.  
 
 ATTACHED NOT 
APPLICABLE 
Recruitment advertisement     
Participant information sheet     
Consent form     
Questionnaire      
Interview Schedule 
  







22. DECLARATION BY APPLICANTS 
 
I submit this application on the basis that the information it contains is confidential 
and will be used by the 
University of Birmingham for the purposes of ethical review and monitoring of the 
research project described  
herein, and to satisfy reporting requirements to regulatory bodies. The information 
will not be used for any 
other purpose without my prior consent. 
 
 
I declare that: 
 The information in this form together with any accompanying information is 
complete and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief and I take full 
responsibility for it. 
 I undertake to abide by University Code of Practice for Research 
(http://www.as.bham.ac.uk/legislation/docs/COP_Research.pdf) alongside any 
other relevant professional bodies’ codes of conduct and/or ethical guidelines. 
 I will report any changes affecting the ethical aspects of the project to the 
University of Birmingham Research Ethics Officer. 
 I will report any adverse or unforeseen events which occur to the relevant 
Ethics Committee via the University of Birmingham Research Ethics Officer. 
 
 










   
Please now save your completed form, print a copy for your records, and then email a 
copy to the Research Ethics Officer, at aer-ethics@contacts.bham.ac.uk. As noted 































APPENDIX 9: CONSENT FORM FOR INTERVIEWEE 
 
CONSENT FORM FOR INTERVIEWEE 
 
UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM 
 
STUDY ON PROJECT MANAGEMENT 
 
Dear Mr/Mrs 
My name is Abdullah Alsabban and I am a Researcher in the area of 
project management. I am currently conducting research for a PhD degree 
at the University of Birmingham Business School.  
 
The subject of my research is to identify causes of project failure that is 
related to Stakeholder relationship. As you know, project failure can be 
caused by many factors. My study will identify the factors that concern 
with Stakeholder relationship. To do this work, it will be necessary to voice 
record (for later reference) the interview. As the researcher, my role will be 
collecting the required data for the research only. I will not have any 
communication or interaction with any other department of your 
organisation referring to your interview.  
  
I am writing to you now to request permission to accept the interview 








As required by the University's ‘Code of Practice for Research’, 
confidentiality and anonymity will be strictly observed. The names of the 
interviewee will not be divulged to anyone. Pseudonyms will be used in the 
final report, and there will not be anything which might identify the 
individuals who participated in this investigation. To ensure confidentiality 
and anonymity all voice-records, notes, or other written material which I 
might make in the course of this work will be stored in a secure, locked 
location and used solely for this research. I will be the only person with 
access to the storage. As required by the University's ‘Code of Practice for 
Research', all voice records and notes will be destroyed after ten years.  
 
 If, after initially agreeing, you later wish to withdraw from the study you 
may do so at any point. If you withdraw you can still be informed about the 
findings when the research is completed. I will be writing my observations 
and findings in the thesis for my PhD degree. 
 
N.B. The last date (deadline) for participants to wish to withdraw the data 
they have provided for the purpose of this research is the date of the thesis 
submission (31/08/2017). 
 
Please tick the box below to indicate whether you/are not willing to be 
involved in the study. 
 
I am willing to participate in the study                                      
I will not participate in the study                                               








Should you require any further information about the study please contact 
me by email on  Or you may call me; my phone 
number is  
 
 
Academic supervisor details: 
 
Dr. Mark Hall 
PHD Senior Lecturer 
Birmingham Business School 
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